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Issues in the Testing, Recruiting, and Selection 
of American Military Officers 
by 
Mark J. Eitelberg, Janice H. Laurence, and Dianne C. Brown 
America's military officers, leaders of nearly two-million uniformed warriors 
and technicians, managers of multi-billion dollar budgets, have been described in 
the popular press as "the mind and soul of the vast machine that is the chief 
guardian of the nation and the democracies of the West." They are called "brass"-
three-hundred thousand men and women who have pledged "life, fortune, and 
sacred honor" in service to their country, trained in the management of violence, 
holding a mighty key to the success or failure of the nation's defense. 
Who are these people who occupy such an unusual position of influence over 
our lives, and how were they chosen for the task? What tests or measures of ability 
are being used for selection? How do officers fit into the general stream of American 
life-before, during, and after their time in Service? These are all important 
questions that have somehow managed to escape public scrutiny. 
In Becoming Brass, Eitelberg, Laurence, and Brown explore the answers to 
these questions, looking specifically at: the demographic characteristics of officers 
and their comparative "quality," as measured by scores on the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT); current trends and prospects in officer recruiting and the possible 
influence of testing on the future composition of the officer corps; and the major 
routes by which individuals become officers, paying special attention to the role of 
standardized tests in the process. In addition, the authors attempt to weigh the 
benefits and burdens of military service for officers-opportunities gained and lost-
demonstrating the uniqueness of the military as an institution and the profession of 
arms as a way of life. 
Demography and "Quality'' 
The authors observe that "the demographic characteristics of today's officers 
are probably one of the military's best-kept secrets-not because the information 
isn't there to be seen, but because very few people outside of the defense establish-
ment itself are concerned enough to look." Several factors are cited that may account 
for the apparent lack of interest in officers-including the perception that a college 
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education implies the ability to command (and virtually all officers are college 
graduates). Added to this is the understanding that measures of "quality" for many 
officers have less to do with technical expertise and job proficiency than with 
leadership effectiveness; and years of research have still produced no agreement on 
which personal traits are most needed for one to become an effective leader. 
Eitelberg and his associates take a closer look at the officer corps and find that 
over 80 percent of its members are white men. Women comprise about 11 percent of 
all officers, and minorities (male and female) account for just under that proportion. 
Approximately 11 percent of Army officers are black, in contrast to proportions of 
between 3 and 5 percent in the other Services and 6.5 percent defense-wide. At the 
same time, all Services have equally small proportions of Hispanics at 2 percent or 
below. There is noticeably greater racial or ethnic diversity among women than 
among men-owing to the fact that 21 percent of all black officers are women, along 
with up to 15 percent of other minority groups. 
The authors also attempt to explore the socioeconomic nature of the officer 
corps. They find that there is continuing movement toward "democratization," a 
trend that was first recognized over 30 years ago. The authors point to evidence 
suggesting that "today's officers come from a wide spectrum of socioeconomic back-
grounds-clustered somewhere in the middle class" and possibly "slightly over-
representative of the lower social and economic classes." 
Through the aid of a new data base (linking Department of Defense comput-
erized personnel files with records maintained by the Educational Testing Service), 
Eitelberg and his associates were able to analyze the SAT scores of about 56 percent 
of all officers commissioned from 1975 through 1985. Comparisons between the SAT 
scores of officers and those of the general population indicate that the scores of 
officers are considerably higher. For example, officers commissioned in 1985 had an 
SAT score (combined Verbal and Math) of 1046, compared with a score of 890 for 
high school seniors tested in 1980 (roughly the year in which these officers would 
have been tested). By converting SAT point scores to percentile scores, -the authors 
were able to further study the comparative performance of officers on this test. The 
results reveal that officers as a whole score well above the national average: about 
75 percent of all Army officers commissioned from 1975 through 1985 scored above 
the 50th percentile, in addition to 78 percent of Marine Corps officers, 83 percent of 
Air Force officers, and 90 percent of those in the Navy. The SAT scores for officers 
tend to be highest among those assigned to occupations in the Scientist and 
Professional, Engineering and Maintenance, and Intelligence areas-and lowest 
among those serving in Supply and Procurement, Health Care, and Administration. 
A study of the SAT scores at colleges hosting ROTC programs similarly shows 
that ROTC units are situated at "above-average" institutions. The authors observe 
that the advantage held by ROTC colleges is greater on the SAT Math than on the 
Verbal, reflecting the military's preference for officers with scientific and technical 
interests. In addition, the Navy is found to have ROTC host units at the most 
competitive schools (on average) of all Services-with an SAT score of 1083 
(combined Verbal and Math), compared with a national average ofless than 950 for 
all college freshmen. 
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Testing and Selection 
The central focus of Becoming Brass is the process by which officers are 
selected, especially with regard to the use of standardized testing. Eitelberg and his 
associates introduce the subject by providing a brief history of the various tests 
currently being used to screen officer candidates. The American military is a pioneer 
in the field of aptitude testing, with a rich history dating back to World War I. 
However, the aptitude testing of officers is found to be a more recent development 
that has its origins in aviation screening. Furthermore, in contrast to the enlisted 
force, there is no single aptitude test or battery for selecting officers. As the authors 
point out, there are at least a dozen different tests now being used to screen for 
officer commissioning programs. These tests vary in number and type because the 
programs in which they are used have different purposes: some are for college 
students, others for college graduates; and some are for "all-purpose" officers, while 
others may be for pilots or navigators. The SAT and the ACT (American College 
Test) are used in screening high school graduates for the military's college programs 
because completion of college is an important first step in becoming an officer. The 
military's other tests are designed mainly for college graduates. 
The authors proceed to review current research on the relationship between 
aptitude test scores and officer performance, concentrating on the criteria used to 
develop the tests and set minimum standards. Each of the Armed Services operates 
independently in the commissioning of its officers, and each employs its own 
methods and procedures that not only differ across Services, but by the particular 
precommissioning programs within a Service as well. The available research reflects 
these differences, and aptitude measures currently being used are related in varying 
degrees to offic:er performance. 
The strongest relationships between test results and performance are found for 
students in college or military training. However, evidence also exists that aptitude 
tests can predict training attrition, military performance ratings, and other 
measures for new officers. Eitelberg and his associates attempted to see if a 
relationship exists between SAT scores and officer performance. A preliminary 
analysis showed the following: the SAT mean scores of officers promoted to grade 
0-2 or 0-3 (0-1 is the lowest commissioned grade) are higher than those of officers 
who were not promoted to these grades; there is very little difference in longevity of 
service between officers who scored above the 50th percentile and those who did not; 
and officers who scored above the 50th percentile were less likely than those who 
scored below average to experience "short service" Gess than 4 years). Nevertheless, 
the authors considered the results "inconclusive" because of the many unknown 
factors that may have influenced officer performance. 
The authors emphasize that testing is just one dimension of a larger selection 
process within each of the Services. In fact, all programs rely heavily on the "whole 
person" method for evaluating applicants. There are differences between programs 
in the amount of weight given test scores-depending on the education level of the 
applicant-but test scores alone do not decide who is admitted or rejected from 
participating. Final decisions on applicants are based on a variety of factors. At the 
same time, a military officer's first job hinges more on his or her major in college 
and personal preferences than on anything else; and, precommissioning test results 
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are not known to play a role in personnel decisions affecting officers. The authors 
conclude that, generally, the Armed Services have been successful in the way they 
handle their officer programs-so much so that many elements of the programs 
"could be held up as a model for other organizations to follow." 
Opportunities 
Eitelberg and his associates cite several unresolved issues concerning oppor-
tunities for women and minorities in the officer corps, including: the fact that 
members of these groups are still concentrated in certain lower-status job 
categories; the continuing problem of differences between the promotion rates for 
minorities and those for male whites; the persistent difficulties of all Services, 
except the Army, in attracting racial/ethnic minorities, and possible weaknesses in 
recruiting strategies; and the continuing need-for the nation as a whole-to 
provide better opportunities for minorities to attend and complete college. 
In their attempt to define the opportunities of being an officer, Eitelberg and 
his associates stress that military service can be both demanding and highly 
rewarding. It is clearly not for everyone, they write. They go on to contrast the 
public's image of the American officer with the reality and the considerable demands 
placed on officers for geographic mobility, separation from family, and other 
personal and family sacrifices. Within this context, the authors also review studies 
comparing civilian pay levels to those in the military, concluding that there "seems 
to be more confusion than consensus over how the whole of military compensation 
should be measured"-and how to relate the unique conditions of military service 
(known as the "X factor") to pay. The authors likewise find a public misconception 
regarding the benefits of military retirement-with available evidence indicating 
that retired officers may be at a financial and (second) career disadvantage when 
compared with their civilian counterparts. In addition, studies suggest that 
differences between the prestige structures of the military and civilian society result 
in a relationship such that "what gets you ahead in the military tends to hold you 
back in civilian working life, and vice versa." 
All of this underscores a major point made by the authors: the profession of 
arms, as much as it has changed over the past few decades, is "still unlike any other 
job society has to offer"; and that "the peculiar dimensions of military service have 
worked to produce a set of related benefits and burdens for officers that are equally 
distinct." Screening officer candidates, then, is as different from screening civilian 
employees as there are differences between the military and civilian society-
because the objective, as the authors point out, is to select people who will be well-
suited for both a military job and a military way oflife. 
In discussing the process of selecting officers, Eitelberg and his associates 
explore "pathways to a successful military career." From the perspective of a general 
or an admiral, the authors find that one of the best routes is through a Service 
academy. In fact, academy graduates tend to remain in the military longer; and, 
although they represent just one out of six new officers each year, they account for 
one out of three general and flag officers, with increasingly larger proportions at the 
top. (Although history shows that the proportion of general and flag officers who are 
academy graduates has declined considerably over the past several decades.) 
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In a 1984 Gallup poll, a sample of generals and admirals were asked to identify 
the "social origins" of their family when they were growing up. Approximately 19 
percent claimed to have been raised in a lower-class family. Very few officers, 
regardless of background, get to wear a general's star on their shoulder-yet, as an 
eminent sociologist observed over 30 years ago, the military does offer "opportunities 
for social mobility to the dedicated and to the proficient, even if they are of lowly 
origin." In their conclusion, Eitelberg and his associates find that this is one facet of 
military service that hasn't changed-but "it will take continuing vigilance and 
adherence to the principles of equal opportunity, continuing efforts in behalf of those 
of 'lowly origin,' to make a good thing even better." 
Becoming Brass (1989) is approximately 160 pages with 45 tables. The study 
was supported by the National Commission on Testing and Public Policy, University 
of California at Berkeley. 
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Publication Update (2020) 
This monograph was the subject of a cover story in Navy Times: 
"Brains on Board," Navy Times, 14 August 1989, pp. 14-16. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers later published an edited and revised version of the monograph: 
Eitelberg, Mark J., Laurence, Janice H. and Brown, Dianne C. "Becoming Brass: Issues in the 
Testing, Recruiting, and Selection of American Military Officers" in Test Policy in Defense: 
Lessons from the Military for Education, Training and Employment. Edited by Bernard Gifford 
and Linda Wing. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, pp. 79-219. 
In 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers merged with Springer Science+Business Media, 
commonly known as Springer. 
The Springer publication is available (PDF, eBook, or Physical Book) for purchase at: Chapter 
(https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-2970-1 _ 2); and Book 
(https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-011-2970-1 ). 
Eitelberg M.J., Laurence J.H., Brown D.C. (1992) Becoming Brass: Issues in the Testing, 
Recruiting, and Selection of American Military Officers. In: Gifford B.R., Wing L.C. (eds) Test 
Policy in Defense. Evaluation in Education and Human Services, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. 
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They run the largest enterprise in the United States and the most 
lethal military establishment in the world. They spend more than 31 per-
cent of the federal budget, and their purchasing decisions can make or 
break the economies of whole regions. In the nuclear age, they literally 
hold the fate of the earth in their hands-for despite the tradition of civil-
ian control and an elaborate system of safeguards, they can begin a 
nuclear war without any real interference from the nation's elected 
officials. They are America's military elite-the 299,000 officers of the 
Army, the Navy, the Air Force and Marines, the mind and soul of the vast 
machine that is the chief guardian of the nation and the democracies of 
the West.I 
America's military brass, leaders of nearly two million uniformed warriors and 
technicians, managers of multi-billion dollar budgets, are a "commanding" group 
indeed. These are the men and women to whom we have entrusted our nation's front 
line of defense. They run our ships, fly our planes, control our missiles, and direct 
our children in battle. We give them the authority to make or carryout some of our 
nation's most important decisions, judgments that can affect the lives of many, 
including ourselves. 
Who are these officers, the people Newsweek calls the "mind and soul" of Amer-
ica's vast military machine? How are they chosen? What tests or measures of ability 
are being used to select new members for the military's corps of officers? And how do 
these people fit into the general stream of American life-before, during, and after 
their time in service? 
These are all interesting questions, one would assume, given the importance of 
military officers within the framework of our national security. Unfortunately, as 
most researchers in this area soon discover, the officer corps has rarely been exam-
ined in much detail. There are very few descriptive studies of the military's officers, 
and even fewer studies of the manner in which officers are selected, trained, and put 
to work for the country. 
1"The New Warriors," Newsweek, 9 July 1984, p. 32. 
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In 1987, the National Commission on Testing and Public Policy was established 
with major funding provided by the Ford Foundation. The Commission is currently 
engaged in a three-year, policy-oriented investigation of the role of tests in the allo-
cation of opportunities in education, training, and employment. 
One area of interest to the Commission is the relationship between testing and 
individual opportunities for service as a military officer. Specifically, the Com-
mission expressed interest in the following subjects: 
1) The demographic characteristics of the nation's military officers 
over the past several years; 
2) The testing policies of the various military services regarding the 
identification, selection, education, training, and promotion of 
officers; 
3) The relationship between officer candidate test scores and perfor-
mance in educational and training programs, as well as promotion 
to high levels ofleadership; 
4) The socioeconomic costs and benefits attached to being an active or 
retired military officer; and 
5) The implications of the military's policies and practices for testing 
and opportunity allocation in the civilian sector. 
The present study was undertaken at the request of the National Commission 
to explore these five areas. 
A NOTE ON THE OFFICER CORPS TODAY 
As of January 1988, there were over 2.1 million men and women on active duty 
in the American Armed Forces, including about 290,000 commissioned officers and 
over 14,000 academy cadets. More than two-thirds of all commissioned officers could 
be found in either the Air Force (37 percent) or the Army (32 percent). Approxi-
mately 24 percent were serving in the Navy, and just over 6 percent were in the 
Marine Corps. 
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The commissioned ranks and their respective pay grades in the Armed Forces 
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Almost three out of four officers in the active duty military are within the 
grades of0-2 through 0-4, with the majority of these at the level of0-3. The percent-
age distribution of officers by pay grade is bell-shaped from 0-1 through 0-5, as 
shown below. A relatively small proportion of officers are found in the grade of 0-6, 
while fewer than one-half of one percent are in the very highest grades of 0-7 
through 0-10:2 
Marine Air All 
Pay Grade Army Navy Corps Force Services 
0-10 • • • • • 
0-9 0.1 • • • • 
0-8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0-7 0.2 . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0-6 5.0 5.5 3.5 5.3 5.1 
0-5 12.0 11.3 8.8 11.7 11.5 
0-4 18.3 19.8 17.5 18.4 18.7 
0-3 37.2 33.1 33.4 39.3 36.8 
0-2 18.4 14.6 21.9 14.1 16.1 
0-1 8.7 15.3 14.5 10.9 11.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
• Less than 0.05 percent 
2Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; and Defense 88, 
September/October 1988, p. 27. 
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OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Section 2 of the monograph lays the basic foundation for the study by present-
ing a demographic portrait of the officer corps, highlighting measures such as sex, 
age, racial/ethnic group, and education. The primary focus is on the demographic 
characteristics of officers by occupational group, which provides greater insight to 
the possible effects of officer testing and selection on career opportunities. Section 2 
closes with a brief examination (from limited evidence) of the possible changes that 
have taken place in the socioeconomic background of officers. 
The military's commissioning programs are described in Section 3. The entry 
standards for these programs are then discussed, with special emphasis on the use 
of standardized tests. This leads to a review of the development and validation of 
the specific aptitude tests currently employed by the Armed Forces in selecting 
officer candidates. The material on test validation includes a preliminary analysis of 
the relationship between scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and various indica-
tors of officer performance. Section 3 closes with a brieflook at the perceptions and 
reality of what it takes to become a general or admiral in today's military. 
Section 4 takes advantage of a new data base, created by merging Department 
of Defense computerized files on military officers with Educational Testing Service 
files on persons who have taken the Scholastic Aptitude Test. The new data base is 
described and then used to evaluate the comparative "quality" of military officers 
over time. Occupational differences are also examined, with special emphasis placed 
on the test performance of officers in different demographic categories. 
Current trends and prospects in officer recruiting-especially among women 
and minorities-are explored in Section 5. The recent experiences of the military 
academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs serve as the focal 
point for a discussion of the possible role of testing in determining the future 
composition of the officer corps. The Army's ROTC program-the largest of all 
Services-is used as a case study. 
The benefits and burdens of military service for officers are then reviewed in 
Section 6, separating the "image" from the "reality." Opportunities gained and lost--
ranging from public prestige to military retirement-are defined and weighed in an 
effort to describe the uniqueness of the military as an institution and the profession 
of arms as a way oflife. 
The study concludes with Section 7, in which the authors probe the policy 
implications of the military's methods for screening officer candidates. In addition, 
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the authors evaluate possible changes or areas for improving current practices in 
recruiting, selecting, and assigning officers. 
Becoming Brass responds to a request for research made by the Commission on 
Testing and Public Policy. It has a broad scope that extends beyond the boundaries 
of the subtitle. This was the intention of the Commission, because very little infor-
mation is available to the general public on the officer corps-and because, to fully 
understand the policies that determine who will be a military officer, one must have 
some knowledge of the institution itself, its operations, its people, its purpose, its 
traditions, and its place in society. As the reader will also discover, portions of the 
text are devoted specifically to the conditions of selection and service for women and 
minorities. This is a natural direction of the research. When one sets out to study 
"the allocation of opportunities in education, training, and employment," a clear dis-
tinction will eventually be drawn between those who "have" and those who "have 
less." In the military, as in other sectors of employment, opportunities often vary by 
sex and across racial/ethnic lines; and issues involving equality of opportunity, 
though applicable to all persons, have tended to focus on women and minorities. The 
point should not be lost, however, that the employment opportunities of others can 
be similarly affected by the military's testing practices and personnel policies. 
This section on "background" begins with a rather dramatic quotation from 
Newsweek, placing military officers in a position of power, control, and importance 
second, perhaps, only to our highest elected officials(" ... they literally hold the fate 
of the earth in their hands"). Of course, not every officer has the power to start a 
nuclear war; not every second lieutenant is "the old man"; and not every.captain is a 
"skipper." Most officers work at mundane jobs, just like their counterparts on the 
civilian side-and very few get to be the "mind and soul" of America's "vast 
machine." 
But one must realize that the leaders of the modern military, collectively, hold 
an unusual position of influence over our lives. As the recruiting advertisement 
states, "we're not a company, we're your country." This isn't General Motors or IBM 
or McDonald's. This is, as Adam Yarmolinsky observes, a massive and far-reaching 
institution without parallel in this country: 
The United States military establishment is the largest institutional 
complex within the United States government. It is so much larger than 
all other institutions of government that its operations and its impacts--
on the economy, on class and racial minorities, on science and research, 
on higher education, on the legal system of justice, on the national 
scheme of values-are literally of another order of magnitude. Not only 
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is it larger but it is more pervasive than any other governmental institu-
tion except the Post Office and the Internal Revenue Service, extending 
its impacts into almost every community in the United States.a 
It is with this understanding that the questions of officer selection and testing 
take on new meaning and importance-not just from the perspective of the individ-
ual and the allocation of opportunities, but from the standpoint of society as a whole. 
These are, after all, not just people in jobs, but people in national service, leaders 
and managers who have dedicated a portion of their working life to the security and 
defense of the country. 
3 Adam Yannolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1973), p. 327. Some may disagree that any institution is more pervasive--0r has a greater impact on the 
American people-than the military. Indeed, the Department of Defense has a direct influence on the livelihood 




A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT OF OFFICERS 
IN THE MODERN MILITARY 
The demographic characteristics of today's officers are probably one of mili-
tary's best-kept secrets--not because the information isn't there to be seen, but 
because very few people outside of the defense establishment itself are concerned 
enough to look. When the draft came to an official end in June 1973, most eyes were 
directed squarely on the military's rank and file: would the enlisted force, as some 
had predicted, become grossly unrepresentative of the nation as a whole; would 
there be a disproportion of disadvantaged youths and minorities, pressed into 
service by the invisible hand of their own poverty; would the ranks come to resemble 
a band of "hired guns," mercenaries, who had little stake in the society they were 
pledged to defend? 
At the same time, there was some expression of interest in the military's corps 
of officers-to the extent that the combined processes of self-selection or self-
recruitment, negative retention, and professional socialization could act to homoge-
nize military membership.1 The unidimensional, in-bred force, so it went, would 
eventually place a severe strain on civil-military relations.2 This particular issue 
led to various small studies of the geographical origins, social backgrounds, and 
general attitudes of officers. 3 
There has also been some discussion over the past twenty years regarding the 
racial or ethnic content of the officer corps. However, as Binkin and Eitelberg point 
out, the social composition of the enlisted ranks (where blacks have been 
overrepresented since the end of the draft) has generally received much more 
1 Negative retention is the continuous process by which those who do not "fit in" are not promoted or 
choose voluntarily to leave the military. See Morris Janowitz, "The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft," Adelphi 
Papers, No. 94 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1973); Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer 
Military as a 'Sociopolitical' Problem," Social Problems 22 (February 1975): 432-439; and Jerald Bachman, John 
D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All- 11olunteer Force: A Study of ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 72-77, 75, 141-142. 
2A brief treatment appears in Mark J. Eitelberg and Martin Binkin, "Military Service in American 
Society," in A. J. Goodpaster, et al., eds., Toward a Consensus on Military Service (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon 
Press, 1982), pp. 244-246. 
3Literature on "homogenization" is reviewed in Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force. The 
Service academies have also produced a number of studies concerning the backgrounds and origins of their 
students. 
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attention.4 From available information, it appears that most of the people now 
keeping track of the racial or ethnic composition of the officer corps are its civilian 
and military leadership-and their interests lie mainly in finding ways to boost 
participation by minorities. More recently, equal opportunity specialists have been 
busy monitoring promotion rates, assignment issues, and possible problems of 
institutional discrimination. 5 
Nevertheless, the demographic characteristics of the officer corps have not been 
a very popular subject in manpower research literature--and, with a few notable 
exceptions, the level and degree of attention given to the enlisted ranks has far out-
weighed that devoted to officers.6 This may be the case because there are more than 
7 times as many enlistees as there are officers. More to the point, the officer corps is 
viewed as a higher profession, as a specialized activity for well-qualified leaders, 
experts, and managers-and a place, unlike the enlisted force, where citizenship 
does not necessarily imply the right or responsibility of service. 7 
Most of the statistics presented in this section were derived from special tabu-
lations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), located in 
Monterey, California. The data sources include the Officer Master and Loss File, the 
Officer Cohort File, and the Officer Accession File. The demographic portrait 
painted here is actually just a rough sketch of the active duty military-highlighting 
measures such as sex, age, racial/ethnic group, and education within different pay 
4Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg; with Alvin J. Schexnider and Marvin M. Smith, Blacks and the 
Military (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 59. 
5See, for example, Richard Halloran, "Navy is Studying Bias in Promotions," New York Times, 23 July 
1988. 
6In 1974, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Office of the Secretary of Defense to submit 
annual reports to Congress on the demographic, educational, and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals in 
the military's active duty enlisted force. The Department of Defense continues to comply with this requirement, 
each year presenting more detailed and comprehensive material. No similar report is either required or 
produced on the officer corps. 
7 See Eitelberg and Binkin, Military Service for a discussion of the American "tradition." This idea is 
perhaps best exemplified by the histcry of the draft-used during critical periods tc recruit physicians into the 
officer corps, but otherwise not applied directly as a method for obtaining officers. (Although, obviously, the draft 
benefited the officer corps by attracting persons who sought tc avoid being conscripted.) Histcry also shows a 
tendency to describe the officer corps as a profession for the select few. An extreme variant of this view is held by 
some British officers who believe that the leadership qualities necessary to win battles are natural, not 
manufactured, traits-that good officers come from a social class and a school heritage that has prepared them 
for leadership. (The last point is from a personal communication with H. Wallace Sinaiko of the Smithsonian 
Institution, 27 January 1989.) 
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grades or occupations. A final subsection then explores the possible changes that 
have taken place over the past several years in the socioeconomic background of 
officers. In addition, information on demographic characteristics is presented in 
Sections 4 and 5, including detailed data on Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 
enrollees and the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of active duty officers. 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: COMPOSITION BY SEX 
AND RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP, FAMILY PATTERNS 
As shown in Table 1, there are currently about 286,000 commissioned officers 
on active duty. Just over one out often officers are women (11.0 percent), and almost 
the same proportion of the total are minorities (10.8 percent). Overall, white men 
make up over 80 percent of the officer corps. 
The proportion of all officers who are black is 6.5 percent, and the proportion 
who are Hispanic is 1.8 percent. The percentages of minority officers vary 
considerably by sex, with relatively greater racial/ethnic diversity in the population 
of female officers. For example: 5.8 percent of male officers are black, compared with 
12.6 percent of female officers; and, overall, just over 10 percent of white officers are 
women, while women comprise more than double that proportion (21.3 percent) of 
black officers. For all officers as well, the proportion who are minorities is almost 
twice as high among women (18.1 percent) as it is among men (9.9 percent). 
Table 2 provides a much more detailed view of the sex composition of the officer 
corps, showing percentages by pay grade within each of the Armed Services. As seen 
here, the overall proportion of women is highest in the Army (12.1 percent), followed 
by the Air Force (11.9 percent), and the Navy 10.4 percent). The smallest proportion 
is found in the Marine Corps, where there are fewer than 600 female officers, mak-
ing up 3.2 percent of the total. 
Within each Service, the highest concentration of female officers can be found 
in the junior grades of 0-1 through 0-3. Here, more than 15 percent of officers in the 
both the Army and the Air Force are women, while the overall proportion is 13. 7 
percent. At the same time, the proportion of officers who are women declines 
considerably in the higher ranks: just 6.2 percent of all officers in pay grades 0-4 
through 0-6 are women, and less than a single percent (9 women in all) are general 





Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers, 
by Sex and Racial/Ethnic Group, December 1987 
Distribution Across Racial/Ethnic Groups by Sex 
Other/ TQt!i!I 
Sex White Black Hispanic Unknown Percent Number 
Male 90.1 5.8 1.7 2.4 100.0 254,923 
Female 81.9 12.6 2.0 3.5 100.0 31,630 
Both 89.2 6.5 1.8 2.5 100.0 286,553 
Distribution Across the Sexes by Racial/Ethnic Group 
Racial/Ethnic TQt!i!I 
Group Male Female Percent Number 
White 89.9 10.1 100.0 255,484 
Black 78.7 21.3 100.0 18,730 
Hispanic 87.7 12.3 100.0 5,074 
Other/Unknown 84.8 15.2 100.0 7,265 
All Groups 89.0 11.0 100.0 286,553 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Excludes warrant officers. 
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Table 2 
Number and Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers, 
by Pay Grade, Service, and Sex, December 1987 
Pay Grade Nym!2~r P~ri.ent 
and Service Male Female Total Male Female 
0-7 through 0-10 
Army 403 4 407 99.0 1.0 
Navy 254 2 256 99.2 0.8 
Marine Corps 69 1 70 98.6 1.4 
Air Force 332 2 334 99.2 0.6 
All Services 1,058 9 1,067 99.2 0.8 
0-4 through 0-6 
Army 31,011 2,174 33,185 93.4 6.6 
Navy 22,835 1,892 24,727 92.3 7.7 
Marine Corps 5,344 117 5,461 97.9 2.1 
Air Force 35,736 2,138 37,874 94.4 5.6 
All Services 94,926 6,321 101,247 93.8 6.2 
0-1 through 0-3 
Army 50,439 9,046 59,485 84.8 15.2 
Navy 37,812 5,148 42,960 88.0 12.0 
Marine Corps 12,447 477 12,924 96.3 3.7 
Air Force 58,241 10,629 68,870 84.6 15.4 
All Services 158,939 25,300 184,239 86.3 13.7 
All Pay Grades 
Army 81,853 11,224 93,077 87.9 12.1 
Navy 60,901 7,042 67,943 89.6 10.4 
Marine Corps 17,860 595 18,455 96.8 3.2 
Air Force 94,309 12,769 107,078 88.1 11.9 
All Services 254,923 31,630 286,553 89.0 11.0 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 























Table 3 shows how raciaVethnic groups are distributed by pay grade within 
each Service. As seen here, the Army has by far the greatest proportion of minori-
ties-14.8 percent-compared with 9.9 percent in the Air Force, 7.9 percent in the 
Navy, and 7.7 percent in the Marine Corps. The difference between the Army and 
the other Services is mainly the result of the higher proportion of blacks in the 
Army. Overall, blacks make up 10.6 percent of the Army's officer corps, in contrast 
to proportions of between 3 and 5 percent in the other Services. 
Similar to women, the proportions of minorities generally decrease as one 
moves up the ranks: for example, 8 percent of all officers in pay grades 0-1 through 
0-3 are black, compared with 4 percent in grades 0-4 through 0-6 and 3.6 percent in 
grades 0-7 through 0-10. In the Army, about 13 percent of all junior-grade officers 
(0·1 through 0-3) are black-which, numerically (7,733), is almost 2.5 times greater 
than the total number of black officers in the entire Navy and Marine Corps com• 
bined (3,122). Overall, fewer than one in twenty (4.7 percent) of the general and flag 
officers are minorities, compared with a proportion of 10.8 percent in the aggregate 
officer corps. 
A good part of raciaVethnic disparity in the upper ranks is due to the fact that 
promotion is dependent on an individual's tenure, and much of the progress in 
minority recruitment is fairly recent. Differences by raciaVethnic group can also be 
attributed to lingering problems of equal opportunity in the military's promotion 
system, as suggested in a 1988 study by the Navy.8 Generally, newly commissioned 
officers are eligible for selection to 0-2 in two years, to 0-3 in around four years, to 0-
4 in the ninth or tenth year, and to 0-5 in the fifteenth or sixteenth year of service. 
In 1970, blacks comprised around 3 percent of officers in the Army, less than 1 
percent in the Navy, 1 percent in the Marine Corps, and just under 2 percent in the 
Air Force.9 Ten years later, the Services had noticeably higher proportions of 
blacks: 8 percent of all officers in the Army, 3 percent in the Navy, 4 percent in the 
8See Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity in the Navy (Washington 
D.C.: Chief of Naval Operations, December 1988), Chapter 4, "Career Progression." For historical perspective, 
see Larry Phillips, "OER Study Reveals Race Bias," Army Times, 8 August 1973, p. 3. This subject is further 
explored in Section 7 of the monograph, under "Opportunities and the Special Case of Minorities." 
9From Department of Defense, The Negro in the Armed Forces: A Statistical Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 1971). 
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Table 3 
Number and Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers, 
by Pay Grade, Service, and Racial/Ethnic Group, December 1987 
Pay Grade All GrO!Ji;ll:i 
and Service White Black Hispanic Other Percent Number 
0-7 through 0-10 
Army 92.1 6.9 0.2 0.7 100.0 407 
Navy 95.7 2.0 1.2 1.2 100.0 256 
Marine Corps 98.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 70 
Air Force 98.2 1.2 0.3 0.3 100.0 334 
All Services 95.3 3.6 0.5 0.7 100.0 1,067 
0-4 through 0-6 
Army 90.3 6.3 1.1 2.1 100.0 33,185 
Navy 95.1 2.2 1.0 1.6 100.0 24,727 
Marine Corps 95.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 100.0 5,461 
Air Force 93.4 3.2 1.5 2.0 100.0 37,874 
All Services 92.9 4.0 1.2 1.9 100.0 101,247 
0-1 through 0-3 
Army 82.3 13.0 1.6 3.1 100.0 59,485 
Navy 90.4 4.1 2.4 3.1 100.0 42,960 
Marine Corps 90.9 5.1 2.2 1.8 100.0 12,924 
Air Force 88.3 6.6 2.3 2.8 100.0 68,870 
All Services 87.1 8.0 2.1 2.9 100.0 184,239 
All Pay Grades 
Army 85.2 10.6 1.4 2.8 100.0 93,077 
Navy 92.1 3.4 1.9 2.6 100.0 67,943 
Marine Corps 92.3 4.4 1.8 1.5 100.0 18,455 
Air Force 90.1 5.4 2.0 2.5 100.0 107,078 
All Services 89.2 6.5 1.8 2.5 100.0 286,553 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: "Other" category includes persons who could not be identified by racial/ethnic group. Figures exclude 
warrant officers. 
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Marine Corps, and 5 percent in the Air Force.lo (Though, by 1988, only the Anny 
could show an increase in the proportion of black officers.) 
The relatively greater concentration of minorities in the lower ranks can be 
seen in Table 4. With the exception of female officers falling under the "other/ 
unknown" category, the proportion of white men and women in pay grades of 0-4 
Table 4 
Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers, 
by Pay Grade, Sex, and Racial/Ethnic Group, December 1987 
Sex and Racial/ Pall Grad~ 
Ethnic Group 0-1 thru 0-3 0-4 thru 0-6 0-7 thru 0-10 Total 
Male 
White 61.0 38.6 0.4 100.0 
Black 75.6 24.1 0.1 100.0 
Hispanic 74.3 25.6 0.1 100.0 
Other/Unknown 73.0 26.9 0.1 100.0 
All Groups 62.3 37.2 0.4 100.0 
Female 
White 78.8 21.2 * 100.0 
Black 88.2 11.8 * 100.0 
Hispanic 84.2 15.1 0.2 100.0 
Other/Unknown 76.3 23.7 0.0 100.0 
--
All Groups 80.0 20.0 * 100.0 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
"Less than 0.05 percent. 
Note: Excludes warrant officers. 
lOBinkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, p. 61. 
14 
and above are consistently greater than those for minorities of the same sex. How-
ever, there are also proportionately more men than women, regardless of 
racial/ethnic group, in pay grades beyond the level of 0-3-indicating the effects of 
relatively recent increases in the proportion of women in the military (and, to a 
lesser extent, higher rates of personnel turnover among female officers). 
The 1985 Department of Defense Survey of Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
reveals that the officer corps is a "family-oriented" organization. Approximately 75 
percent of all officers were married at the time of the survey-ranging from 70 per-
cent in the Navy to 78 percent in the Air Force. Over 60 percent of all officers were 
married with children, and another 2 percent were single parents. It was also found 
that marriage rates increased (as expected) with pay grade: in the lower pay grades 
(0-1 and 0-2), about 50 percent of officers were married, and half of those officers 
had children; in the next two pay grades (0-3 and 0-4), the rate increased to 80 per-
cent, three-quarters of whom had children; while, in the higher pay grades (0-5 and 
above), 90 percent were married, and "the great majority" had children.11 
NEW OFFICERS: AGE, EDUCATION, AND TRENDS IN COMPOSITION 
BY SEX AND RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP 
The vast majority of officers are college graduates when they receive their 
active-duty commission, as shown in Table 5. Over 80 percent of all officers 
commissioned from fiscal 1975 through 1987, according to DMDC data files, 
possessed at least a college degree. (This converts to 95 percent of all those with 
"known" education. The problem of unreported education continues, with 22 percent 
of all newly-commissioned officers in fiscal 1987 showing "unknown" education in 
Department of Defense records.)12 
11Department of Defense, Description of Officers and Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985 
(Arlington, VA:. Defense Manpower Data Center, Octcber 1986), pp. 55-61. 
12The responsibility for errors or incomplete information lies with the Armed Services. DMDC statistics 
are based on data provided by the Services themselves. For practical reasons, DMDC does not attempt tc recode 
or update information on new officers after it is submitted by the Services and entered into the record. 
Nevertheless, the Air Force points out that its policy during the 1985--<l7 period required that all new officers 
possess a college degree. The Marine Corps has similarly noted that the percentage shown for officers with .. some 
college'" should be .. more on the order of magnitude of the other Services ... 
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Table 5 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, by Education 
at Time of Commissioning, Fiscal 1975-87 (Combined) 
Education at Time 
of Commissioning 
Less than College 
Some College 






























Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. 
Close to three-quarters of all new officers over the past 13 years were commis-
sioned in their early- to mid-twenties (between 21 and 25 years of age). Generally, 
as seen in Table 6, new officers are slightly older in the Air Force and the Navy than 
in the Army and the Marine Corps. Indeed, in the Marine Corps, 84 percent of new 
officers received their commission at the ages of 21 through 25; and in the Army, 
over 11 percent were commissioned at the age of 21 or below (compared with less 
than 1 percent in the other Services). These age differences between the Services 
reflect different age standards and eligibility requirements. 
The sex composition of the officer corps has changed considerably over the past 
decade or so, as suggested in the preceding subsection and illustrated more directly 
in Table 7. In 1975, women comprised 8.7 percent of all new officers; by 1987, the 
proportion of women had nearly doubled to over 16 percent. This increase in the 
overall proportion of women is attributable to rising proportions in the Army and 
the Air Force: between 1975 and 1987, the proportion of newly-commissioned offi-
cers who were women jumped from 6.1 percent to 19. 7 percent in the Army; in the 
Air Force, the proportion climbed from 12 percent to about 20 percent. At the same 
time, there were just slight changes in the proportion of newly-commissioned female 
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Table 6 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, by Age 
at Time of Commissioning, Fiscal 1975-87 (Combined) 
Age at Time of Marine Air All 
Commissioning (years) Anny Navy Corps Force Services 
Less than 21 11.4 0.4 0.2 0.7 4.1 
21-25 73.2 72.4 84.1 70.3 72.9 
26-30 13.0 19.6 15.3 21.3 17.7 
Greater than 30 2.3 7.7 0.4 7.8 5.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean Age 23.7 24.5 23.5 24.7 24.2 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. 
17 






















Number and Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Service and Sex, Selected Years, Fiscal 1975-87 
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 
93.9 88.3 84.0 82.5 80.3 
6.1 11.7 16.0 17.5 19.7 
(5,586) (6,901) (6,868) (7,436) (5,810) 
89.8 89.2 90.2 87.2 90.0 
10.2 10.8 9.8 12.8 10.0 
(4,341) (4,711) (5,468) (4,528) (5,068) 
97.0 96.6 94.2 96.0 95.2 
3.0 3.4 5.8 4.0 4.8 
(1,955) (1,589) (1,441) (1,585) (1,359) 
88.0 85.1 85.9 82.9 79.6 
12.0 14.9 14.1 17.1 20.4 
(5,576) (5,450) (6,676) (8,213) (5,939) 
91.3 88.3 87.0 84.6 83.9 · 
8.7 11.7 13.0 15.4 16.1 
(17,458) (18,691) (20,453) (21,762) (18,176) 


















Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct ccmmissions. 
officers in the Navy and the Marine Corps. These variations between the Services 
are due largely to the combat restrictions placed on the use of women and the 
differing missions of the Services. (The Marine Corps has a more intensive con-
centration of combat-related positions, and women are banned by law from assign-
ment to most ships in the Navy.) 
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Increases in the proportion of minorities among newly-commissioned officers 
are less dramatic, as shown in Table 8. Indeed, in the Marine Corps, the proportion 
of new officers who are black was higher in 1975 (6.6 percent) than it was in 1987 
(5.8 percent); and in the Air Force, the proportion of blacks was the same in 1975 as 
it was in 1987 (5.3 percent), and lower than the thirteen-year average (6.9 percent). 
There were modest increases in the proportion of minorities in the Navy's yearly 
crop of new officers-rising from 2.5 percent of blacks and 1.1 percent of Hispanics 
in 1975 to 4.2 percent of blacks and 2.9 percent of Hispanics in 1987. However, the 
Navy average for blacks over the 1975-87 period remained the lowest of all Services 
at 3.3 percent. 
In sharp contrast to the other Services, the Army witnessed a substantial 
increase in the proportion of new officers who are black: in 1975, the proportion (4.7 
percent) appeared lower than in all Services except the Navy (though the Army had 
the highest percentage of other or "unknown" cases); by 1987, the proportion of 
blacks was approaching 13 percent.12 As remarkable as these changes are, it should 
also be noted that the Army's experience in recruiting Hispanics has apparently 
remained static over the past decade. 
Issues, policies, and practices affecting the demographic character of the officer 
corps are addressed in subsequent sections of the monograph. Nevertheless, the 
topic of minority recruitment for the officer corps can be given some added perspec-
tive by Table 9, which shows the percentage distribution of college graduates (ages 
20 through 29) by sex and racial/ethnic group. College graduates essentially form 
the manpower pool or supply from which officers are selected. "To join .the military 
as an officer," the ROTC College Handbook states, "applicants must generally have 
a four-year college degree."13 
As seen in Table 9, blacks currently make up about 6.3 percent of the man-
power pool considered educationally eligible for commissioning-including 5 percent 
of black men and 7 .6 percent of black women. Hispanic men comprise a slightly 
higher proportion of the pool (5.1 percent) than black men; and Hispanic women 
account for a lower proportion (4.8 percent) than their black counterparts. 
12It should be noted that the proportion of"unknown" cases is initially quite large in the period examined 
(almost 20 percent in 1975), and then tapers off to just 3 percent in 1987. The large proportion of "unknowns" 
during the earlier years has a distorting effect on the racial/ethnic distributions for the Army and for the 
combination of all Services. 
13solomon Wiener, ROTC College Handbook, 1989-90 (New York: ARCO, 1988), p. 4. 
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Table 8 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, by Service 
and Racial/Ethnic Group, Selected Years, Fiscal 1975-87 
Service and 
Racial/Ethnic Group 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 
Army 
White 73.9 76.4 82.1 78.5 82.1 
Black 4.7 8.3 5.9 12.0 12.8 
Hispanic 1.6 2.5 0.6 0.4 2.0 
Other/Unknown 19.8 12.9 11.4 9.2 3.1 
All Groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Navy 
White 93.1 93.0 92.6 89.2 89.6 
Black 2.5 4.5 3.4 4.6 4.2 
Hispanic 1.1 1.0 1.3 3.1 2.9 
Other/Unknown 3.3 1.5 2.7 3.2 3.3 
All Groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Marine Corps 
White 90.6 92.9 94.9 89.5 88.2 
Black 6.6 3.7 4.1 5.9 5.8 
Hispanic 2.2 3.0 0.3 2.5 2.5 
Other/Unknown 0.7 0.4 0.8 2.1 3.5 
All Groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Air Force 
White 91.9 87.8 88.8 89.1 89.6 
Black 5.3 8.5 6.2 6.3 5.3 
Hispanic 1.8 1.7 2.2 1.9 1.8 
Other/Unknown 1.0 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.4 
All Groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
All Services 
White 86.3 85.3 88.0 85.5 87.1 
Black 4.6 7.0 5.2 7.8 7.4 
Hispanic 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 
Other/Unknown 7.6 5.8 5.5 5.0 3.3 
All Groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




























Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 







Percentage Distribution of U.S. Population (Ages 20 through 29) 
Who Completed Four or More Years of College, 
by Sex and Racial/Ethnic Group, March 1985 
White I2tal 
and Other Black Hispanic Percent Number (Est.) 
89.9 5.0 5.1 100.0 3,317,000 
87.6 7.6 4.8 100.0 3,294,000 
88.7 6.3 4.9 100.0 6,611,000 
Source: Derived from data appearing in Bureau of the Census, Educational Attainment in the United States: March 
1982 to 1985, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 415 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1987). 
Comparing the figures in Table 9 with those in Table 8, one is struck by the 
fact that the Army's proportion of new officers who are black (12.8 percent in 1987) 
is currently more than double the proportion of blacks in the eligible pool (6.3 
percent). At the same time, the other Services are underrepresented in this respect; 
and all four Services, including the Army, are below the level of representation for 
Hispanic men and women in the U.S. population of college graduates.14 
14Individuals are given the opportunity to identify their own racial/ethnic group on official military 
records. Various studies have suggested that this method results in an undercounting of persons who may 
otherwise be of Spanish origin. For example, a few years ago the Anny examined the records of almost 19,000 
individuals who had common Spanish surnames and found that as many as 70 percent of the Spanish-surnamed 
officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel did not claim to be Hispanic. See G. H. Barbosa, W. Gosnell, and 
C. Evans, The Latin American Challenge and Army Hispanic Soldier Policy (Washington, D.C.: Assistant 
Secretary of the Anny for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 18 February 1986). 
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Occupational Assignment Patterns for New Officers 
and the Total Active Forcel5 
The patterns for occupational assignment of female officers are generally 
different from those of their male counterparts for several reasons, including per-
sonal choice, academic interests (or college major), selection standards, tradition, 
and legal restrictions on the assignment of women. It is difficult to draw any solid 
conclusion from the data presented in Table 10, since over half of all male officers 
and one-quarter of all women are categorized as either "nonoccupational" or 
"unknown" in the DMDC Officer Accession File. Nevertheless, the data suggest that 
new female officers are assigned mainly to Health Care, Administrators, or 
Engineering and Maintenance-while a large percentage of men are placed in 
Tactical Operations and Engineering and Maintenance (or they are designated for 
further occupational training). Of all officers assigned to occupations soon after 
commissioning, women were clearly overrepresented in the following areas: Health 
Care (69 percent of persons assigned); Administrators (28 percent); Intelligence (26 
percent), and Scientists and Professionals (26 percent).16 
The job placement experiences of new officers by sex in 1987 (see Table 11) are 
basically consistent with the historical patterns described above. Of particular note 
is the finding that at least 40 percent of new female officers are initially assigned to 
Health Care. 
A more revealing picture of the sex composition of officers by occupational area 
can be seen in Table 12. The proportion of"unknown" and nonoccupational cases are 
reduced considerably by focusing on the entire active duty force, and the level of 
"representation" for the sexes within job categories can be clearly distinguished. The 
most striking finding here is that women account for almost one out of every three 
officers in Health Care and one in four officers assigned as Administrators-even 
though women make up just 11 percent of the entire officer corps. Indeed, of the 
32,000 female officers in the active duty force as of June 1988, over 13,000 were 
serving in Health Care and another 7,000 were Administrators-putting nearly two 
out of every three women (a total of 64.4 percent) in these two occupational areas. At 
15 A list of the major subcategories for each occupational area is presented in the appendix. 
16These percentages are not shown in the table. For comparison concerning "representation," women 
accounted for about 13 percent of all new officers between 1975 and 1987. 
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Table 10 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Sex, Fiscal 1975-87 (Combined) 
All N!:lW OffiQ!:lrl,! 
Occupational Areaa 
General Officers and Executives 
Tactical Operations 
I ntellige nee 
Engineering and Maintenance 
Scientists and Professionals 
Health Care 
Administrators 

























































Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be placed 
on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
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Table 11 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Sex, Fiscal 1987 
All N!;!W Offi!,!;!rlz 
Occupational Areaa Male Female Percent Number 
General Officers and Executives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
Tactical Operations 25.1 8.8 22.5 4,087 
Intelligence 2.6 5.2 3.0 550 
Engineering and Maintenance 10.2 10.8 10.3 1,871 
Scientists and Professionals 1.2 2.1 1.3 245 
Health Care 4.0 40.0 9.8 1,779 
Administrators 4.8 13.2 6.1 1,111 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 3.3 8.0 4.1 743 
Nonoccupationalb 22.5 4.4 19.6 3,559 
Unknown 26.3 7.4 23.3 4,331 
Total 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 15,250 2,926 18,176 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. 
aFirst occupation on record for each offjcer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be placed 
on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
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Table 12 
Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers 
(All Services), by Occupational Area and Sex, June 1988 
TQts!I 
Occupational Areaa Male Female Percent Number 
General Officers and Executives 98.7 1.3 100.0 3,258 
Tactical Operations 98.1 1.9 100.0 121,556 
Intelligence 84.6 15.4 100.0 12,154 
Engineering and Maintenance 91.6 8.4 100.0 32,715 
Scientists and Professionals 91.0 9.0 100.0 12,562 
Health Care 68.5 31.5 100.0 42,948 
Administrators 73.7 26.3 100.0 27,078 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 86.9 13.1 100.0 21,089 
Nonoccupationalb 97.1 2.9 100.0 15,983 
Unknown 95.0 5.0 100.0 383 
All Areas 
Percent 89.0 11.0 100.0 
Number· 257,703 32,023 289,726 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Excludes warrant officers. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those w~h duties unassigned, ROTC officers wa~ing to be placed 
on active duty, and special-assignment officers). 
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the other end of the spectrum, just 1.3 percent of all general and flag officers were 
women, and women accounted for fewer than 2 percent of officers assigned to Tacti-
cal Operations (a consequence of the combat restriction on women). 
The historical patterns of assignment for new officers by racial/ethnic group, as 
shown in Table 13, suggest that minorities have a greater likelihood than whites of 
being placed in Tactical Operations (except for Hispanics), Engineering and Mainte-
nance, Administrators, and Supply, Procurement and Allied. In fact, though blacks 
accounted for 6.6 percent of new officers over the 1975-87 period, they represented 
15 percent of all new officers assigned to the Supply, Procurement and Allied area, 
11 percent of Administrators, and about 8 percent of persons initially placed in 
Tactical Operations and Engineering and Maintenance. 
The assignment experiences of minorities in 1987 (see Table 14) appear to 
follow the historical pattern. One notable exception is in the area of Health Care, 
where almost 14 percent of new black officers are initially placed (rivaling 
Engineering and Maintenance). In addition, the proportion of blacks assigned to 
Tactical Operations has increased to 30 percent, compared with a standard of 22.5 
percent for the entire cohort of new officers. 
In 1981, Binkin and Eitelberg observed that black officers "tend to be concen-
trated in jobs (such as supply, procurement, and administration) not considered part 
of the mainstream.''17 In fact, records dating back at least 25 years show that black 
officers have been consistently overrepresented in the supply, procurement and 
administration areas, with gradually increasing proportions in engineering and 
maintenance jobs.18 Table 15, which shows the composition of each occupational 
area by racial/ethnic group, indicates that the trend still continues: while blacks 
comprise 6.5 percent of the officer corps, they account for 12.2 percent of officers 
serving in Supply, Procurement and Allied, 11.5 percent of Administrators, and 8.1 
percent of persons in Engineering and Maintenance. Hispanics are also overrepre-
sented in these occupational areas (though to a lesser extent), as well as in Health 
Care. 
17Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, p. 59. 




Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Racial/Ethnic Group, 
Fiscal 1975-87 (Combined) 
Other and 
Occupational Areaa White Black Hispanic Unknown 
General Officers and Executives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tactical Operations 17.1 21.2 15.2 23.2 
Intelligence 2.8 2.2 2.3 3.5 
Engineering and Maintenance 12.1 15.1 12.9 13.8 
Scientists and Professionals 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.7 
Health Care 4.7 5.3 4.5 6.9 
Administrators 8.1 14.8 10.9 8.2 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 2.5 6.1 3.2 3.0 
Nonoccupationalb 18.7 9.3 18.3 5.5 
Unknown 32.5 25.0 31.1 35.2 
Total 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 220,365 16,985 4,386 16,989 















Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grnde of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be placed 
on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
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Table 14 
Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Racial/Ethnic Group, Fiscal 1987 
Other and All !:irQYl2li 
Occupational Areaa White Black Hispanic Unknown Percent Number 
General Officers and Executives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
Tactical Operations 22.0 30.0 18.5 20.4 22.5 4,087 
Intelligence 3.1 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.0 550 
Engineering and Maintenance 9.9 13.6 11.5 13.3 10.3 1,871 
Scientists and Professionals 1.3 1.2 1.5 2.2 1.3 245 
Health Care 9.5 13.6 9.5 9.1 9.8 1,779 
Administrators 5.9 8.7 5.7 6.8 6.1 1,111 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 3.7 8.9 4.2 4.2 4.1 743 
Nonoccupationalb 20.6 9.6 17.5 17.7 19.6 3,559 
Unknown 24.1 12.0 29.2 23.0 23.3 4,331 
Total 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 15,831 1,345 400 600 18,176 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: "New Officers" refers to newly-commissioned officers who entered active duty at the pay grade of 0-1. 
Excludes warrant officers and some persons who received direct commissions. · 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those wtth duties unassigned, ROTC officers waning to be placed 
on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
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Table 15 
Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Officers 
(All Services), by Occupational Area and Racial/Ethnic Group, 
June 1988 
Other and 811 !;a[Q!Jl2S 
Occupational Areaa White Black Hispanic Unknown Percent Number 
General Officers and Executives 95.9 2.4 0.8 0.9 100.0 3,258 
Tactical Operations 91.7 4.8 1.5 2.0 100.0 121,556 
Intelligence 90.8 5.0 1.6 2.6 100.0 12,154 
Engineering and Maintenance 86.9 8.1 2.0 3.0 100.0 32,715 
Scientists and Professionals 90.3 5.6 1.5 2.6 100.0 12,562 
Health Care 86.1 6.3 2.0 5.6 100.0 42,948 
Administrators 83.4 11.5 2.5 2.6 100.0 27,078 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 83.2 12.2 1.9 2.7 100.0 21,089 
Nonoccupationalb 90.0 3.9 2.6 3.5 100.0 15,983 
Unknown 87.5 3.4 0.5 8.6 100.0 383 
-- -- --Total 
Percent 88.8 6.5 1.8 2.9 100.0 
Number 257,244 18,881 5,222 8,379 289,726 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Excludes warrant officers. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b1ncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be placed 
on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
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THE SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF OFFICERS 
No large-scale study of the socioeconomic background of either enlistees or 
officers has ever been undertaken. The Department of Defense is planning to con-
duct a major study of the socioeconomic "representation" of enlisted personnel 
within the coming year, and there have been recent efforts to describe the social or 
economic background of recruits from existing data on the individual's zip code at 
the time ofenlistment.19 Even though there are no major sources of information on 
the subject, a collection of material published over the past several decades suggests 
that the socioeconomic character of the officer corps has been changing. 
Morris Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier, was one of the first to recognize a 
discernible trend toward the "democratization" of the officer corps. He writes: 
American military leaders traditionally have come from the more privi-
leged [social] strata. However, recent trends in their social background 
supply striking confirmation of the decline of the relatively high social 
origins of the military, and of its transformation into a more socially 
heterogeneous group.20 
To support his finding, Janowitz points to the following: increasing percentages 
of officers, especially academy cadets, drawn from the working class (mainly the 
sons of skilled- workers); the loss of a direct linkage between the military and the 
sons of the upper class (or the so-called "best" families); a decline in the number of 
sons from upper-middle-class business and professional backgrounds (or the "high-
status" professions), with a shifting emphasis on lower-middle class sources of 
recruitment; changes in the religious affiliation of officers, away from Protestantism 
(that reflects the social structure of the rural South); a sharp increase in self-
recruitment, especially among the sons of noncommissioned officers; changes in the 
geographical distribution of ROTC units, with increasing presence at "less presti-
gious hinterland institutions" and Southern schools; and, finally, the increased 
representation of blacks and other racial or ethnic minorities.21 
19Richard V. L. Cooper used the zip code approach in Military Manpower and the All, Volunteer Force, R-
1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1977). More recently, analysts from the Congressional Budget Office have 
employed the approach in a study (forthcoming) of the socioeconomic background of enlisted personnel. 
20Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 89. 
21 Jbid., pp. xxvi-x:xxii, 89-101. 
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In 1981, Fitzgerald studied changing patterns of recruitment at the U.S. Naval 
Academy, using Janowitz's hypothesis of "democratization" as a guide.22 Fitzgerald's 
research covered the Academy classes of 1925 to 1975, and his principal findings 
tended to confirm the trend identified by Janowitz: (1) the proportion of sons from 
working-class families increased from 11 percent of the average class prior to 1955 
to an average of 25 percent for subsequent classes; (2) there was an increase in the 
proportion of Roman Catholics (from 17 percent to 30 percent) and a decrease in the 
proportion of "high-status, traditional Protestants" (from 39 percent to 32 percent); 
(3) there was a four-fold increase in self-recruitment, with an average of 20 percent 
of the 1955-75 classes coming from families with career-military fathers, including 5 
percent on the enlisted side (up from 0.5 percent over the 1925-50 period); (4) 
numbers of minorities (almost 11 percent of the class of 1977) and women (6 percent 
of the classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982) climbed; and (5) Academy cadets from large 
urban areas were somewhat overrepresented.23 
Several years ago, Newsweek commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct 
a survey of generals and admirals, representing all four branches of the military. 
The survey respondents numbered 257, more than one in four flag-rank officers on 
active duty in 1984. One of the questions asked the officers to identify "the social 
class of your family when you were growing up."24 This particular question was also 
posed to a sample of general officers in a previous study-and offered an interesting 
opportunity to compare the social backgrounds of the military's top officers over 
three-quarters of a century.25 
Table 16 combines the results of the studies. If one accepts the self-perceptions 
of the general officers concerning their background, there has been a steady and 
rather dramatic shift in the socioeconomic character of the military's top leadership 
since the period around World War I. The proportion of persons describing their 
origin as either upper class or upper-middle class has declined, while the proportion 
22John M. Fitzgerald, "Changing Patterns of Officer Recruitment at the U.S. Naval Academy," Armed 
Forces and Socuety 8 (Fall 1981): pp. 111-128. 
23[bid., pp. 124-126. The final point on urban overrepresentation contradicts part of the Janowitz 
hypothesis, but it stands as further evidence of democratization. 
24"Can We Fight a Modern War?," Newsweek, 9 July 1984, p. 37. 
25see Janowitz, The Professional Solduer, p. 90. 
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Table 16 
Trends in the Social Origins of General 
and Flag Officers, 1910-84 
Social Class of 
Family When 1l110-2Q 1 ll~Q 1 ll!l4 
Growing upa Army Army Army Navy Air Force All Services 
Upper 26 8 3 4 0 2 
Upper Middle 66 68 47 57 30 22 
Middle 8 23 45 34 62 57 
Lower 0 1 5 5 8 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(Number) (38) (49) (140) (162) (60) (257) 
Source: Data for 1910-50 are from Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971 ), p. 
90. Data for 1984 are from a Gallup Organization poll commissioned by Newsweek and reported in "Can 
We Fight a Modern War?," Newsweek, 9 July 1984, p. 37. 
aThe source document for 1910·50 used the following categories: upper; upper middle; lower middle; upper lower; 
and lower lower. For the purpose of this comparison, lower middle was designated as middle, and the two lower· 
class categories were combined. 
of those seeing themselves as either middle class or lower class has risen. Perhaps 
the most surprising result of the 1984 survey is that 19 percent of the generals and 
admirals claimed to have grown up in a lower-class family. According to A Modern 
Dictionary of Sociology, "lower class" can be divided into two categories: (1) lower-
lower class, including those who are semiskilled and unskilled workers, and who 
"tend to be on relief, live in the worst sections of town, and are considered to be im-
moral by the other social classes" and (2) upper-lower class, which includes "the 
class of 'respectable' people who live in less desirable sections of town, and who are 
factory operatives and service workers"-and who, "while poor, have certain atti-
tudes of the middle class, such as cleanliness, and a sense of responsibility toward 
their work."26 
26George A Theodorson and Achilles J. Theodorson, A Modern Dictionary of Sociology (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), p. 237. The definitions are based on the Yankee City studies ofW. Lloyd 
Warner and Paul S. Lunt (Tiu, Social Life of a Modern Community, published by Yale University Press in 1941). 
On the upper-lower class group, the authors add: "They are not regarded as the lowest people on the social 
ladder, as judged by middle-class standards, although they are relatively poor and uneducated." 
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However one defines "lower class," it is unexpected, given the historical image 
of military elites (from "an old family, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, rural upper-middle 
professional background"27), that one in five generals and admirals today grew up in 
a working class family, and more than three out of four came from the middle and 
lower classes. Janowitz maintains that this type of information "reflects the differ-
ent social stratification of the officer corps of the three services," even though the 
statistics deal only with persons who have risen to the highest ranks.28 It may also 
be a manifestation of the Abraham Lincoln complex-where people in high places 
tend to exaggerate the modest conditions of their "log cabin" origins. 
Further evidence of the social transformation of the officer corps is suggested, 
though indirectly, by Snyder.29 In a study of the various trends in officer recruit-
ment, Snyder found that, "by emphasizing technical qualifications and academic 
program-career field matching, the services have adapted many of the recruiting 
perspectives oflarge-scale nonmilitary organizations." In short, he adds, the trend 
has been toward a "civilianization" of officer training.so Other studies have sug-
gested that college students with technical majors tend to come from middle-income 
families, thus enhancing the prospects of officer recruitment for this group.31 This, 
along with an expansion of commissioning sources, has opened the doors of the 
officer corps to a wider range of individuals who might otherwise not have joined. 
Today, as many as one-third of all new officers accept a commission in trade for a 
college education-either with an ROTC scholarship or with attendance at a Service 
academy. Some of these people might not be able to afford a college education 
without the help of the military, and they are taking full advantage of an excellent 
opportunity for social or career mobility. Other factors may also attract young people 
from lower-income families to the officer corps. Indeed, in a 1980 survey of college 
students, Becerra found that interest in becoming a military officer was influenced 
27Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. xxvii. 
28,bid., p. 410. 
29William P. Snyder, "Officer Recruitment for the All-Volunteer Force," Armed Forces and Society 10 
(Spring 1984): 401. 
30lbid., p. xvii. 
31Rosina M. Becerra, A.n Assessment of the College Market, Spring-Summer 1980 (Los Angeles: Institute 
for Social Science Research, University of California, May 1983), p. vi. 
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by the individual's desire for skill-building and professional opportunities, as well as 
by the hope of gaining self-improvement. She also found a relatively stronger 
interest in officer training programs among students from lower-income families 
and a higher likelihood of commissioning for nonwhite persons through one of the 
nonacademy sources. The combination of results from this survey led to the 
following conclusion by the author: 
The role of the military in providing a path of upward mobility for some 
college students is strongly suggested in these data: being nonwhite and of 
lower-than-average family income, expecting a lower-than-average start-
ing salary, and viewing the military as an organization which provides a 
satisfactory degree of economic success and career security all increase the 
probability of enrollment in an officer training program.32 
The "democratization" of the officer corps, especially as it relates to socioeco-
nomic measures, would undoubtedly be an interesting subject for future research. 
One could also explore the actual or perceived effects of officer service on the oppor-
tunities, life choices, careers, and families of those who may have joined the military 
in search of social mobility. Of particular interest here are the intergenerational 
effects of service as a military officer-that is, the positive or negative influence of 
an individual's military career (and all that it brings or removes) upon the lives of 
his or her children and succeeding generations. 33 To date, all of these topics remain 
relatively untouched and ripe for analysis. 
32Ib·d .. l ., p. XVll. 
33Research relating to intergenerational transfer is quite limited within the context of military service. 
Three notable works that have examined the subject of military occupational transfer are: Albert D. Biderman 
and Barbara A. Haley, An Exploratory Study of Intergenerational Occupational Succession in the Nauy 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., 1979); John H. Faris, "The All-Volunteer Force: 
Recruitment from Military Families," Armed Forces and Society (Summer 1981): 545-559; and George W. 
Thomas, "Intergenerational Mobility and Career Orientation of Military Officers," Professional Paper, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1986. · 
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Section3 
THE SELECTION OF OFFICERS: STANDARDIZED TESTING 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
In fiscal 1988, about 23,000 men and women entered military service as newly 
commissioned officers. They were selected in a variety of ways and may have 
prepared for their new positions through any one of many different programs. In 
fact, each of the Armed Services operates independently in the commissioning of its 
officers, and each employs its own methods and procedures for selecting officer 
candidates-methods and procedures that not only vary across Services, but by the 
particular precommissioning program within a Service as well. 
In contrast to the enlisted force, there is no single aptitude test for selecting 
officers. Each officer candidate program is recognized as having its own peculiar 
needs, so separate programs typically have their own selection methods and tests. In 
general, the aptitude measure used to select a candidate is influenced by the nature 
of the precommissioning program-that is, by whether it begins as an in-college or 
post-college program for preparing new officers. 
The present system for recruiting officers is based on the premise that all 
officers should be college graduates. "Mental testing," as Northrup et al. point out, 
"is less of an issue in officer recruiting than it is in enlisted recruiting." "On the 
other hand," the authors write, 
educational attainment, namely, a four-year college degree, is of para-
mount importance in becoming an officer. Some officers 'come up through 
the ranks,' but the overwhelming majority of officers enter active service 
at the officer level after graduation from college.1 
This section examines the various officer candidate programs currently 
administered by the Armed Services, dividing these programs by their in-college or 
post-college approach. The aptitude measures used to select officer candidates are 
then described.2 The next subsection presents a brief overview of the relationship 
1 Herbert R. Northrup et al., Black and Ot/u,r Minority Participation in the All-Volunteer Nauy and 
Marine Corps (Philadelphia, PA: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1979), p. 63. 
2This section draws heavily from a previous study by one of the co-authors: Dianne C. Brown, Military 
Officers: Commissioning Sources and Selection Criteria, FR-PRD-87-42 (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, December 
1987). A more detailed bibliography of historical sources can be found here. 
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between aptitude test scores and officer performance, as gleaned from the Services' 
own validation studies and testing research, as well as from the results of original 
analyses using the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). The section closes by taking a 
look at the experiences and perceptions of general officers concerning the best path-
way to a "successful" military career. 
OFFICER CANDIDATE PROGRAMS 
Officer candidate programs can be separated into two basic categories: (1) those 
for college students and (2) those for college graduates. Programs for college 
students may actually provide an education or offer varying levels of financial 
assistance to help cover the costs of a college education. These programs include the 
Service academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).3 ROTC programs 
can also be divided into two types: (1) scholarship ROTC, which offers up to four 
years of financial assistance, paying for college tuition, required educational fees, 
textbooks, supplies, and equipment (including, in the case of the Army, a $1,000 
subsistence allowance); and (2) nonscholarship ROTC, which provides only a subsis-
tence allowance. 
Programs for college graduates are covered under the general heading of 
Officer Candidate School (OCS). These programs go by different names in the 
separate Services: for example, the Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course 
(BIOCC) in the Army; OCS in the Navy (including Aviation Officer Candidate 
School and Naval Flight Officer Candidate School); OCS in the Marine Corps (with 
an Officer Candidates Class, Women Officer Candidates Program, and other pro-
grams, such as Platoon Leaders Class, available as options for college students and 
graduates); and Officer Training School (OTS) in the Air Force. 
Individuals may also be commissioned by direct appointment. These commis-
sions are granted to persons who are professionally qualified in the medical or 
health field, and to lawyers, chaplains, and engineers. Officers who have entered 
under this program are given a minimum of military training and they are often 
commissioned at a higher rank. (The direct appointment program is not covered in 
this section because of its highly specialized nature.) 
3The Secretary of each Service is also authorized to set up Junior ROTC units at public or private high 
schools (with a limit of 1,600 units nationwide). 
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A testing practice book, called Officer Candidate Tests, states that "written 
tests are an essential part of the selection process for all OCS programs"-because 
"test scores play a significant role in determining who will be accepted and 
rejected."4 Paper-and-pencil tests also play a significant role in the programs for 
college students, because they help to determine who will be accepted or rejected by 
a particular college, as well as who will win an ROTC college scholarship. 
The separate Services have different priorities and strategies for recruiting 
officers. As seen in Table 17, the Army and the Air Force place relatively greater 
emphasis on ROTC than does either the Navy or the Marine Corps. In fact, half of 
all newly commissioned officers in the Army during fiscal 1987 were products of 
ROTC-compared with 38 percent of those in the Air Force, 26 percent in the Navy 
(the largest proportion in this Service), and 25 percent in the Marine Corps. At the 
same time, more than one out of two new Marine Corps officers came out ofan OCS-
type program (mainly the Platoon Leaders Class and Officer Candidate Class); and 
one-quarter of Air Force officers were products ofOTS. 
Summary of Programs for College Students 
There are three Department of Defense academies:5 The United States Mili-
tary Academy at West Point, New York (Army); the Umted States Naval Academy 
at Annapolis, Maryland (Navy and Marine Corps); and the United States Air Force 
Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado (Air Force).6 The academies all offer a four-
year program of study leading to a baccalaureate degree and a commission (as a 
second lieutenant in the Army, Marine Corps, or Air Force and an ensign in the 
Navy). Students at the academies receive free tuition, room, board, medical and 
dental care, and a monthly allowance. Graduates of the academies are currently 
required to remain on active duty for at least five years. 
ROTC programs are provided at colleges and universities throughout the 
United States. As of 1988, the Army ROTC program was being offered at more than 
310 host colleges and universities, with at least 100 additional extension centers and 
4solomon Weiner, Officer Candidate Tests (New York: ARCO Publishing, Inc., 1985), p. 4. 
5The U.S. Coast Guard, which is under the Department of Transportation during peacetime, also has an 
academy, located in New London, Connecticut. 
Sup to 16 percent of all graduates at the Naval Academy each year can be commissioned as an officer in 
the Marine Corps. 
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Table 17 
Number and Percentage Distribution of New Officers, 
by Source of Commission and Service, Fiscal 1987 
Source of Marine Air All S!:!rviQ!:!S 
Commission Army Navy Corps Force Percent 
Academy 15.1 14.5 13.0 14.8 14.7 
ROTC 49.9 26.4 25.4 39.1 38.2 
Ocsa, OTS 5.5 20.7 55.3 24.6 19.2 
Direct Appointment 9.5 4.1 4.3 21.4 11.5 
ATP 0.0 9.8 1.1 0.0 2.8 
Otherb 20.1 24.6 1.1 • 13.6 
Total 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 7,079 5,925 1,419 6,909 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
•Less than 0.05 percent. 
a Includes most programs administered by the Marine Corps (primarily Platoon Leaders Class). 
b1ncludes various sources coded separately from listed programs. 
Abbreviations 
ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps 
OCS Officer Candidate School 
OTS Officer Training School (Air Force) 










about 900 more colleges participating under cross-enrollment agreements (for 
students not attending an ROTC host institution). Navy-Marine Corps ROTC pro-
grams were located at 66 host colleges and universities, along with another 130 or 
more colleges with cross-enrollment agreements. ROTC host colleges in the Air 
Force numbered around 150 in 1988, with an additional 700 or so colleges partici-
pating under a cross-enrollment agreement. It is estimated that about 100,000 
students are currently enrolled in ROTC programs. 
ROTC programs generally require that students take specified courses in 
military science along with their regular course work. In addition, they are usually 
required to attend drills and participate in a summer training session either 
between the sophomore and junior years or between the junior and senior years. 
(Uniforms are worn by the ROTC cadets while participating in military functions, 
including attendance at military science classes.) Military service obligations vary 
by Service for graduates, depending on the type of program. Scholarship programs 
also carry a military service obligation (in the enlisted force) for students who 
default from the terms of their ROTC contract. 
ROTC scholarships primarily cover four years of college. The Army and the 
Navy also offer scholarships for one, two, or three years; and the Air Force has 
programs for two, two and one-half, three, and three and one-half years. In the 
Navy, odd-year scholarships are awarded to students who have joined ROTC under 
the nonscholarship program and are subsequently recommended for a scholarship 
by their commanding officer. 
Advanced ROTC training is provided to nonscholarship students over the 
course of their junior and senior years. During this period, students are given a 
subsistence allowance. To apply for advanced ROTC, students are usually required 
to complete either ROTC training during the first two years of college or a six-week 
summer training session. 
As noted above, the Marine Corps also operates several officer candidate 
programs for college students that are apart from the Naval ROTC program.7 
Platoon Leaders Class (PLC), which is the largest of these programs, consists of two 
six-week summer training sessions and is for freshmen, sophomores, and juniors in 
7 Students in the Naval ROTC program may sign up for the Marine Corps option. Up to 16 percent of the 
students are permitted to enter the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps also draws a limited number of new officers 
from the Army and Air Force programs. 
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college. The student is required to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve while 
attending college and participating in PLC. Students at any college may enroll in 
PLC, since (unlike ROTC) all military training is conducted off-campus during th~ 
summer. PLC participants must complete college and OCS to obtain a commission. 
The Navy also administers several student programs, including a bacca-
laureate degree completion program, the Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate 
program, the Reserve Officer Candidate program, and programs for aspiring chap-
lains, lawyers, doctors, and dentists. In addition, the Navy's Broadened Opportunity 
for Officer Selection and Training Program (or BOOST) deserves special mention. 
BOOST is a college preparatory course for young men and women who exhibit 
the potential to become an officer but lack the required academic skills to qualify for 
one of the Navy's college programs. A concentrated course of instruction, lasting 
from 9 to 14 months, is offered in mathematics, science, and English at the Naval 
Training Center in San Diego. About 450 students (400 from the Navy and 50 from 
the Marine Corps) are admitted to the program each year, selected from twice as 
many applicants in the enlisted force and the pool of new recruits. An SAT score of 
at least 850 (combined Verbal and Math) is normally required for admission, though 
waivers are available for applicants with lower scores.8 
The BOOST program was created by the Navy in the late 1960s for "education-
ally and culturally deprived" persons, and is described in official literature as an 
"affirmative action initiative."9 Currently, the Navy's goal is to have three-quarters 
of all participants from a racial or ethnic minority group. Graduates of the program 
are guaranteed an ROTC scholarship, and several are admitted to the Naval 
Academy each year. (The Navy also runs a Naval Academy Preparatory School, 
which has an annual enrollment of about 300 students but does not have any 
8The Navy plans to increase the number of BOOST spaces to 500. About 29 percent of blacks and 4 7 
percent of Hispanics commissioned in the Navy during 1987-88 were BOOST graduates. See James Longo, 
"Boorda to Track Minority Officers' Progress," Navy Times, 20 February 1989, p. 12. 
9Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity in the Navy (Washington D.C.: 
ChiefofNaval Operations, December 1988), p. 3-13. 
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minority goals.)lO Navy officials are proud ofBOOST's achievements over the past 
two decades and its continuing role as the "premier upward mobility program" for 
minority officers.11 
Summary of Programs for College Graduates 
OCS programs vary in length from Service to Service (and by program within 
each Service). As a rule, officer candidates who go through OCS programs begin as 
enlistees. Individuals who enter the military with an expressed intent of attending 
OCS join first as an enlistee and may then be required to complete some form of 
initial military training before becoming eligible for OCS. Enlisted personnel who 
are already in the military are permitted to enter an OCS program if they can meet 
eligibility requirements. An example of the latter path to OCS is the Airmen's 
Education and Commissioning Program (AECP) in the Air Force. Under AECP, 
enlisted personnel may remain on active duty with the Air Force while completing a 
baccalaureate degree in engineering or science. Upon graduation from college, the 
AECP participant becomes eligible to attend OCS.12 
Army OCS is open to two types of applicants: (1) college graduates who enlist in 
the Army and (2) enlisted personnel who have a minimum of two years of college. 
(Enlisted personnel who have not completed college can then attend OCS and be 
commissioned-but they must possess a college degree for promotion above the rank 
of captain.) The Army's OCS program (BIOCC) is a 14-week course, divided into 
three phases. After completing BIOCC, individuals are either commissioned in the 
Regular Army (for the top one-third of the class) or in the Army Reserve. Newly 
lOThe Army administers a ten-month course of instruction through its U.S. Military Academy 
Preparatory School. Army authorities say that this course can help to raise a soldier's SAT score by about 130 
points. The Air Force also has a Preparatory School for its Academy. It admits about 230 students a year, and is 
described as "very competitive." The Air Force program is primarily for enlisted personnel who can meet the 
criteria for admission to the Academy but need some improvement in English, mathematics, and science. 
11This comment has been made by several Navy officials. The CNO Study Group on Equal Opportunity 
called BOOST "a proven, effective, affirmative action program." The Group also recommended that the program 
be expanded by another 100 students "to provide more opportunities for black and Hispanic sailors to become 
naval officers." See Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity, pp. 3-29, 3-30. 
12rn general, attendees of the Air Force OCS (OTS) program are not primarily enlistees. Between 1983 
and 1988, approximately 29 percent of OTS entrants were enlisted personnel. The remainder did not have prior 
service in the enlisted force. From Department of Air Force, "Comments on Draft Paper," 3 March 1989. 
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commissioned officers are next required to attend an officer basic course for the 
occupational branch in which the individual was commissioned, usually lasting from 
12 to 14 weeks. 
The Navy's OCS program lasts about 16 weeks (14 weeks for Aviation OCS plus 
an additional 12 to 14 months of Navy flight training for pilots and 8 to 12 months of 
training for flight officers). Continued training is given to newly commissioned 
officers for most occupations. Occupational training may last from seven weeks (for, 
say, an engineering duty officer) to more than a year (for a nuclear propulsion 
officer). 
In the Marine Corps, individuals are required to complete a 10-week screening 
and training program before being commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 
Marine Corps Reserve. (Qualified enlisted personnel can apply through the Enlisted 
Commissioning Program.) Newly commissioned officers are then required to attend 
a 23-week basic professional course, where they are evaluated in the three general 
areas of military academics, military skills, and leadership. Completion of "basic 
school" is followed by assignment and training in one of various career paths (such 
as 13 to 16 months of aviation training for pilots). 
Officer trainees in the Air Force must complete a 12-week course (15 weeks for 
pilot candidates who do not have a private pilot's license) in fundamental military 
subjects. Completion of basic training earns a commission in the Air Force Reserve 
and a trip to technical school, which may last from five months to a year. 
APTITUDE MEASURES USED TO SELECT OFFICER CANDIDATES 
Several aptitude tests are currently used by the Armed Services to select officer 
candidates. The academies, like most undergraduate colleges, use the SAT or the 
American College Test (ACT) in conjunction with high school class rank. ROTC 
programs primarily use SAT and ACT scores to determine eligibility, but.some 
programs require additional tests.13 With the exception of the Marine Corps, OCS 
programs employ tests that have been developed specifically for officer selection: the 
Army uses the Officer Selection Battery (OSB) and the General Technical (GT) 
composite of Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASV AB); the Navy uses 
13For example, the Air Force ROTC program requires that candidates for the Professional Officers Course 
take the Air Force Officer Qualifying Test. The Army requires that applicants to its ROTC nonscholarship 
programs take the Officer Selection Battery Forms 3 and 4. 
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the Officer Aptitude Rating (OAR), the Academic Qualification Test (AQT), and the 
Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR), all of which are composites from the Aviation 
Selection Test Battery (ASTB); and the Air Force uses the Air Force Officer 
Qualifying Test (AFOQT). The Marine Corps requires that applicants to all of its 
precommissioning programs (except for the Naval Academy and Naval ROTC, which 
are administered by the Navy) obtain a qualifying score on the SAT, the ACT, or the 
Electronics Repair (EL) composite of the ASVAB. In addition, aviation applicants in 
the Marine Corps are required to achieve passing scores on the AQT-FAR.14 
Table 18 presents a summary of the aptitude tests and academic achievement 
measures used to select officer candidates for each of the Service programs. A more 
detailed review of the various selection criteria for officer candidate programs is 
provided after the following description of the aptitude tests. 
Brief History and Description of Officer Aptitude Tests15 
As previously noted, the SAT and the ACT play an important role in the 
selection of officer candidates in college programs. These are the traditional 
measures of academic ability used for incoming college freshmen in the academies 
and scholarship ROTC programs-much the same as in undergraduate colleges 
throughc,ut the country. Because these programs involve a substantial monetary 
investment in the candidate's postsecondary education, the foremost concern at this 
point is the selection of individuals who will succeed in college. The SAT, developed 
by the Educational Testing Service for the College Entrance Examination Board, is 
a college entrance examination designed to measure general verbal and mathe-
matical reasoning ability.16 The ACT, developed by the American College Testing 
14It should be noted that one-third of all officers in the Marine Corps are pilots. Marine Corps authorities 
stress that all officer candidates must also pass a physical fitness test. Though not an aptitude test, it is 
considered relevant here because it reflects the "distinctive emphasis [of the Marine Corps] on physical 
conditioning and may suggest that interesting demographic differences exist across the Services even at the 
officer candidate level." From Headquarters, U.S. Marir.e Corps, "Comments to the Authors," 16 February 1989. 
15A more detailed discussion and list ofreferences can be found in Brown, Military Officers. 
16The score scales for the SAT Verbal and Math have a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100. 
Validation studies correlating SAT scores with freshmen grade point averages yield correlations of about .35 for 
each component. Multiple regression coefficients of around .54 are typical when combining both components as 




Aptitude Tests and Academic Criteria Used to Screen Officer Candidates, 
by Program and Service, 1987-88 
PROGRAM ARMY NAVY MARINE CORPS AIR FORCE 
Academy SAT/ACT SAT/ACT a SAT/ACT 
H.S. Rank H.S. Rank H.S. Rank 
ROTC SAT/ACT SAT/ACT a SAT/ACT 
Scholarship) H.S. Rank H.S. Rank H.S. Rank 
College GPA H.S.GPA H.S. GPA 
College GPA 
AFOOT 
ROTC OSB3 &4 Varies by a AFOOT 
Nonscholarship Unit SAT/ACT 
College GPA 
OCSIOTS OSB 1 & 2 OAR SAT/ACT AFOOT 
and Other GT of ASVAB Elof ASVAB College GPA 
Aviation OCS NIA AQT-FAR SAT/ACT NIA 
Elof ASVAB 
AQT-FAR 
Source: Adapted from Dianne C. Brown, Military Officers: Commissioning Sources and Selection Criteria, FR 
PRD-87-42 (Alexandria, VA; HumRRO, December 1987). 
asame as Navy. Up to 16 percent of Naval Academy graduates may be commissioned as Marine Corps officers; 
and the same portion of Naval ROTC students are permitted to enter the Marine Corps each year. 











Scholastic Aptitude Test 
American College Test 
High School 
Grade Point Average 
Air Force Officer Qualifying Test 
Officer Selection Battery 
Officer Candidate School 
Officer Training School 








Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery 
General Technical Composite 
Officer Aptitude Rating 
Aviation Qualification Test-
Flight Aptitude Rating 
Electrical Composite 
Not Applicable 
Program, is also designed as a college entrance examination, measuring general 
verbal and mathematical comprehension.17 
The tests used in selecting officer candidates for OCS and OTS programs are 
intended to assess more specific aptitudes or characteristics that predict officer 
performance-since virtually all of the applicants, as college graduates, have 
already demonstrated a level of academic success. Many ROTC nonscholarship 
programs, geared mainly for college juniors and seniors, likewise use tests that are 
aimed at predicting success in the military-since most of the upper-class students 
are expected to complete college. The tests used to select officer candidates for OCS, 
OTS, and ROTC nonscholarship programs include the OSB, the OAR-AQT-FAR, the 
AFOQT, and portions of the ASVAB. 
1. The OSB 
In 1955, the Army initiated a large-scale research effort, called the Officer 
Prediction Task, that eventually culminated in the development of a test battery for 
predicting officer performance in specific assignment areas. Prior to this time, 
selection and assignment of Army Officers were based on the theory that broadly-
trained officers could apply their knowledge and skills to almost any assignment.18 
The first test created under the Officer Prediction Task project was the 
Differential Officer Leadership Experimental Test Battery (or DOL), which took a 
total of three· days to administer. After several successor tests and years of 
validation studies, the Cadet Evaluation Battery (CEB) evolved. The CEB was a 
much-refined and shortened version of the DOL, measuring cognitive abilities and 
interest in three areas: combat leadership, technical-managerial leadership, and 
career potential. The technical-managerial leadership (cognitive) subtest of the CEB 
was used in the Army's advanced ROTC program from 1972 through 1983. The CEB 
17The ACT consists of four subtests: English, mathematics, social studies, and natural sciences. Each 
subtest has a score range of one to 36, with means varying by subtest from 17.2 (social studies) to 20.8 (natural 
sciences), and all with a standard deviation of 5.5. Validity coefficients for ACT composite scores (the average of 
all subtests) are around .40 to .50, when correlated with college grade point average. See Ann Anastasi, 
Psychological Testing (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1982). 
18L. P. Willemin, Officer Prediction Research of the U.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, 
Paper presented at the Conference of Department of the Army Military Management Team Chiefs, Washington, 
D.C., 1967. 
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was then renamed the Officer Selection Battery (OSB) Forms 1 and 2, which is 
currently used for selection into Army OCS.19 
A new test-OSB Forms 3 and 4-was developed for the selection of ROTC 
nonscholarship students beginning in school year 1986-87. Work on the new test, 
which is completely separate from OSB Forms 1 and 2, began in the early 1980s. 
The test content is based on a job analysis conducted to identify performance 
dimensions required of Army lieutenants. The factors assessed with the OSB Forms 
3 and 4 include initiative, decision making, administration, communication, 
interpersonal manner, technical knowledge, and combat performance. 
2. The OAR-AQT-FAR 
Research on the selection of Navy aviation candidates began in the 1920s. 
At the time, selection of candidates for flight school was based primarily on physical 
standards-but it soon became apparent that physical qualifications were not 
sufficient predictors of an individual's ability to complete flight training. Interviews 
were eventually incorporated into the medical examination, probing the applicant's 
character, motivation, and intelligence. 
In 1939, the Civilian Pilot Training (CPT) program was inaugurated to 
provide a civilian pilot combat force for Army and Navy flight sections. Selection for 
CPT used biographical inventories, psychomotor tests, and paper-and-pencil 
cognitive tests. By the start of World War II, the Navy was using three tests (also 
used in CPT) to select flight candidates: the Wonderlich Personnel Test (PT), the 
Bennet Mechanical Comprehension Test (MCT), and the Purdue Biographical 
Inventory (BI). 
The first Naval aviation selection test battery was introduced in 1942. The 
BI and the MCT were combined to make up the Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR). The 
following year, the PT was replaced with the Aviation Classification Test (ACT), a 
test of general intelligence that included judgment, arithmetic reasoning, vocab-
ulary, meter-reading, and checking. The ACT and the FAR were refined and new 
forms were administered in 1944. 
19The Officer Candidate Test (OCT), first introduced by the Army in 1967, was previously used to screen 
male applicants for OCS. The OCT included mathematical computations, word knowledge, and scientific and 
technical subjects. 
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The Aviation Selection Test Battery (ASTE) was introduced in 1953. It 
consisted of the Aviation Qualification Test or AQT (a replacement for the ACT), 
new forms of the MCT and the BI, as well as a newly-created Spatial Apperception 
Test (SAT). In 1971, a new version of the ASTE was implemented. (The SAT and the 
BI were revised by the Educational Testing Service, and the AQT and the MCT were 
revised by the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.) A year later, the Officer 
Aptitude Rating (OAR), a composite of the AQT and MCT, was added for use in 
selecting candidates for nonaviation programs. 
The ASTE-an "aviation" test battery-is still used as a selection device 
for the Navy's OCS program (through the OAR composite). At the same time, the 
FAR (currently a composite of the MCT, SAT, and BI) and the AQT are used as part 
of the screening process for Navy and Marine Corps flight training programs. (The 
AQT, a measure of verbal and quantitative aptitude, was validated against perfor-
mance in preflight ground school; and the FAR was validated against the criterion of 
passing flight training.) 
The ASTE has been under revision since 1981. Experimental forms (for 
validation studies) are currently being administered to midshipmen at the Naval 
Academy, students in Naval ROTC, and aviation candidates processing through the 
Naval Air Station (Pensacola). It is anticipated that the revised ASTE will be ready 
for use sometime during 1991.20 According to a testing practice book, called Officer 
Candidate Tests, "it is probable that the test items will still measure academic, 
mechanical, and spatial aptitudes, and the biographical inventory will measure 
basic knowledge of aerospace, as well as mature judgment, risk-taking willingness 
and other personal attributes essential for successful performance in pilot and naval 
flight training."21 Actually, Navy testing psychologists expect that certain ASTE 
components-especially the biographical inventory-will be modified to reflect the 
many changes that have taken place in training and technology over the past 20 
years (when the previous ASTE revision was first published).22 
20Jnformation on the ASTB revision is from conversations with staff members at the Navy Medical 
Research and Development Office, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. 
21Weiner, Officer Candidate Tests, p. 31. 
22Personal communications with the Navy Medical Research and Development Office, which is 
responsible for developing and validating the revised ASTB. 
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3. TheAFOQT 
Prior to World War II, candidates for aircrew training were required to 
have completed at least two years of college. In 1941, this requirement was dropped 
because of a manpower shortage. With the war came a rapidly increasing demand 
for aircrew personnel (pilots, navigators, and bombardiers) and the need for more 
effective screening methods. The Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination (ACQE) 
was created to replace the two-year college requirement for screening Army aircrew 
officers. The ACQE proved to be valuable in predicting training outcomes and was 
used until 1947. 
The Army's Aviation Psychology Program also introduced the Aircrew 
Classification Battery (ACB) in 1942. It consisted of both paper-and-pencil tests and 
psychomotor tests and was used primarily for classification. It was additionally used 
for the screening of aircrew members over the succeeding five-year period. 
The Aviation Cadet-Officer Candidate-Qualifying Test (AC-OC-QT) 
replaced the ACQE and ACB as an experimental screening device for various Air 
Force programs, including nonaviation OCS. The test was revised in 1950 and 
renamed the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Test (ACQT). One year later, the ACB was 
reintroduced in a revised form and used for both aircrew and nonaviation screening. 
The Air Force Officer Qualifying Test (AFOQT) was developed in 1951. 
The preliminary form incorporated the AC-OC-QT. Over the past four decades, the 
AFOQT has been revised many times. Currently, the AFOQT contains more than 
300 test items and takes over four hours to complete. It consists of 16 subtests, 
which are grouped to form the following five composites: Pilot, Navigator-Technical, 
Academic Aptitude, Verbal, and Quantitative. The Pilot and Navigator-Technical 
composites are used to help select candidates for training in these respective areas. 
The Verbal and Quantitative composites are used in screening individuals for OTS. 
The various composites also play a limited role in helping officer candidates find 
appropriate Air Force occupations. 
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4. TheASVAB 
The ASV AB has been used by all Armed Services in screening candidates 
for enlistment since.1976.23 It is taken each year by nearly two million applicants to 
the military and high school students (as part of a high school testing program), 
making it the most widely used multiple aptitude battery and the largest-volume 
employment test in the United States. 
Various forms of the ASV AB have been developed since the original ver-
sion was introduced in 1968. It presently consists often subtests, reflecting "subject 
areas which have shown validity through prediction of training criteria in each of 
the Services."24 The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a composite of four 
ASV AB subtests, and is employed by all Services in their enlistment screening. In 
addition, the Armed Services have developed their own aptitude composites, which 
are used to supplement the AFQT in determining enlistment eligibility and to class-
ify enlistees for job training.25 
As previously noted, portions of the ASV AB are used for screening officer 
candidates. The Army, for example, requires that OCS applicants achieve a passing 
score on the General-Technical (GT) composite, which includes the arithmetic 
reasoning, word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension subtests of the ASVAB. 
In addition, OCS applicants in the Marine Corps may take the Electronics Repair 
(EL) composite, consisting of the general science, arithmetic reasoning, mathematics 
knowledge, and electronics information subtests of the ASV AB. 
The Marine Corps also requires that all of its newly commissioned officers 
take the General Classification Test (GCT). The GCT is actually the Army General 
Classification Test (or AGCT), a test of "general learning ability" that was developed 
23The American military is a pioneer in the field of aptitude testing, with a rich history of enlistment 
screening that dates back to 1917. Readers interested in the history of military testing at the enlisted level are 
referred to M. J. Eitelberg, J. H. Lawrence, and B. K. Waters, Screening for Service (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], September 1984); and M. J. Eitelberg, 
Manpower for Military Occupations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Force 
'.11:anagement and Personr- el], April 1988). 
24Department of Defense, Test Manuol for the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Chicago, IL: 
Military Entrance Processing Command, July 1984), p. 94. 
25See Eitelberg, Manpower for Military Occupations, for a comprehensive description of the military's 
aptitude composites. 
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during World War II and used as an aid in assigning new recruits to military jobs. 
The GCT (AGCT) emphasizes spatial thinking and quantitative analysis, while 
"keeping at a minimum items greatly influenced by amount of schooling and by 
cultural inequities."26 The test results are not intended for use in assigning officers 
to occupations or in making personnel decisions, but the scores appear in every 
Marine officer's personnel record. 
HOW THE APl'ITUDE TESTS ARE USED IN SELECTING OFFICER 
CANDIDATES 
Because there are such varied uses of aptitude tests both across and within the 
Armed Services, it is difficult to describe all of the testing policies and practices in a 
concise and organized fashion. This review therefore focuses on the various 
approaches employed by the separate Services within the context of the three major 
sources of officer candidates: the academies, ROTC (scholarship and nonscholar-
ship), and OCS. 
Academies 
All three Service academies use the "whole person" system for evaluating 
applicants. At West Point, a "whole person score" is derived from weighting three 
factors: academic aptitude, which combines SAT or ACT scores with high school 
rank (60 percent); leadership potential, which is estimated from athletic participa-
tion in high school and high school teacher recommendations (30 percent); and 
physical aptitude, which is measured with the Academy's Physical Aptitude Exami-
nation (10 percent). The Naval Academy assigns each applicant a numerical score, 
called the "candidate multiple," calculated from the following variables: SAT or ACT 
scores; high school class rank; evaluations by high school teachers; participation in 
extracurricular activities; and specially adapted scales from the Strong-Campbell 
Interest Inventory, which is designed to assess areas of interest and to predict 
career retention. The Air Force Academy's "selection composite" is similar to West 
Point's "whole person score" and is derived by weighting and combining the 
26Staff, Personnel Research Section (The A<ijutant General's Office), "The Army General Classification 
Test," Psychological Bulletin 42 (December 1945): 760. The Marine Corp version of the AGCT consists of four 
subtests: reading and vocabulary, arithmetic computation, arithmetic reasoning, and pattern analysis. 
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following elements: academics, which adds together SAT or ACT scores with high 
school rank (60 percent); extracurricular activities (20 percent); an admissions panel 
rating (20 percent); and an interview and candidate fitness test (no specified 
weighting). 
There are no strict cut-off scores for the SAT or ACT in West Point's admission 
process; rather, a candidate's scores are weighted and combined with high school 
rank to produce either a "CEER" score (for applicants who have taken the SAT) or 
an "ACEER" score (for those who have taken the ACT).27 However, "general guide-
lines" are used to evaluate applicants on the basis of their SAT or ACT scores, 
depending each year on the number and quality of persons applying. In 1987, the 
general guidelines for aptitude test scores were set at the following levels: 470 on 
the SAT Verbal and 500 on the SAT Math; or 19 on the ACT English and 22 on the 
ACT Math.28 At the same time, the guideline for high school rank was established 
at the top 40 percent of the graduating class. 
The most heavily weighted component of the Naval Academy's "candidate mul-
tiple" score is the SAT or ACT score combined with high school rank. The combina-
tion of these two factors makes up about 60 percent of the "candidate multiple." As 
of 1987, minimum scores on the SAT were set at 520 for the Verbal and 600 for the 
Math. Minimum scores on the ACT we1·e 24 for the English and 28 for the Math.29 
Cut-off scores at the Air Force Academy in 1987 were established at 500 for the 
SAT Verbal and 550 for the SAT Math; or 21 on the English, 24 on the Math, 19 on 
the Social Studies, and 24 on the Natural Sciences components of the ACT. In addi-
tion, an applicant's high school rank had to be in the top 40 percent of the graduat-
ing class. The cut-off scores at the Air Force Academy, as well as at the other 
academies, may be waived for applicants who demonstrate exceptional potential in 
other areas of qualification. 
27CEER is an acronym derived from .Qollege Entrance Examination Scores and High School Rank. 
ACEER is from ,American .Qollege Entrance Examination and High School Rank. 
28The scales for SAT and ACT scores are described above in notes 16 and 17, respectively. 
29The formula for weighting the SAT Verbal and SAT Math has recently changed. Equal weighting of the 
two components had been used. As of 1988, the SAT Math is triple-weighted with respect to the SAT Verbal. 
(The implications of this change are discussed in Section 5.) 
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Applicants to the Service academies must also receive a nomination from a 
legal authority, such as a member of Congress. Those who meet the minimum 
qualifications of each institution then have their files reviewed by an admissions 
board. Subjective appraisals of an applicant's qualifications may be made at this 
point. In fact, at the Naval Academy, the admissions board may adjust an appli-
cant's "candidate multiple" by up to 20 percent. The rationale here is that reviewers 
may be able to see something important in a candidate's background, a positive or 
negative characteristic otherwise omitted from the "whole person" rating. 
ROTC: Scholarship Programs 
The Army employs a "whole person score" (WPS) in selecting candidates for its 
four-year scholarship program. The WPS is composed of the following weighted 
factors: SAT or ACT score (25 percent); high school class standing (25 percent); 
participation in extracurricular activities and other elements that show leadership 
ability (40 percent); and the Physical Aptitude Examination (PAE) (10 percent). 
The Army's WPS has a score range of 1 through 999; and cut-off scores can 
change from one year to the next, depending on the number and quality of appli-
cants. Nevertheless, the four-year scholarship program does establish specific cut-off 
scores for the SAT and ACT-and, if these minimums are not met, the candidate is 
rejected without further review. During the 1987-88 school year, applicants were 
required to achieve a minimum SAT score of850 (combined Verbal and Math) or an 
ACT composite score of 17. 
In recent years, 81 percent of students with four-year scholarships had SAT 
scores between 1000 and 1399; and 12 percent scored between 1400 and 1600. About 
92 percent of scholarship recipients finished high school in the top 25 percent of 
their graduating class. In addition, 82 percent had won varsity athletic letters, close 
to half had been a captain of a varsity athletic team, 63 percent were members of 
the National Honor Society, and more than four out of five had been an officer of 
their high school or senior class.ao 
30From Solomon Weiner, ROTC College Handbook, 1988-90 (New York: ARCO, 1988), p. 12. 
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The Navy's four-year scholarship program uses a two-step process in selecting 
students: initial screening, followed by final selection. SAT or ACT scores serve as 
the sole criterion for initial screening. Those who qualify are then reviewed by a 
selection board. During the 1987-88 school year, initial selection required a score of 
at least 950 on the SAT (450 Verbal and 500 Math), or 42 on the ACT (19 English 
and 23 Math). Applicants who achieve the minimum required test scores are then 
evaluated on the basis of several weighted factors: SAT or ACT scores (19 percent); 
high school rank (56 percent); results of a structured interview by a Navy officer (10 
percent); results of the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory, used to predict career 
tenure (9 percent); and scores derived from a biographical questionnaire designed to 
predict retention (5 percent).31 
In the initial screening for an Air Force four-year scholarship, applicants are 
required to meet the following criteria before any further consideration is given: 
high school grade point average of 2.5 (A=4, B=3, C=2); high school class standing in 
the top 25 percent; and an SAT score of 1000 (with a minimum of 450 on the Verbal 
and 500 on the Math) or an ACT composite score of 23 (with at least 19 on the 
English portion and 20 on the Math). An applicant's intended major in college is also 
very important, as evidenced by the results in a recent school year: 77 percent of the 
Air Force's four-year scholarships went to engineering majors; 18 percent went to 
science majors; and just 5 percent were given to nontechnical majors (in business, 
accounting, economics, and management).32 Applicants who have achieved the 
minimum test scores and high school grades are then evaluated by a scholarship 
selection board. The board reviews academic records, test scores, leadership experi-
ence, extracurricular activities, and work experience. A personal interview, 
responses to a questionnaire, and evaluations by high school officials are also used 
by the board in awarding scholarships. 
The Army requires the same SAT and ACT minimum scores for its three-year 
scholarship program as it does for the four-year program. However, SAT and ACT 
scores are not used in the selection process for the two-year scholarship program. 
Instead, a passing grade point average of 2.0 is needed to qualify for further 
consideration. 
31 In 1988, a new weighting formula was introduced for calculating SAT scores: 70 percent for the SAT 
Math and 30 percent for the SAT Verbal, in place of the previous combination of 50 percent each for Math and 
Verbal. 
32Weiner, ROTC College Handbook p. 27. 
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The Air Force follows the same basic procedures in selecting candidates for its 
various odd-year scholarship programs as it does for its four-year program. How-
ever, since the applicant has been in college for at least one year, college grade point 
average is substituted for high school average and no minimum scores are set for 
the SAT or ACT.33 Furthermore, the applicant is required to achieve a minimum 
score on the AFOQT. 
ROTC: Nonscholarshlp Programs 
Currently, the Army's nonscholarship program uses the Precommissioning 
Assessment System (PAS) for selecting candidates. Precommissioning selection 
normally occurs at the beginning of the junior year in college. Applicants are 
evaluated on the basis of physical fitness, grades, participation in extracurricular 
activities, writing skills, and motivation (as interpreted through a structured 
interview). Applicants must also achieve a passing score on the OSB Forms 3 and 4. 
A score of 90 or above on the OSB is generally required. (The OSB scale has a mean 
of 100 and a standard deviation of 20.) Candidates scoring below 90 may be 
accepted, and guidelines are provided on how to treat such cases. For example, 
persons scoring from 81 through 89 may be subjected to a "whole person evaluation," 
which may find outstanding performance in another area (such as grade point 
average) and be seen to compensate for the lower OSB score. Individuals scoring 
between 71 and 80 are required to undergo a whole person evaluation; and those 
scoring below 70 require a whole person evaluation as well as a "special selection 
justification." 
The nonscholarship portion of the Navy's ROTC program is called the college 
program. College program students are selected by individual units, and standards 
vary by unit. There are no centrally established admission criteria. (Selection for 
scholarship programs of less than four years also takes place within the various 
units, with no uniform criteria.) 
33Air Force authorities note that relatively little weight (no more than 20 percent) is attached to SAT or 
ACT scores in programs where information is available on college grades or performance in college ROTC 
courses. In addition, officers assigned to the review board to assess candidates are "briefed on the differences in 
SAT performance by sex and race, so that these differences are taken into account in the interpretation of 
individual scores,'' From Department of Air Force, "Comments on Draft Paper," 3 March 1989. 
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The Air Force uses the AFOQT in screening applicants for its nonscholarship 
programs. Minimum required scores are 15 on the Verbal composite and 10 on the 
Quantitative compqsite. (Percentile scores are used. The normative population has a 
relatively high ability level considered necessary for officer applicants.) Pilot 
candidates additionally require scores of 25 on the Pilot composite and 10 on the 
Navigator-Technical composite; and navigator candidates require scores of 10 on 
the Pilot composite and 25 on the Navigator-Technical composite. (The scores for 
pilots and navigators on these two composites must also add up to a total of at least 
50.) 
Applicants to nonscholarship programs in the Air Force are then given a Qual-
ity Index score. The Quality Index score is made up of both academic and 
nonacademic factors that are weighted about equally. Nonacademic factors include: 
the detachment commander's overall rating; review board ratings of self-confidence, 
human relations, extracurricular participation, and communication skills (from a 
structured interview and written exercise); and a physical fitness test. The academic 
component includes cumulative grade point average and the scores on two AFOQT 
composites (Verbal and Quantitative). An applicant must also be in "good standing" 
with the academic requirements of his or her college, or possess a cumulative grade 
point average of 2.0 (on a 4.0 scale) if the college does not have a "good standing" 
rule.34 
OCS Programs (including Marine Corps Programs) 
Factors considered in the selection of candidates for Army OCS include the 
Physical Aptitude Examination, college grade point average, letters of recommenda-
tion from former employers and professors, college major (engineering and science 
are preferred), and an interview by a selection board. Scores on the OSB (Forms 1 
and 2) and the GT composite of the ASVAB are also used in the selection process. As 
with Army ROTC, these factors are not weighted, but are reviewed as part of the 
"whole person" evaluation. 
34rt should be noted that all Air Force ROTC participants eventually must have a Quality Index score. 
The Quality Index is used for admission into the last two years of ROTC, called the Professional Officer Course, 
when students actually contract with the Air Force to serve after graduation. The Air Force procedure is said to 
emphasize nonacademic characteristics of applicants-including "motivation, flexibility, assertiveness, 
perseverance, responsibility, self.confidence, cooperation, decisiveness, organization, leadership, and moral 
values." See Department of Air Force, "Comments on Draft Paper," 3 March 1989. 
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To be eligible to apply to Army OCS, an applicant must have a minimum score 
of 90 on the technical-managerial leadership (cognitive) subtest of the OSB and a 
minimum score of 110 on the GT composite.35 The applicant's file is then sent to a 
selection board. The selection board, in turn, assigns a numerical rating to each 
applicant. The highest rated applicants are selected, based on the number of avail-
able positions in OCS. 
The Navy OCS and AOCS programs consider an applicant's collegiate grade 
point average, extracurricular activities, employment record, and physical examina-
tion results.36 However, before an individual is allowed to apply, he or she must 
achieve a qualifying score on one or more of the ASTB composites. 
Navy OCS uses the OAR composite as a preliminary screening device and 
generally requires that individuals obtain a score of at least 40.37 As part of the 
Navy's affirmative action program, racial or ethnic minorities who score from 36 to 
40 on the OAR can be accepted as students at the Officer Candidate Preparatory 
School before being placed in OCS. The Navy's OACS program uses the AQT-FAR 
composites for preliminary screening. In 1987-88, minimum cut-off scores were set 
at 6 on the AQT and 7 on the FAR.38 
Persons who wish to enter the Air Force OTS program are required to first 
achieve a minimum score on the AFOQT. The individual's application is then sub-
mitted to a central selection board for evaluation. The selection board considers 
factors such as collegiate grade point average, AFOQT scores (the Academic 
Aptitude, Pilot, and Navigator-Technical composites for candidates applying for 
rated commissions), college major, work or military experience, and. leadership 
potential. No weighting formula is used by the board in evaluating a candidate's 
qualifications. 
As previously noted, the Marine Corps may commission up to 16 percent of 
graduates from the Naval Academy each year and the same proportion of students 
completing Naval ROTC. Students who enter ROTC under the Marine Corps option 
are required to have an SAT score of 1000 (combined Verbal and Math) instead of 
35The OSB is interpreted on a standard score scale with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20. 
36Swimming ability is also an important factor in determining eligibility for AOCS. 
37The OAR score range is O through 100 with a mean of 50. 
38The score scale for both the AQT and the FAR is in stanines with a mean of 5. 
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the Navy's requirement of 950. This is the only difference between the Navy and the 
Marine Corps in aptitude selection criteria for ROTC. 
To enter the Platoon Leaders Class, an applicant must have an SAT score of at 
least 1000 or an ACT score of at least 45 (combined English and Math) or an ASV AB 
EL composite score of 120 or higher (with waivers granted to 115).39 Applicants for 
the Marine Officer Candidate Course and the Enlisted Commissioning Education 
Program must meet the same aptitude requirements as are used for the Platoon 
Leaders Class; however, under the latter program, otherwise qualified applicants 
may receive a waiver to 900 on the SAT and to 40 on the ACT. The requirements for 
the Enlisted Commissioning Program in the Marine Corps are the same as for the 
Enlisted Commissioning Education Program. In addition to the aptitude scores 
listed above, aviation applicants are required to obtain minimum scores on the AQT-
FAR composites of the ASTB (with the opportunity for a waiver). 
Applicants who are able to achieve the required minimum scores for Marine 
programs are then evaluated under the "whole person" concept. For most of the 
Marine Corps programs, the following factors are considered: recommendations from 
professors or employers; college transcripts; physical examination results; and the 
individual's work or military record. These factors are not weighted in any formal 
manner by Marine Corps reviewers. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APTITUDE TEST SCORES AND 
OFFICER PERFORMANCE 
The earliest use of an aptitude test to select officers grew out of the Navy's 
efforts to screen aviator candidates after World War I. High attrition rates of officers 
in flight school and studies of World War I pilot casualties pointed to the need for 
standardized psychological methods for selecting aviators. The first screening device 
developed to improve aviation selection was a psychological interview. It was added 
to the general medical examination and was intended to assess a candidate's 
c·1aracter, motivation, and intelligence. Several years later, other screening 
devices-such as biographical inventories, psychomotor tests, and paper-and-pencil 
cognitive tests-were added to the process for selecting flight school candidates in 
both the Navy and the Army Air Corps. 
39Tbe EL composite scores are based on a standard score scale with a mean of 100 and a standard 
deviation of 20. 
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The first efforts to screen aviator candidates eventually spilled over into other 
areas of officer selection and job placement. The manpower mobilization for World 
War II brought an increasing need for better means of selecting and assigning new 
officers-specifically, for psychological tests that could be used to screen officer can-
didates and to place them in jobs where their chances for success were best. Thus 
began close to 50 years of extensive research and development of officer aptitude 
testing in the Armed Forces.40 
Current resea_rch on the relationship between aptitude test scores and officer 
performance can be categorized according to the criteria used in developing the tests 
and setting minimum standards. Generally, five different types of criteria are 
employed by the military's testing psychologists: (1) college grade point average; (2) 
training course grade; (3) school or training attrition; (4) military performance 
rating; and (5) job performance. These criteria are often applied in various combina-
tions, depending on the purpose of the test, but are discussed separately below. 
College Grade Point Average 
Military studies relating aptitude test performance to college grade point aver-
age (GPA) are conducted in the academies and ROTC, all of which use the SAT or 
ACT. The academies validate their selection composites annually. 
As previously discussed, an applicant's SAT or ACT score is usually combined with 
high school rank to define the "academic" portion of a selection index (called the 
"whole person score" at West Point, the "candidate multiple" at Annapolis, and 
the "selection composite" at Colorado Springs). Validation at West Point is therefore 
based on this academic measure (referred to as the CEER or ACEER score), rather 
than on the SAT or ACT alone. For example, a recent West Point validation study 
correlating CEER scores (the SAT version) with freshman GPA produced a multiple 
correlation coefficient of .63.41 An earlier study produced somewhat higher results, 
40see Brown, Military Officers, for a more complete discussion of the history of officer testing. 
41 R. P. Butler, "Display of Admission Variables," (Memorandum for the Record) (West Point, NY: U.S. 
Military Academy, Office of the Director of Institutional Research, 1985). The coefficients presented in this sub-
section are indices of the relationship between predictors (e.g., an aptitude test) and a criterion (e.g., completion 
of training, freshman GPA, etc.). A perfect positive correlation would have a coefficient of one. A perfect negative 
correlation would have a coefficient of minus one. When there is no relationship, the coefficient would be zero. 
For comparison, an average correlation between a cognitive test on an observed job performance criterion would 
be around .21; and for a training performance criterion, about .25. It should be noted that these coefficients tend 
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with coefficients of .69 and .71 for the classes of 1977 and 1978, respectively.42 By 
comparison, validation studies conducted by the Educational Testing Service 
typically yield correlations of .35 for each component of the SAT; and coefficients of 
about .54 are found when both Verbal and Math components are combined with 
high school grades.43 
Two Navy studies offer a somewhat different view, showing bivariate cor-
relations between individual components of the Academy's "academic" measure and 
freshman GPA. For the SAT Verbal, correlations run between .34 and .38. On the 
SAT Math, higher correlations are found, ranging from .42 to .50. At the same time, 
high school rank tends to correlate with freshman GPA at around .44 to .53.44 
The Air Force Academy validates its "academic" measure against freshman 
GP A each year. Although current validity studies from the Air Force Academy are 
unavailable in published form, researchers report that the coefficients run from 
around .48 to .62.45 
Validation studies are not routinely conducted for the ROTC programs because 
of the large number of host institutions and affiliated colleges. Consequently, admi-
nistrators of the ROTC programs rely on studies conducted by the Educational 
Testing Service or American College Testing Program or others to monitor the 
predictive utility of the SAT and ACT. It can also be said that they rely somewhat on 
the host institution's own ability to select students who have a good chance of 
succeeding. 
to underestimate the true relationship due to errors in criterion measurement and restriction ofrange (for officer 
programs, the use of a selective, previously-screened population of college-bound applicants or college 
graduates). 
42T. G. Davidson, CEER/ACEER as a Predictor of Academic Grade Point Average, 77-014 (West Point, 
NY: U.S. Military Academy, Office of the Director oflnstitutional Research, 1977). 
43TJ,e higher coefficients reported by West Point may be due to the fact that the criteria are drawn from a 
single institution with a somewhat different course of study. Validation studies by the Educational Testing Ser-
vice involve a variety of colleges and universities, with less consistency among performance criteria. 
44J. D. Mattson, I. Neumann, and N. M. Abrahams, Development of a Revised Composite for NROTC 
Selection (San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1986); and I. Neumann and N. M. 
Abrahams, Empirical Weighting of Predictors for the Naval Academy Selectum Program, NPRDC-TR-76-37 (San 
Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1976). 
45Research Department, Air Force Academy, personal communication, February 1986. 
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One published study that revised the Navy's ROTC selection composite was 
available for review. Correlations of the SAT components and high school rank with 
freshman GPA were comparatively low. Coefficients with GPA were .10 for the SAT 
Verbal, .18 for the SAT Math, and .29 for high school rank.46 The lower correlations 
in this study are probably due to the variety of institutions from which the criterion 
(GPA) measures were obtained. 
Training/Course Grade 
Studies relating aptitude test scores to military training performance focus on 
the tests developed by the Services themselves primarily for screening into OCS 
programs. These tests are geared more toward college graduates, so prediction of 
collegiate performance is no longer needed. 
Validation of the OSB Forms 3 and 4 against faculty ratings of officer potential 
for a sample of 2,805 college juniors enrolled in ROTC produced coefficients of .26 
(for Form 3) and .28 (for Form 4). Form 3 was also validated against the final grade 
in the Officer Basic Course, required of all Army officers upon commissioning, 
resulting in a correlation of .52.47 The validity of OSB Forms 1 and 2 was also 
determined using the Officer Basic Course final grade. The Technical-Managerial 
subtest employed for selection into OCS showed a coefficient of .29.48 
There are several studies relating the AFOQT aptitude composites with the 
final course grade in non-rated (or non-flight) training courses. One study examined 
this relationship for 1,025 officers from OTS in eight different non-rated courses. 
The majority of the coefficients were positive and significant, and between .20 and 
.35.49 Interestingly enough, the rated composites (or flight composites, meaning 
Pilot and Navigator-Technical) had coefficients comparable to those of the academic 
46Mattson et al., Development of a Revised Composite. 
4 7M. A. Fischl et al., Development of Officer Selection Battery Forms 3 and 4, Technical Report 603 
(Alexandria, V k Anny Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1986). 
48A. C. F. Gilbert, Predictive Utility oftM Officer Evaluation Battery (OEB), Paper presented at the 20th 
Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association, Oklahoma, OK, 1978. 
49T. 0. Arth and M. J. Skinner, Aptitude Selectors for Air Force Officer Non-Aircrew Jobs, Paper 
presented at the 94th Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association, 1986. 
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composites. (This suggests that these flight composites may predict success in non-
flight training as well as the general aptitude composites.) Another study that used 
9,029 officers attending one of 37 technical training courses over a four-year time 
span shows very similar results. Most correlations were between .20 and .40, and in 
some instances the rated composites correlated higher with success in the training 
courses than did the non-rated composites.SO 
In 1983, a study was conducted to validate the SAT and ASV AB EL composite 
in predicting Marine Corps training performance. The criteria in this study were 
grades in The Basic School (TBS). (TBS is a comprehensive, five-month program 
required of every Marine Corps commissioned officer.) Correlations corrected for 
range restriction were .72 for the SAT and .73 for the ASVAB EL. Additionally, the 
study validated AQT-FAR and OAR scores. Using the same criteria, the coefficients 
were .65 for the AQT, .29 for the FAR, and .67 for the OAR. In this case, the general 
aptitude measures appear the best at predicting academic performance in TBS, 
which is a non-specialized, non-technical school. The lowest of these relationships 
was found for the FAR, which is designed primarily to predict success in flight 
school.51 
School/l'raining Attrition 
The Naval Academy has consistently used student attrition as a criterion in its 
test validation research. One recent study is especially interesting in its categoriza-
tion of different types of student attrition. Three types of attrition were examined in 
the study, including voluntary resignation, all disenrollment, and academic 
disenrollment only. The SAT Verbal, SAT Math, and high school class rank were 
each found to be the best at predicting academic disenrollment, with point-biserial 
correlations of .21, .37, and .29, respectively. On the other hand, all three predictors 
were also the least effective in predicting voluntary resignation, with negative 
SOT. 0. Arth, Validation of the AFOQT for Non-Rated Officers, AFHRL-TR-85-50 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air 
Force Human Resources Laboratory, 1986). 
51P. Stoloff, Officer Selection Study, CNR-53 (Alexandria, VA; Center for Naval Analyses, 1983). 
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correlations in two cases. All disenrollment showed relatively small correlations 
with the aptitude predictors, near .10 or less.52 
A recent Air Force study sought to establish the validity of the AFOQT in pre-
dicting successful completion of training in air weapons control. Specific grades were 
not considered in this study, just passing the course; and training attrition was 
equated with failing the course. Validity coefficients were all between .19 and .26 for 
each AFOQT composite. The Academic Aptitude composite of the AFOQT, a general 
aptitude measure consisting of verbal and quantitative components, showed the 
highest relationship with course completion.53 
A consistent finding in military studies that validate aptitude test scores with 
attrition is that quantitative composites are generally better than verbal composites 
in predicting who will finish school or complete training.54 This may relate to the 
fact that scientific and technical subjects are emphasized to a great extent in the 
military's training and education programs. 
Military Performance Rating 
A "military performance rating" is given to students enrolled in the Service 
academies. This rating is based on the student's military knowledge and conduct, 
and it has been used in academy validation studies as a component or measure of 
overall student performance. For example, a recent West Point study found that 
SAT scores and high school rank-when combined with other factors-were helpful 
in predicting a cadet's military performance rating: athletic participation and 
extracurricular activities scores (measured on a standardized score scale), when 
applied alone, produced a coefficient of .26; adding SAT scores and high school rank 
52r. Neumann, Revision of the United States Naval Academy Selection Composite (San Diego: Navy 
Personnel Research and Development Center, 1986). A previous study found very similar results; however, 
academic disenrollment was not viewed separately. (See Neumann and Abrahams, Empirical Weighting.) At the 
same time, a study of Air Force Academy cadets showed almost no relationship between the SAT and early 
"motivational elimination"-with correlations ranging between .01 and .11. (See R. E. Miller, Predicting First-
Year Achievement of Air Force Academy Cadets, Class of 1968, AFHRL-TR-68-103 [Lackland AFB, TX: Personnel 
Research Division, Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, 1968]). 
53L. S. Finegold and D. Rogers, Relationship Between Air Force Officer Qualifying Test Scores and Success 
in Air Weapons Controller Training, AFHRL-TR-85-13 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Labora-
tory, 1985). 
54See Ibid.; Neumann, Revision; Neumann and Abrahams, Empirical Weighting; and Mi11er, Predicting 
First-Year Achievement. 
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to athletic participation and extracurricular activities scores resulted in a coefficient 
of .32.55 
At the same time, several Navy studies suggest an inconsistent relationship 
between aptitude test scores and military performance ratings. One study, for 
instance, found comparatively high correlations between the SAT (.28 for the SAT 
Verbal and .35 for the SAT Math) and Naval Academy ratings.56 Yet, a study of 
Naval ROTC students found virtually no correlational relationship between similar 
variables.57 And an earlier study of midshipmen at the Naval Academy resulted in 
much smaller correlational values for the SAT Verbal (.10) and the SAT Math 
(.13).58 
The only available Air Force study on the subject adds to the confusion. Using 
the military performance rating as a criterion, Air Force researchers found a small 
negative correlation (-.09) for the SAT Verbal and a small positive correlation (.04) 
for the SAT Math.59 
The variety of results on this measure suggests that there is a lack of unifor-
mity both between Services and within Services on how the military performance 
rating is defined, scored, and applied. The findings of studies conducted at the Naval 
Academy also suggest that performance ratings may have been modified over time 
to be more reflective of academic skills. 
Job Performance 
Job performance measures are difficult to obtain on a standardized basis. 
Consequently, many studies of military job performance rely on substitute measures 
that are more accurately called indicators of job-related behavior. An individual's 
promotion experience, retention, and attrition behavior are most commonly used in 
military studies because these variables are relatively easy to locate in automated 
55Butler, "Display of Admission Variables." 
56Neurnann, Revision. 
57Neumann and Abraham, Empirical Weighting. The differences between the Academy study and the 
ROTC study may be largely due to dissimilarities in the definition and computation of military performance 
ratings. 
58Ibid. 
59Mi11er, Predicting First•Year Achievement. 
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personnel data files. Information from fitness reports or a supervisor's evaluation 
may also be employed, but measures of this type are problematic in many ways and 
tend to exhibit little variance. 
Only one published study was found that compared aptitude test scores with 
the job-related experiences of officers.60 In this study, three ''job performance" vari-
ables-loss rate from active duty, Officer Effectiveness Reports (OERs), and early 
promotion to the rank of major-were examined in relation to scores on the College 
Board achievement tests and the Graduate Record Examination (GRE).61 College 
Board English achievement test scores correlated with OERs at a level of .12. 
College Board English and Math achievement test scores combined with athletic 
and extracurricular activities indices correlated with early promotion at a level of 
.44. Although the GRE is not used for selection in officer candidate programs, multi-
ple coefficients with the three criteria were comparatively high: .25 for loss rates, .44 
for early promotion, and .49 for OERs.62 
Summary of Research Literature 
The research shows that the aptitude measures currently being used by the 
Armed Services to select officer candidates are related in varying degrees to officer 
performance. The strongest relationships are found for students in college or mili-
tary training. However, evidence also exists that aptitude tests can predict training 
attrition, military performance ratings, and other areas of performance for new offi-
cers. It should be emphasized that aptitude tests are not the sole criteria for admis-
sion to military officer programs. Indeed, all precommissioning programs use 
aptitude tests in conjunction with other information on the applicant to make selec-
tion decisions. The connecting thread throughout all of these programs is a common 
reliance on the "whole person" approach to screening applicants. 
60M, J. O'Connell, The Relationship Between Air Force Academy Cadet Performance and Officer Perfor-
mance, Paper presented to the Rand Conference on Defense Manpower, 1976. 
61Most officers are rated at the very top of the scale on the OER (that is, they are given a nine on a scale 
from one to nine). The study therefore used a dichotomous variable: individuals were divided between those who 
received scores of nine on their five most recent OERs and those who did not. 
62Jt should be noted that multiple regression analyses, which generally yield higher coefficients, were 
used here. Bivariate regressions, which look at each predictor individually, are often used in other related 
studies. 
64 
The SAT and Officer Performance: Results of Preliminary Analysis63 
The Department of Defense has recently become interested in studying the 
characteristics, assignment trends, and performance of what are termed "high apti-
tude" military personnel. As part of this effort, the Department of Defense was able 
to obtain the SAT scores of about 56 percent of all officers commissioned from fiscal 
1975 through fiscal 1985. (The "SAT/officer" data base is discussed in some detail in 
Section 5 of the monograph.) 
This new information on the SAT scores of military officers opens the door to 
various studies, including an investigation of the relationship between college 
admissions test scores and selected measures of officer performance. However, there 
are obstacles to the research that can be performed in this area. First, the 
SAT/officer data base contains a limited amount of background material on officers. 
(For example, the officer's precommissioning program is missing.) Research relating 
aptitude scores to officer performance is further complicated by the restriction of 
range in officer test scores. The military's screening process has produced a highly 
selective and aptitudinally homogenized group of people, and variance in their test 
scores is relatively narrow. 
Nevertheless, a preliminary effort was made to examine the relationship 
between SAT scores and officer performance, with the help of the SAT/officer data 
base. Three traditional measures of military performance-promotion, retention, 
and attrition-formed the focus of the analysis. 
• Promotion 
Military officers are subject to an "up or out" policy of promotion. This 
policy states that individuals who are passed over for promotion twice are released 
from service. The purpose of "up or out" is to provide at each rank more qualified 
officers than there are positions at the next higher rank-creating, in essence, a 
promotion system that supposedly lets only the very best rise to the top. At the same 
time, officers who are fully qualified for promotion may find themselves "out" rather 
than "up" for any of various reasons relating more to promotion policies or their 
particular career path than to job performance. In this sense, at least, promotions 
may not actually reflect true differences in performance. 
63This subsection draws heavily from Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. Eitelberg, 
Demographics and Performance of Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, 
December 1988), draft. 
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The promotion criterion is also complicated by the fact that promotion 
periods vary between Services and between occupational groups within the separate 
Services. For example, Navy officers are usually promoted to 0-4 in 9 to 10 years, 
compared with a period of about 10 to 12 years in the other Services.64 In addition, 
using the example of the Nayy, officers assigned to aviation or nuclear power tend to 
get promoted to the middle grades faster than do those in many other fields due to 
current manning shortages; and, generally, officers in the Navy's warfare specialties 
rise through the ranks faster than do their counterparts in nonwarfare positions. 
Despite the various problems in studying promotion rates, an initial 
attempt was made to examine the relationship between SAT scores and this tradi-
tional measure of "performance." The SAT means of the sample group of officers 
(commissioned from fiscal 1975 through fiscal 1985) were compared on the basis of 
promotion or non promotion to grades 0-2 and 0-3. The results of the comparison for 
officers within the separate Services are presented in Table 19. 
It should be noted that promotion to 0-2 is virtually automatic after two 
years (one year and six months in the Army). Yet, as shown in Table 19, a small 
percentage of officers within each of the Armed Forces (ranging from 6 percent in 
the Army to less than 3 percent in the Air Force) fail to be promoted to 0-2. Since no 
one should remain as an 0-1 after sufficient time in service, it is assumed that the 
nonpromoted group are actually attrition cases--or, more precisely, persons who 
failed to complete required training subsequent to commissioning. 
Within all Services, nonetheless, the SAT mean scores of officers promoted 
to either 0-2 or 0-3 are higher than those of officers who were not promoted. These 
differences are statistically significant in all comparisons except at the level of 0-3 
in the Marine Corps. 
It is also interesting to observe that the scoring differences are consis-
tently wider at the 0-2 level than at the 0-3 level. For example, within the Army, 
officers promoted to 0-2 have an SAT mean score that is 75 points above the mean 
score of those who were not promoted; at the level of 0-3, the advantage of promoted 
officers is 29 points. This may be an effect of the natural "weeding out" process that 
occurs over time as a result of promotion, retention, and attrition-a conclusion 
64Jn 1986, 75 percent of qualified O-3s in the Army were promoted to 0-4 after 11 years and one month; 
87 percent of the Navy's qualified O-3s were promoted to 0-4 after nine years and six months of service; 80 per-
cent of qualified O-3s in the Marine Corps were promoted after 10 years and 11 months; and 90 percent of the 
Air Force's qualified O-3s were promoted after 10 years and eight months. From "Commissioned Officers, 
Promotion Opportunity and Promotion Point Years-Months," OASD (FM&P), MM&PP (O&EPM), 15 June 1987. 
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Table 19 
SAT Mean Scores of Officers Promoted and Not Promoted 
to 0-2 and 0-3, by Service 
PrQmQ!!ill! !Q Q·i!a NQ! PrQmQ!!ilQ !Q Q:;ia 
Number SAT Mean Number SAT Mean 
SERVICE of Cases Score of Cases Score 
Army 28,336 1015 1,846 940 
Navy 21,516 1113 803 1050 
Marine Corps 8,805 1011 338 972 
Air Force 32,401 1055 949 997 
PrQmQt!;ld !Q o-ab tlQt et2mQ!id IQ Q:;ib 
Number SAT Mean Number SAT Mean 
SERVICE of Cases Score of Cases Score 
Army 16,853 1027 6,071 998 
Navy 13,471 1115 2,799 1098 
Marine Corps 3,984 1012 3,137 1008 
Air Force 21,198 1059 2,984 1028 
Source: Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. Eltelberg, Demographics and f'erformance of 
Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, December 1988), draft. 
Note: All mean differences are statistically significant at the level of .01 (using at test), with the exception of 
the mean difference for the Marine Corps in pay grade 0-3, which is not statistically significant (t value of 
-.89). 
aOfficers commissioned from fiscal 1975 through fiscal 1983. 
bOfficers commissioned from fiscal 1975 through fiscal 1981. 
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supported by the fact that the SAT mean scores of officers, when compared by 
promoted or not-promoted categories, are higher at the 0-3 level than at the level of 
0-2 within all four Services. 
• Retention 
Retention, or longevity, is another measure that is often placed under the 
general heading of "performance," although it is more accurately tied to career 
behavior. Manpower analysts use it as a "performance" measure because it shows 
the longer-term return to the military of its investment in the recruiting and train-
ing of personnel. In addition, retention serves to show how well the individual has 
"fit" into the military environment-assuming that people stay in service because: 
(a) they are perceived to be good performers by their employer (and are thus 
encouraged to continue), and (b) they themselves prefer to extend their employment. 
The main obstacle in studying the retention experiences of officers is that 
the individual's initial active duty obligation depends on his or her source of com-
mission. For example, the academies now require a five-year active duty obligation; 
and ROTC and OCS obligations for active service may last from three months to six 
years, depending on the type of precommissioning program and the size of the 
military's investment in training and education.65 Furthermore, the programs that 
screen on the basis of SAT scores and have the highest minimum requirements such 
as the academies, ROTC scholarship programs,and certain aviation programs-also 
have the longest active duty obligations. Unfortunately, the SAT/officer data base 
does not contain detailed information on an individual's source of commission or 
service obligation. 66 
Retention rates may also vary by occupation for several reasons, including 
participation in advanced training, programmed turnover, job market factors, 
quality of life and job satisfaction, as well as the special bonuses or economic 
65Graduates of aviation programs, for example, have longer required periods of active service because of 
the relatively expensive training. Shorter required periods of active service may involve longer periods of 
reserve duty. For instance, Army ROTC school graduates actually have an eight-year obligation of combined 
active and reserve service-allowing them to spend from two to four years on active duty, with the remainder of 
their eight-year obligation in the reserves. The Army's ROTC school graduates are also permitted to serve just 
three months on active duty, followed by eight years in the reserves. 
66The source of commission may also affect comparisons based on longevity (using months served) in 
another way. The time of the year during which an officer is commissioned may vary from program to program, 
complicating a month-by-month measure of service for officers commissioned through different programs in the 
same fiscal year. 
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incentives used to retain officers in critical fields. Occupational information on 
officers is available, and will undoubtedly be examined in future analyses. 
For the present study, a simple comparison was made using the average 
number of months served by officers and a two-way split of SAT average scores: offi-
cers scoring above the 50th percentile on the SAT (combined Verbal and Math) and 
those scoring below. (The methodology for determining percentile ranges is 
explained in Section 5 of the monograph.) 
The results of this comparison appear in Table 20. For the most part, there 
is very little difference between the number of months served by officers in each of 
the two SAT categories. The largest difference in retention is found within the 
Marine Corps, where officers in the upper 50th percentile tend to serve about six 
months longer than those in the lower 50th percentile. Within the Navy and the Air 
Force, too, retention is slightly higher (by 0.8 and 2.2 months, respectively) for those 
who scored in the upper 50th percentile. On the other hand, retention is slightly 
lower for higher-scoring officers in the Army (by a margin of 1.9 months). The com-
bined experiences of the Services give a small edge to officers in the upper 50th per-
centile, who served an average of 97 .1 months, compared with 94.1 months for those 
in the lower 50th percentile. 
• Attrition (Short Active-Duty Service) 
Individuals who do not complete their required term of service are 
categorized as personnel losses due to attrition. To measure true attrition, one must 
be able to identify those officers who leave the military before finishing a full term of 
obligated service. 
However, as stated in the discussion on retention, the SAT/officer data 
base does not include information on the active duty obligations of officers. 
"Attrition" was alternatively defined in the present study, therefore, as "short ser-
vice." Four years of service was selected for the preliminary analysis because it 
represents a relatively short period of active duty following commissioning. 67 
The numbers and percentages of officers (commissioned over the fiscal 
1975-81 period) who did not remain on actiYe duty for more than four years are dis-
played in Table 21. As seen, the percentages of officers who leave within four years 
67The initial active-duty obligation for officers in the Marine Corps Reserve was three years during the 
study period (recently increased by six months). In this case, and in the case of other reservists, short active-duty 
service may not mean separation from the military. 
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Table 20 
Average Number of Months Served for Officers Commissioned 
in Fiscal 1975, by SAT Mean Score (Above or Below 50th Percentile), 
September 1985 
Average Number of Months Serveda 
SAT Mean Scoreb 
Above5Dth Below50th 
SERVICE Percentile Percentile All Officers 
Army 92.2 94.1 92.5 
(2,859) (605) (3,464) 
Navy 95.6 94.8 95.5 
(2,202) (183) (2,385) 
Marine Corps 89.3 83.5 87.8 
(870) (300) (1,170) 
Air Force 105.6 103.4 105.3 
(2,856) (349) (3,205) 
All Services 97.1 94.1 96.7 
(8,782) (1,442) (10,224) 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data ·center. 
Based on analyses appearing in Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. 
Eitelberg, Demographics and Performance of Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude 
(Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, December 1988), draft. 
Note: Mean difference for the Army, Navy, and Air Force are not statistically significant (using 
at test). The mean difference for the Marine Corps is significant at the level of .05, and 
the difference for All Services is significant at the level of .01. 
aNumbers of officers appear in parentheses. 
bThe percentile range is based on the scores of individuals who took the SAT between 1972 and 1981. 
(See Section 5 for a description of the methodology.) 
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Table 21 
Number and Percent of Officers Who Left Active Duty 
Within Four Years of Commissioning, by SAT Mean Score 
(Above or Below 50th Percentile), September 1985 
SAT Mean Scoreb 
A!2QV£l :l!!lh P£lr1.£lnjllg l;!fallQYl 50t!J egri;g!Jl!l!il TQ!i!I 
SERVICE3 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Army 20,271 25.6 6,677 31.2 26,948 26.9 
Navy 20,259 17.6 1,876 23.5 22,135 18.1 
Marine Corps 5,929 26.2 1,634 33.8 7,563 27.8 
Air Force 20,596 12.0 4,144 16.6 24,740 12.8 
All Services 67,055 19.1 14,331 26.3 81,386 20.3 
Source: Based on data appearing in Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. Eitelberg, 
Demographics and Performance of Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, 
December 1988), draft. 
a Includes officers who were commissioned between fiscal 1975 and fiscal 1981. 
bThe percentile range is based on the scores of individuals who took the SAT between 1972 and 1981. (See 
Section 5 for a description of the methodology.) 
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are consistently lower for those with SAT scores above the 50th percentile than for 
those with scores below the 50th percentile. For all Services combined, about 19 
percent of officers scoring in the upper 50th percentile stay no more than four years 
on active duty. By comparison, the four-year rate for officers in the lower 50th per-
centile is over 26 percent. 
It should be emphasized that officers with higher SAT scores tend to be 
found in programs that have longer obligations for active duty following commis-
sioning. The results shown in Table 21 are undoubtedly affected by this factor. In 
addition, the "short service" findings may be influenced by a proportionately greater 
number oflower-50th-percentile officers opting for service in the reserves over active 
duty. All officers who leave active duty, regardless of the reason, appear as person-
nel "losses" in the SAT/officer file. In the Army, it is possible for an officer with the 
ROTC scholarship option to serve on active duty for just three months, followed by 
eight years of service in a reserve unit. Other ways are also open to newly commis-
sioned Army officers for combining active duty and reserve duty into eight years of 
obligated service. The point is, then, that without some added information on the 
individual's character of service, there is no reason to view "short service" as neces-
sarily unsatisfactory or inadequate. (Although it is possible that a particularly short 
length of active service in some occupations may fail to provide the government with 
a reasonable return on its investment in the individual's training and education.) 
The preliminary comparison of officer "performance" and SAT scores is 
inconclusive at best. Too many questions remain unanswered concerning the 
observed differences-questions that may never be totally resolved because of limi-
tations in the SAT/officer data base. Nevertheless, future studies are already being 
planned with the hope of finding an improved approach to the issue of 
"performance." One such approach calls for a more detailed analysis of the service 
histories of officers by occupational area. 68 
68see Brown, Laurence, and Eitelberg, Demographics and Performance. 
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PATHWAYS TO A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAREER: 
A VIEW FROM THE TOP 
In 1984, the editors of Newsweek commissioned a Gallup Poll of U.S. military 
generals and admirals as part of a cover story on "The Top Brass." The poll was the 
first of its kind by a national news organization. It was conducted over a six-day 
period, and surveyed a total of257 generals and admirals (more than one out of four 
flag-rank officers on active duty at the time), representing all four branches of the 
military. 69 
One of the more interesting questions on the survey asked the respondents to 
select (from a structured list) the factors they considered to be "positives" or "nega-
tives" for succeeding in the military. As shown in Table 22, almost all of the officers 
gave a positive response to "having expert combat leadership skills" (99 percent) and 
"having expert managerial skills" (98 percent). At the same time, almost nine out of 
10 officers (88 percent) felt that "being a Service academy graduate" helped one 
succeed in the military. 
Curiously, 61 percent of the general and flag officers felt that "being black" is a 
positive factor in one's chances for succeeding. There are several ways to interpret 
this result, but whatever interpretation is applied, the implication is that the color 
of an individual's skin influences his or her military career opportunities (at least in 
the eyes of these generals and admirals). The responses to "being black" may reflect 
the officers' understanding of affirmative action policies; yet, it is interesting to 
observe that "being female" is seen as having more of a negative (44 percent) than 
positive (41 percent) influence on one's opportunities for success in the military. 
The predominant view of these general officers on the positive effects of "being 
black" is not a universally shared opinion, by any means. In fact, despite vast 
improvements during the past two or three decades, blacks and other minorities still 
face various forms of institutional discrimination in their military careers. One 
particularly difficult and persistent problem lies in the area of promotion rates. 
According to a recent report in the Navy Times, "promotion rates for black officers 
[in the Navy] to 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 continue to lag behind the majority": 












Attitudes of General and Flag Officers About "Positive" 
and "Negative" Factors for Succeeding in the Military 
e1m:,ea1age Dl:it[lbUll!lD Ill Blllil:l!lDlillli 
Listed Factorsa Positive Negative Neutral 
Having Expert Combat Leadership Skills 99 1 0 
Having Expert Managerial Skills 98 2 0 
Being a Service-Academy Graduate 88 2 10 
Being Black 61 15 24 b 
Being Good-Looking 60 4 36 
Being the Child of a High-Ranking Military Officer 46 19 35 
Being Female 41 44 15 
Starting Out as an Enlisted Man 26 53 21 
Being a Southerner 22 7 71 C 
Source: From a Gallup Poll of 257 generals and admirals that was ccmmissioned by Newsweek and 











a Respcndents were asked to indicate (from a structured list): "Are the following pcsitives or negatives 
for succeeding in the mil~ary?" · 
b Includes 1 percent "don't know" respcnses. 
c Includes 2 percent "don't know" respcnses. 
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In 1985, for promotions to 0-4 through 0-6, white line officers were pro-
moted at rates 13 to 23 percent higher than blacks. Two years later, much 
larger percentages of white line and staff officers were promoted to 0-4, 
05, and 0-6 than were blacks. In fact, blacks fell further behind between 
1985 and 1987.70 
The Navy's concern over this and other problems for blacks led to the formation 
in 1988 of a special Equal Opportunity Study Group. 71 Some observers thought it 
was an unusual action in that most groups of this kind are created as a result of 
outside pressures or criticism, rather than through the organization's own interests 
and initiative. 
The Army, which has set the pace for minority recruiting over the past 20 
years, also has a continuing problem in officer promotions. The gap has narrowed 
somewhat, but minorities in the Army still trail whites in selection rates at the level 
of 0-3 through 0-6. The largest discrepancies are found among majors (0-4) and 
lieutenant colonels (0-5), where the proportions of eligible minorities selected for 
promotion are over 7 percent lower than for whites.72 
The promotion rate issue received widespread publicity in 1987, when a retired 
Army major filed a $10 million civil rights class action suit against the federal 
government, charging that the Army's "illegal and unconstitutional promotion sys-
tem" discriminated against Hispanic and black officers.73 The Army is currently 
examining its Officer Evaluation Report in an effort to resolve the problem oflower 
minority promotion rates. 74 
70James Longo, "Networking Boosts Black Officer Ranks; Pace Still Slow," Navy Times, 1 August 1988, 
pp. 8, 10. 
71The 25-rnember study group was formed to examine the recruitment, retention, and promotion of 
minority officers and to revise the Navy's Equal Opportunity Manual and affirmative action plan. However, the 
primary impetus for the group was to "find ways to improve promotion and advancement opportunities for 
minority sailors and officers." See James Longo, "Navy Forms Study Group to Check Equal Opportunity," Navy 
Times, 25 July 1988, p. 14. 
72"0n the Record: Interview with Delbert L. Spurlock, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs," Army Times, 17 October 1988, pp. 20, 22. 
73Leslie Guevarra, "$10 Million Suit Over Military Promotions," San Francisco Chronicle, 15 August 
1987, p. 4. 
74"0n the Record," Army Times, p. 22. 
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Two of the nine factors on the list in Table 22 are directly related to an individ-
ual's military origins or the way in which a person becomes an officer: "being a 
Service-academy graduate" and "starting out as an enlisted man." 
Currently there is no reliable estimate of the number of officers who began 
their military career as an enlistee. However, it is likely that the proportion of 
former enlistees would decline for each succeeding pay grade in the officer corps-
since those who become officers at the grade of 0-1 have already accumulated time 
in service, and they would therefore tend to be eligible for retirement before their 
counterparts who entered the officer corps directly.75 
This may help to explain why proportionately fewer general or flag officers-
13.5 percent as of September 1987-were commissioned through OCS or OTS (the 
typical source of commission for a former enlistee), as compared with a historical 
rate of 25 percent. (Though informed sources claim that the number of former 
enlistees is relatively small, at less than 10 percent of all new officers and fewer 
than one-third of OCS or OTS graduates.) Biographical data on the Army's newest 
crop of brigadier generals doesn't help much to clarify the issue: of the 50 colonels 
nominated for promotion in 1988, 14 percent were commissioned through OCS, 
22 percent were West Point graduates, 62 percent were products of ROTC, and one 
person had received a direct commission.76 The 14 percent figure appears relatively 
low, but it is actually higher than the proportion of Army officers commissioned 
through OCS over the past 18 years (between 12 and 13 percent). 
As of September 1987, about 40 percent of all generals and admirals on active 
duty had received their commission through ROTC, and 32 percent were graduates 
of one of the Service academies. Historically, around 15 percent of new officers each 
year come from the Service academies and 45 percent are obtained through ROTC 
programs. This appears to support the prevailing opinion among general officers 
that being a Service academy graduate can help one's military career. 
75Former enlistees who decide to retire at the 20-year point would thus have Jess opportunity to rise in 
rank as an officer, since eligibility for promotion is dependent on time-in-grade. 
76Bernard J. Adelsberger, "Rising Stars: Who Made the Brigadier General List and Why," Army Times, 
29 August 1988, pp. 4, 6, 8, 16, 69. A study at the Center for Creative Leadership in Colorado Springs found that 
brigadier generals tend to be "smarter, better educated, and less interested in culture, art, and music than many 
high-level corporate executives." The generals scored in the 95th percentile on a short "intelligence test," and 
nearly all possessed at least a master's degree. See John Bales, "Generally Outstanding," Psychology Today, 
June 1988. 
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But this is nothing new. As Table 23 shows, the percentage of generals and 
admirals who are academy graduates has always been comparatively high-and, 
indeed, much higher in the past than it is today. It was once said that "it don't mean 
a thing if you ain't got that [academy] ring." In fact, as late as 1950, almost all of the 
Navy's admirals were products of Annapolis. Now, fewer than half of the Navy's 
admirals have an academy education. 
Table 23 
Percentage of General and Flag Officers Who Were Academy Graduates, 
By Service, Selected Years, 1910-87 
SERVICE 1910 1920 1935 1950* 1987 
Army 79 86 81 48 30 
Navy 90 96 98 97 47 
Marine Corps n/a n/a n/a n/a 13 
Air Force n/a n/a n/a 48 27 
All Services n/a n/a n/a n/a 32 
Source: Data for 1910-50 are from Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier(New York: The Free Press, 1971 ), 
p. 106, and were originally obtained through a historical sample of over 760 generals and admirals. Data 
for 1987 are from the Defense Manpower Data Canter, and include all generals and admirals on active 
duty as of September of that year. 
n/a Not available. 
• According to Janowttz (see source note, p. xiv), in 1968, 100 percent of the Army's generals and 79 percent of its 
lieutenant generals were academy graduates; 100 percent of the Navy's admirals and vice admirals were academy 
graduates, along wtth 40 percent of 'ts rear admirals; and 100 perc,;nt of the Air Force's generals and 41 percent of 
tts lieuteI1ant generals were graduates of a Service academy. 
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One reason why academy graduates rise to the top in relatively greater propor-
tion is because they tend to remain in the military longer than their nonacademy 
peers. Among officers who. were commissioned in 1977, 55 percent of academy 
graduates were still serving ten years later, compared with 51 percent of the 
nonacademy group. Among those commissioned in 1980, 67 percent of academy 
graduates were still serving, compared with about 60 percent of officers from other 
precommissioning programs. (See Table 24.) This, of course, doesn't address the 
reasons why academy graduates remain in military longer-reasons which may 
relate both to their own career motivations or abilities as well as to various external 
influences, such as preferential assignments. 77 
As a general or admiral moves up the leadership hierarchy, the "positives" of 
being an academy graduate seem to become even stronger. Table 25, for example, 
shows that entry into the military's elite nucleus is enhanced for those who possess 








Percentage of Officers Who Were Still on Active Duty, 
by Date of Commission and Source 
(Academy and Non-Academy), September 1987 
Date of Commission: 1sn Date of commission: 1sao 
ACADEMY NON-ACADEMY ACADEMY NON-ACADEMY 
59.8 49.3 60.6 53.5 
44.9 45.1 62.5 54.2 
43.0 46.9 60.5 48.2 
64.6 61.9 79.2 71.2 
55.1 51.2 67.1 59.8 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpov1er Data Center. 
77 It has been observed that the Services place "a strong emphasis on the importance of Academy training 
as a route to elite positions." This is partly based on "the notion that an early decision to become a career officer, 
plus four years of military academy education, will produce strong commitments to the military establishment." 
See Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldu,r (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. xiii-xiv. 
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Table 25 
Percentage of General and Flag Officers Who Are Academy 
Graduates, by Service and Pay Grade, September 1987 
MARINE AIR ALL 
PAY GRADE ARMY NAVY CORPS FORCE SERVICES 
0-10 63.6 81.8 0.0 15.4 
0-9 32.6 67.7 0.0 36.8 
0-8 37.4 46.6 4.2 25.2 
0-7 22.1 40.0 22.9 27.7 
0-7 through 0-10• 29.9 47.3 12.9 27.4 
Percentage of 
New Officers Who 
Are Academy 15.1 14.5 13.0 14.8 
Graduates, 
Fiscal 1987 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
• As of September 1987, there were 1,070 officers wtthin pay grades 0-7 through 0-1 o, distributed by 







and about 41 percent of the military's 123 lieutenant generals and vice admirals 
(0-9) are academy graduates. However, there are differences between the Services-
most notably between the Navy, which has the highest proportion of academy grad-
uates within every flag-level rank, and the Marine Corps, where all except one of its 
academy graduates are no higher than brigadier general (0-7). 
The data presented here hardly skim the surface of the many and varied path-
ways to a successful military career. Nevertheless, the material does raise two major 
points. First, there are many factors that can influence an individual's performance 
and opportunities for achievement in. a military career- and these factors may have 
no direct linkage with the aptitude test scores once used to screen the individual for 
completion of college or initial military training. Second, the road an individual 
takes to enter the officer corps may relate in some manner, though uncertain, to the 
course and longevity of that individual's career; and to the extent that aptitude tests 
have affected the officer's precommissioning experience, they may also be said to 
have affected his or her military career. 
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Section4 
THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY OFFICERS 
ON THE SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE TEST (SAT) 
In the late 1960s, many opponents of the proposed "all-volunteer force" argued 
that it would "be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will be 
likely to enlist and pursue military careers."1 In addition, some people were uneasy 
about the possible consequences that ending conscription could have on the compo-
sition of the officer corps. Indeed, as two staff members of the President's Commis-
sion on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (or "Gates Commission") observed, "the intro-
duction of an all-volunteer armed force will significantly affect the recruitment of 
officer personnel"; and, some officer co=issioning programs "may experience 
shortfalls. "2 
The various expressions of concern regarding the officer corps were rooted to 
the understanding that conscription (or, more precisely, the avoidance of it) had 
influenced more than a few college graduates into becoming officers. "In recent 
years," the Gates Co=ission noted, "the major portion of the officer corps has been 
recruited from the ranks of college graduates." And, 
while it is important to continue to attract college-graduate officers, the 
decision to staff the officer corps almost entirely with college graduates 
was somewhat arbitrary and came about in part because of the favorable 
recruiting climate provided by the draft. Without the draft, a college-grad-
uate officer corps will be more difficult to recruit and will require higher 
pay levels than one which includes some non-college graduates.a 
The prevalent concern about the quality of the enlisted force has stimulated 
continuing study of the aptitude test scores and education levels of new recruits 
from one year to the next over the past fifteen years. No similar attention has been 
directed at the officer corps for several reasons. First of all, though the draft 
lPresident's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President's Commission on 
an All-Volunteer Armed Force (New York: MacMillan Company, 1970), p. 18. 
2Stuart H. Altman and Robert J. Barro, "A Model of Officer Supply Under Draft and No Draft 
Conditions," in the Pres:ident's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Studies, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, November 1970), p. II-10-1. 
3Pres:ident's Commiss:ion, The Report, p. 67. 
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provided a "positive factor" (as the Gates Commission remarked) in officer recruit-
ing, it also brought many more applicants to the various officer programs than were 
actually needed.4 The supply of "true volunteers" and qualified applicants to the 
officer corps was never much of an issue; in addition, military manpower planners 
took comfort in knowing that the proportion of officers who choose to remain beyond 
a first term of service has usually been quite high. More important, however, was 
the effect of officer selection standards on the types of people who received commis-
sions. Since "most commissioned officer procurement programs are designed chiefly 
to attract college graduates,"5 there is considerably less apprehension about the 
intellectual abilities of officers as compared with enlistees: college graduates have 
already passed through a four-year academic program that began with admissions 
testing and competitive screening; and the general impression is that persons who 
possess a baccalaureate degree are intellectually competent to become military 
officers.6 
For most of the modern era, the quality of the officer corps has been measured 
in terms of the proportion of officers who have a college education. Since practically 
all commissioning programs now require that applicants possess a four-year college 
degree, the quality issue for officers is rarely addressed. In fact, it has been over 
twenty years since anyone has attempted to determine the relative ability of officers 
based on standardized testing. In the late 1960s, the Department of Defense 
required that all incoming officers, including academy graduates, be given the 
Defense Officer Record Examination (DORE). The DORE was essentially identical 
4 Altman and Barro, "A Model," p. II-10-1. William P. Snyder, in "Officer Recruitment for the All-
Volunteer Force: Trends and Prospects, "(Armed Forces and Society 10 [Spring 1984]: 401), points out that this 
refers to line officers (nonspecialists). The military has been less successful recruiting officers with scientific or 
technical backgrounds as well as filling vacancies in the reserves. The continuing success in recruiting line 
officers has been attributed to the same factors that have helped enlisted recruiting-increased pay and benefits, 
job market options, positive perceptions of the military, patriqtism, improved recruiting methods and strategies, 
and soon. 
5President's Commission, The Report, p. 67. 
6This has not always been the case. In 1984, the Army discovered that some ROTC cadets '1ike many of 
their college classmates" could not pass a test of basic academic skills. As a result, the Army initiated a program 
of basic skills testing so that "college students seeking Army commissions [could] prove, despite their high school 
diplomas and admissions to college, they can read, write and do arithmetic." See Jim Tice, "ROTC Cadets to be 
Tested on Basic Academic Skills," Army Times, 12 March 1984, p. 2. 
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to the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and was intended to help Defense 
Department officials monitor the quality of new officers as well as make compar-
isons with the general population of college graduates. The testing program lasted 
for only a few years and was eventually abandoned because the practical value of 
the results was deemed negligible. The test scores were summarized in printed 
reports and never placed in an automated (computerized) format. It appears that no 
formal records of the DORE program were saved.7 
In the past few years, Defense manpower administrators have become inter-
ested again in evaluating the relative quality of military officers. This interest has 
led to the creation of a new data base on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of 
officers.8 This section describes how the data base was developed and presents the 
results of initial analyses. 
THE SAT/OFFICER DATA BASE9 
Department of Defense officials set out to find a uniform measure of officer 
quality in the form of standardized test scores. However, a variety of tests were 
being used to select officers, and these tests varied by Service as well as by commis-
sioning programs. There were, consequently, two major alternatives: (1) administer 
a special test to active duty officers or officer accessions (similar to the DORE pro-
gram of the 1960s); or (2) identify a test taken by a majority of officers and then 
attempt to integrate the testing information with existing data on officers. The 
latter alternative was chosen because it was the less costly approach and because 
SAT scores-used widely for college admissions and for selection into most officer 
commissioning programs-could be obtained for many officers through the Educa-
tional Testing Service (ETS). 
7 The information on DORE is from personal communications with former program administrators and 
data analysts. The DORE results indicated that officers graduating from the academies tended to have the 
highest math scores-and that officers entering through ROTC and other college programs tended to have the 
highest verbal scores. 
81t should be emphasized that standardized test scores may serve as predictors-not measures per se---of 
officer quality. Furthermore, a combination of factors-training, leadership abilities, motivation, job skills, 
personal accomplishments, and so on~ombine to affect the success or failure of persons in the officer corps. 
9The SAT/Officer data base is described in Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. 
Eitelberg, Demographics and Performance of Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude (Alexandria, VA: 
HumRRO, December 1988), draft. 
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An extract of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Officer Cohort File 
(line officers commissioned from fiscal 1975 through fiscal 1985) was matched with 
the ETS computerized data file on SAT scores, using individual social security num-
bers. (Social security numbers were stripped from the data base by ETS after the 
computerized matching was completed.) This procedure resulted in the identifica-
tion of SAT scores for approximately 56 percent of all newly commissioned officers 
over the fiscal 1975-85 period. 
An analysis of the new data base was then performed to determine whether the 
matched sample adequately represented the total population of military officers. 
The SAT/officer sample was compared with the total population in terms of age, sex, 
race, education, and military component. The results showed little difference (less 
than one percent) between the sample and the total population on all variables 
except for education. Generally, across all Services, the matched SAT/officer group 
contains a somewhat higher proportion of college graduates than does the popula-
tion of all officers (ranging from a difference close to 12 percent in the Army to less 
than 3 percent in the Air Force). 
The education differences suggest that the SAT scores for the 56-percent 
sample may be relatively higher than what would be found for the population of 
officers as a whole. However, the education comparison is complicated by the fact 
that a larger proportion of total officers are recorded as having "unknown" educa-
tion, and the vast majority of these officers are probably college graduates. It is 
likely, then, that resolution of the recording or reporting problems would create 
greater similarity between the SAT/officer sample and the total population of 
officers on the education variable.IO 
One major demographic variable-geographic home of record-could not be 
analyzed in the comparison because of missing information in the DMDC Officer 
Cohort File. This particular variable is especially important because of the geo-
graphic differences in use of the SAT for college admissions. A fair number of indi-
viduals absent from the 56-percent SAT/officer sample probably took the American 
College Test (ACT) instead of the SAT. The ACT tends to be used more than the 
lOThis is a difficult variable to evaluate. There are 6 percent fewer college graduates in the total officer 
population than in the sample. But there are also close to 4 percent more '"unknowns'" in the total population. 
More than 9 out of 10 of the unknown cases are probably college graduates-leaving a difference of slightly over 
2 percent college graduates between the sample and the total population when the missing information is taken 
into account. 
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SAT in the Midwest and the South. Consequently, the SAT/officer sample may not 
be geographically representative of the complete population of officers commissioned 
over the fiscal 1975-85 period-but the degree of difference and its importance to the 
general representativeness of the sample is uncertain. 
Table 26 provides a summary of the composition of the SAT/officer data base. 
As shown, SAT scores were found for just under 170,000 officers. About 84 percent of 
the sample is white, and 87 percent are men. Blacks account for almost 6 percent of 
the sample, along with 1.3 percent Hispanics, and 8.5 percent of officers are in other 
or "unknown" racial/ethnic groups. Over 80 percent of the sample are college gradu-
ates, a figure that would undoubtedly be higher if the education levels of all persons 
were "known." 
INITIAL RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
The mean scores for male and female officers on the Verbal and Math compo-
nents of the SAT are displayed in Table 27. (SAT scores are reported on a scale 
ranging from 200 to 800 points with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.) 
Officers who received a commission in 1975 had the highest scores in the 11-year 
period: 511 and 521 for men and women, respectively, on the Verbal component; and 
scores of 571 for men and 521 for women on the Math portion. By 1985, the mean 
Verbal score for women had fallen by 33 points, while the Verbal score for men had 
declined by 17 points, to a level that was 6 points higher than that for women. Math 
scores for men and women in 1985 had likewise declined, but by a much smaller 
margin (8 to 12 points). It is also interesting to note that the SAT mean scores for 
male officers in 1985 were actually a little higher than in most previous years-and 
that the scores for all officers (493 on Verbal and 553 on Math) were close to the 
average for the combined 1975-85 period (496 on Verbal and 552 on Math). 
Table 28 helps to place the SAT scores for officers in perspective. SAT mean 
scores for high school seniors are shown by sex for each year from 1971 to 1987. The 
period prior to 1981 corresponds best to the fiscal 1975-85 cohort of officers, since 
these are the years during which most of the officers were tested as high school 
seniors (4 to 5 years or more before gaining a commission). 
84 
Table 26 
Demographic Summary of the SAT/Officer Data Base: 
Percer:itage Distribution of Selected Variables by Service, 
Officers Commissioned Over the Fiscal 1975-85 Period 
Demographic Marine Air 
Variable Army Navy Corps Force 
Sex 
Male 85.7 88.3 95.9 83.5 
Female 14.3 11.7 4.1 16.5 
--
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Racial/Ethnic Group 
White 74.6 88.7 91.8 89.4 
Black 7.1 3.4 5.2 6.5 
Hispanic 0.7 1.5 1.9 1.6 
Other/Unknown 17.5 6.4 1.2 2.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Education 
Less than College 1.3 0.2 3.8 2.8 
Some College 2.6 1 .1 22.5 0.5 
College Graduate and above 83.2 68.0 66.5 90.4 
Unknown 12.9 30.7 7.2 6.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0. 
Number 57,684 44,676 13,052 53,548 

































Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores 
for New Officers, by Sex, Fiscal 1975-85 
SAT V!;!r!;!51I 
Male Female Total Male 
511 521 512 571 
504 513 504 559 
505 512 506 562 
504 513 505 559 
492 491 492 550 
492 497 493 552 
490 494 490 554 
490 488 490 554 
490 485 490 553 
491 492 491 555 
494 488 -493 560 















Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test scores shown 
here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the Department of Defense Officer Cohort 
Files and SAT information maintained by the Educational Testing Service. 





















Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Me1:1n Scores 
for High School Seniors, by Sex, 1971-87 
SAT V!i!r!2sil 
Male Female Total Male 
454 457 455 507 
454 457 455 505 
446 443 445 502 
447 442 444 501 
437 431 434 495 
433 430 431 497 
431 427 429 497 
433 425 429 494 
431 423 427 493 
426 42Q 424 491 
430 418 424 492 
431 421 426 493 
430 420 425 493 
433 420 426 495 
437 425 431 499 
437 426 431 501 




















Source: The Collage Board, 1987 Profile of SAT and Achievement Test Takers (New York: College Entrance 
Examination Board, 1987). 
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In comparing Table 27 with Table 28, it is clear that the SAT scores of military 
officers are considerably higher than those of the general population. F_or example, a 
comparison between officers commissioned in 1985 and high school seniors in 1980 
shows that officers hold a substantial edge-from 60 to 70 points-on both SAT 
components, regardless of sex. The advantage for officers is greater on the Math 
portion, where the mean for all officers (553) is 87 points above the mean for 
students (466), as shown below: 
(A) (B) Difference Ratio 
SAI :i.:'.!:!cbal Hl65 Qffii.f! cs l 96Q Studf!•ts IA}-1B) IA)L(B) 
Male 494 428 66 1.15 
Female 488 420 68 1.16 
Total 493 424 69 1.16 
SAT Ma!h 
Male 560 491 69 1.14 
Female 513 443 70 1.16 
Total 553 466 87 1.19 
QQmbined Verbal and Math 
Male 1054 919 135 1.15 
Female 1001 863 138 1.16 
Total 1046 890 156 1.18 
It is also interesting to observe that the advantage held by female .officers over 
female students is slightly larger, in all cases, than the advantage held by male 
officers over male students. This applies to both absolute differences and relative 
differences. 
The SAT scores for high school students are similar in some respect to the 
scores for officers over the periods shown in Tables 27 and 28. For example, all 
scores have declined, with the greater drop occurring on the Verbal component. The 
decline in scores is fairly steady for students and officers during the 1971-80 and 
1975-80 periods, respectfully. However, the scores for officers display less variability 
and the slight recovery in test scores is more noticeable. The lowest scores for both 
male and female officers on the Math component occurred among those who were 
commissioned in 1980, and probably tested around 1975 or 1976. The years 1980 
and 1981, similarly, represent the nadir for high school students over the 17-year 
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period from 1971 through 1987. The variability in scores for officers can probably be 
attributed to the combination of selection standards, recruiting programs, and 
various job-market factors (such as applicant supply and the military's demand for 
officers) from one year to the next. 
Table 29 shows the SAT mean scores for new officers by racial/ethnic group. As 
seen here, the scores for white officers are consistently highest and the scores for 
blacks are consistently lowest. The scores for all racial/ethnic groups are higher on 
the Math component. At the same time, the difference between the scores for whites 
and those of minorities are generally larger on the Math component than on the 
Verbal component. For example, over the combined 1975-85 period, the SAT mean 
score for whites on the Verbal component was 506, compared with a mean for blacks 
of 394 (a difference of 112 points); on the Math portion, whites had a mean score of 
563, compared with 431 for blacks (a difference of 132 points). 
The SAT mean scores for high school seniors by racial/ethnic group are dis-
played in Table 30. Comparisons between Table 29 and Table 30 are complicated by 
the more detailed division of racial/ethnic groups in the data on high school seniors. 
Nevertheless, as in the comparison by sex, the scores of officers appear consistently 
higher than the scores of high school students tested in comparable years. For white 
and black officers commissioned in 1985, the advantage over students is as follows: 
(A) (B) Difference Ratio 
S8I :iecbal l 985 QffiQfl[S l 98Q S!ude•ls (8}-/B} (8} L (6) 
White 503 444 59 1.13 
Black 398 330 68 1.21 
SAT Ma!h 
White 563 482 81 1.17 
Black 439 369 70 1.19 
QQc•bioed :iecbal aod Malb 
White 1066 926 140 1.15 
Black 837 699 138 1.19 
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The magnitude of difference between officers and high school students on the 
combined Verbal and Math score is similar for both whites (140 points) and blacks 
(138 points). In absolute numbers, the advantage for white officers over white 
students as a whole is greater than the advantage held by black officers over black 
students on the Math component; and the advantage for black officers over black 
students is greater than the advantage held by white officers on the Verbal 
component. However, in all cases, the relative advantage of black officers over black 
students exceeds the relative advantage held by whites. This is especially evident on 
the Verbal component, where the ratio for blacks is 1.21, compared with a ratio of 
1.13 for whites. 
Table 29 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores for New Officers, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group, Fiscal 1975-85 
l;iAT V!;lrbi!I l;iAT Mi!!h 
Fiscal Year White Black Hispanic Other White Black Hispanic Other 
1975 520 391 476 434 577 437 524 493 
1976 514 385 464 471 569 421 521 521 
1977 516 392 466 473 568 431 514 530 
1978 515 390 467 481 568 430 526 545 
1979 502 392 461 453 556 422 509 517 
1980 501 387 470 470 556 421 514 516 
1981 496 405 470 470 557 439 535 525 
1982 499 396 446 466 562 437 511 509 
1983 504 399 458 456 566 432 509 498 
1984 502 390 459 451 562 428 523 514 
1985 503 398 467 472 563 439 522 557 
1975-85 
Combined 506 394 464 462 563 431 519 513 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test scores shown 
here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the Department of Defense Officer 
Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. Other category includes officers whose 
racial/ethnic group was recorded as "unknown." 
90 
Table30 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores for High School Seniors, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group, 1976-85, 1987 
SAI~etbal 
American Asian Puerto 
Year Indian Pacific Black Mexican Rican White Other 
1976 388 414 332 371 364 451 410 
1977 390 405 330 370 355 448 402 
1978 387 401 332 370 349 446 399 
1979 386 396 330 370 345 444 393 
HlBQ 39Q 39!'2 33Q 3Z2 3fiQ 442 394 
1981 391 397 332 373 353 442 388 
1982 388 398 341 377 360 444 393 
1983 388 395 339 375 358 443 386 
1984 390 398 342 376 358 445 449 
1985 392 404 346 382 368 449 391 
1987 393 405 351 379 360 447 405 
SAT Mi!!h 
American Asian Puerto 
Year Indian Pacific Black Mexican Rican White Other 
1976 420 518 354 410 401 493 458 
1977 421 514 357 408 397 489 457 
1978 419 510 354 402 388 485 450 
1979 421 511 358 410 388 483 447 
J9BQ 42!'2 509 3fl9 4l3 394 462 449 
1981 425 513 362 415 398 483 447 
1982 424 513 366 416 403 483 449 
1983 425 514 369 417 403 484 446 
1984 427 519 373 420 405 487 450 
1985 428 518 376 426 409 490 448 
1987 432 521 377 424 400 489 455 
Source: The College Board, 1987 Profile of SAT and Achievement Test Takers (New York: College Entrance 
Examination Board, 1987). 
Note: Data for 1986 were not reported by racial/ethnic group. 
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It should be noted here that a more meaningful comparison could be achieved 
by contrasting the SAT scores of officers with those of college graduates instead of 
high school students. The SAT mean scores of college enrollees tend to be as much 
as 10 to 15 points higher (on each component) than the scores of high school seniors 
as a whole. 11 In addition, since a number of college enrollees decide to discontinue 
their studies for academic reasons, the expectation is that the SAT mean scores of 
college graduates would be somewhat higher than the scores of college freshmen. 
Nevertheless, no data have been compiled on the SAT scores of college graduates 
across the nation (though individual institutions have undoubtedly examined the 
characteristics of their own students and graduates). 
SAT SCORES BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA 
Tables 31 through 33 show the combined SAT Verbal and Math scores for new 
officers by occupational area. As seen in Table 31, officers assigned to three occupa-
tional areas-Health Care, Administrators, and Supply, Procurement and Allied-
have SAT mean scores that are consistently below the scores of officers assigned to 
other areas and also below the overall mean. (The nonoccupational category is not 
included in this analysis.) At the same time, two occupational areas-Engineering 
and Maintenance and Scientists and Professionals-have officers whose test scores 
are generally the highest and well above the overall mean. 
This occupational pattern holds true (in varying degrees) for both men and 
women, as indicated by Table 32. For example, men and women with lower scores 
are assigned to Health Care, Administrators, and Supply, Procurement and Allied. 
Men and women with the highest scores are assigned to Scientists and Profession-
als. (The occupational area with the second-highest mean score for male officers is 
Engineering and Maintenance.) Women with relatively high scores are also placed 
in Engineering and Maintenance, as well as in Tactical Operations and Intelligence. 
Again, when officers are separated by racial/ethnic group (see Table 33), the same 
occupational assignment pattern emerges, with minor variations. Within each 
racial/ethnic group, the lowest-scoring officers are placed in Health Care, Adminis-
trators, and Supply, Procurement and Allied (with the exception of Health Care for 
officers in the "Other" racial/ethnic category). At the other end of the scale, the 
11From personal communication with Leonard Ramist of the Educational Testing Service, August 1988. 
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Table 31 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores for New Officers, 
by Occupational Area, Selected Years, Fiscal 1975-85 (Combined) 
SAI S!:121:e (C12mblaed llerbill i!Dd Millbl 
Occupatlonal Areaa 1976 1980 1985 1975-85 
General Officers and Executives N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tactical Operations 1054 1045 1007 1044 
Intelligence 1079 1034 1041 1050 
Engineering and Maintenance 1097 1072 1068 1081 
Scientists and Professionals 1043 1128 1082 1123 
Health Care 1024 1030 942 982 
Administrators 1038 988 1011 1010 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 1023 973 969 979 
Nonoccupationa1b 1049 1016 1084 1067 
All Areasc 1060 1039 1046 1048 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test scores shown 
here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the Department of Defense Officer 
Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
blncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be 
placed on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
clncludes persons who could not be identified by occupational area. 
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Table32 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores for New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Sex, Fiscal 1975-85 (Combined) 
SAT score ,combined Verbal and Math\ 
Occupational Areaa Male Female Total 
General Officers and Executives NIA NIA NIA 
Tactical Operations 1044 1042 1044 
Intelligence 1051 1047 1050 
Engineering and Maintenance 1086 1043 1081 
Scientists and Professionals 1121 1127 1122 
Health Care 1035 957 982 
Administrators 1014 1000 1010 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 984 964 979 
Nonoccupationalb 1070 1030 1067 
All Areasc 1053 1010 1048 
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test scores shown 
here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the Department of Defense Officer 
Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
blncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be 
placed on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
clncludes persons who could not be identified by occupational area 
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Table 33 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores for New Officers, 
by Occupational Area and Racial/Ethnic Group, 
Fiscal 1975-85 (Combined) 
SAT l;li;Qr!: !~mblni:g V!:!'.!2!!1 s1nS! M!!!hl 
Occupational Areaa White Black Hispanic Other 
General Officers and Executives NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Tactical Operations 1062 837 985 970 
Intelligence 1067 819 986 998 
Engineering and Maintenance 1104 843 1012 1424 
Scientists and Professionals 1135 918 1037 1108 
Health Care 994 789 883 992 
Administrators 1014 796 944 936 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 1020 754 953 887 
Nonoccupationalb 1083 861 993 1010 












Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test scores shown 
here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the Department of Defense Officer 
Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. Other category includes officers whose 
racial/ethnic group was recorded as "unknown." 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
blncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC officers waiting to be 
placed on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
clncludes persons who could not be identified by occupational area. 
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highest-scoring officers within each racial/ethnic group are generally assigned to 
Scientists and Professionals and Engineering and Maintenance.12 
SAT LEVELS AND "ABOVE AVERAGE'' SCORES13 
Another way of estimating the comparative performance of officers on the SAT 
is to develop scoring levels based on the national distribution of test takers. To 
accomplish this, SAT Verbal and Math scores were combined into a single index and 
converted to quartiles, or four continuous percentile ranges. The conversion 
procedure involved the following steps: first, an SAT reference population was 
established (in this case, the population of high school seniors taking the SAT from 
1972 through 1981);14 next, the SAT standard scores of the reference population 
were converted to their percentile equivalent;15 the percentiles were then computed 









76 - 100 
51 75 
26 - 50 
1 - 25 
Corresponding SAT Scores 
(Combined Verbal and Math)b 
1050 -1600 
880 -1040 
710 - 870 
400 - 700 
aThe percentile score ranges were divided at their midpoints. For example, the fourth quartile actually includes 
gercentile scores through 25.5, the third runs from 25.6 through 50.5, and so on. 
SAT scores are reported in ten-point intervals. 
12This does not mean to imply that SAT scores are used to assign officers to occupational areas. SAT 
scores may exercise an indirect influence on job assignment to the extent that the initial selection process and 
college experience affect career choices and opportunities. 
13This subsection draws upon information contained in Brown, Laurence, and Eitelberg, "Demographics 
and Performance." 
14See Ibid. The years 1970 through 1980 or 1981 were considered a better period. But, prior to 1972, the 
total number of SAT takers was counted as the number of tests taken. In 1972, ETS began calculating SAT 
takers as the total number of graduating seniors who took the test, thereby controlling for the multiple counting 
of individuals who took the test more than once. 
15ETS provided SAT total score ranges (by year) corresponding to various percentile score ranges. ETS 
estimated the total scores within percentile ranges from SAT Verbal and Math means and standard deviations. 
The reference population was created by converting SAT scores to standard z scores and then estimating the 
number ofindividuals scoring at each IO-point interval. 
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The number and percentage distribution of officers (commissioned between 
1975 and 1985) by the above quartiles are presented in Table 34. As shown, the 
Navy has the largest proportion of officers in the highest SAT quartile (65.7 
percent), while the Army has the largest proportion in the lowest quartile (8.3 
percent). In the enlisted force, manpower managers often measure the success of 
recruiting efforts by calculating the proportion of recruits scoring above the 50th 
percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. These people are considered 
"above average" in aptitude, and various programs and policies are aimed at 











Number and Percentage Distribution of New Officers 
by Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Quartile and Service, 
Fiscal 1975-85 
Marine Air All S!ilrviQ!illi 
Army Navy Corps Force Percent Number 
46.2 65.7 43.5 54.1 53.6 90,617 
28.4 24.7 34.9 29.4 28.2 47,701 
17.1 8.1 17.5 13.2 13.5 22,836 
8.3 1.5 4.1 3.3 4.6 7,806 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
57,684 44,676 13,052 53,548 168,960 
Source: SAT quartiles were calculated with the assistance of the Defense Manpower Data Center from data 
appearing in Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. Eitelberg, Demographics and 
Performance of Military Office•s in Relation to Aptitude ,Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, [1>cember 1988), 
draft. 
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information in Table 34, one can easily calculate the proportion of officers with SAT 
scores above the 50th percentile, as shown below: 16 
Army 
74.6 
Percentage of New Officers With SAT Scores 
Above the 50th Percentile, 












Over nine out of ten new officers in the Navy have SAT scores above the 50th 
percentile, placing the Navy well above the other Services by this measure. The 
Navy is considered the most technically-oriented Service, and this may help to 
explain the Navy's greater proportion of higher-aptitude officers. The Air Force also 
has a relatively large concentration of high-tech occupations, and ranks above the 
Army and Marine Corps in its proportion of "above-average" officers. 
The generally high proportions of officers with scores above the 50th percentile 
reflect the standards used to select officers. Currently, the lninimally-acceptable 
SAT scores range from 850 to 1120 for individuals applying to many officer comlnis-
sioning programs.17 A score of 850 falls in the 46th percentile and a score of 1120 
equates to a percentile score of 85. Overall, approximately 84 percent of female 
officers scored above the 50th percentile, compared with 88 percent of men. 
Differences between the various racial/ethnic groups were considerably greater: 86 
percent of white officers scored above the 50th percentile, compared with 71 percent 
of Hispanics, 38 percent of blacks, and 73 percent of officers in other groups. 
16Because the percentile score ranges were divided at their midpoints, the upper half of the distribution 
runs from 50.6 through 100 (the combination of SAT quartiles 1 and 2). It is technically accurate, then, to say 
aboue the 50th percentile. 
17 See Dianne C. Brown, Military Officers: Commissioning Sources and Selection Criteria, FR-PRD-87-42 
(Alexandria, VA; HumRR0, December 1987). 
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Table 35 shows the percentages of officers scoring in the top half of the SAT 
distribution by occupational area and Service. Except for the Marine Corps, all 
Services have their lowest proportions of "above-average" officers in the same three 
occupational areas: Supply, Procurement and Allied; Administrators; and Health 
Care. (In the Marine Corps, the very lowest proportion of these officers is likewise 
found within the Supply, Procurement, and Allied area.) Officers scoring above the 
50th percentile are also underrepresented in the Engineering and Maintenance field 
within both the Army and the Marine Corps; and they are underrepresented in 
Intelligence jobs within the Air Force. At the same time, higher scoring officers are 
overrepresented as Scientists and Professionals and Tactical Operations personnel 
within all Services; as Intelligence specialists in all Services except the Air Force; 
and as Engineering and Maintenance personnel in the Navy and the Air Force. 
An interesting relationship is seen when the data in Table 35 (also Tables 31 
through 33) are compared with the demographic information on officer assignments 
presented in Section 2. Minority officers, as discussed above, tend to have lower SAT 
scores than do white officers. Female officers, as well, tend to have lower SAT scores 
than do their male counterparts. Female officers are clustered in the occupational 
areas of Health Care and Administrators; and they are also slightly overrepresented 
in the Supply, Procurement and Allied field. Historically, minority officers have 
been concentrated in the areas of Supply, Procurement, and Allied as well as 
Administrators; in addition, minorities tend to be slightly overrepresented in the 
Health Care occupations. These three occupations-Health Care, Administrators, 
and Supply and Procurement-are correspondingly lower in terms of officer SAT 
scores, when compared to other occupations within each Service. This leads to 
several questions concerning the· assignment practices of the Services-including 
whether the differences in SAT scores found between the occupations reflect differ-
ing levels of job complexity, or the prevalent assignment patterns for women and 
minorities, or both. The findings additionally indicate the need for more compre-
hensive research on the variations in occupational assignment between white men, 
women, and racial/ethnic minorities.is 
18 A recent trend is a1so found in Engineering and Maintenance-with ovenepresentation of blacks within 
the Army and Marine Corps and underrepresentation within the Navy and Air Force. SAT scores for persons 
assigned to this area are above the overall mean in the Army and Marine Corps. 
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Table 35 
Percentage of New Officers With SAT Scores Above the 50th Percentile, 
by Occupational Area and Service, Fiscal 1975-85 
Marine Air All 
occupational Areaa Army Navy corps Force Services 
General Officers and Executives NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Tactical Operations 76.0 91.5 79.6 85.5 81.8 
Intelligence 79.7 92.5 88.0 78.0 81.9 
Engineering and Maintenance 70.7 93.1 76.7 88.2 85.9 
Scientists and Professionals 85.2 91.4 92.7 93.3 92.3 
Health Care 70.4 70.7 b 73.0 71.6 
Administrators 64.5 88.8 80.9 74.3 75.8 
Supply, Procurement and Allied 60.1 89.1 72.3 66.5 70.4 
Nonoccupationalc 74.8 91.1 81.2 87.2 85.0 
All Areasd 74.6 90.4 78.4 .83.5 81.8 
Source: Derive<J from data appearing in Dianne C. Brown, Janice H. Laurence, and Deborah B. Eitelberg, 
Demographics and Performance of Military Officers in Relation to Aptitude (Alexandria, VA; 
HumRRO, December 1988), draft. 
aFirst occupation on record for each officer. 
b-rhe Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support. 
crncludes patients, students, and others (such as those with duties unassigned, ROTC office~s waiting to be 
placed on active duty, and special assignment officers). 
drncludes persons who could not be identified by occupational area. 
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Occupational patterns are strongly influenced by personal choice, requirements 
that are unrelated to test scores, and by other factors (including legal restrictions for 
women). Occupational choices may also be affected by an individual's academic 
interests and college major. This particular relationship may offer a good explan-
ation for a large part of the observed differences in SAT scores across occupational 
areas---since SAT scores tend to vary, in considerable degree, by the test taker's 
actual or intended area of study in college.19 
Another noteworthy finding in the SAT scores of officers concerns the fact that 
the mean score for blacks (combined Verbal and Math) has never exceeded 844 
(achieved in fiscal 1981) over the 11-year period examined here. An SAT score of850 
is the lowest minimum SAT score typically required to enter a Service precommis-
sioning program. Yet, black representation in the entire officer corps is just slightly 
below the proportion of college graduates who are black (discussed in Section 2); 
and, using this measure of comparison, blacks are overrepresented among the 
Army's officers.20 This suggests that there is some flexibility in the way SAT 
requirements are being applied under the ·"whole person" approach to selecting 
future officers-and that the Services have been making some progress in recruiting 
minorities despite the initial impediment for many in having a relatively low SAT 
score. 
19see, for example, Table 38 in Section 5. 
20 Another standard for comparison is the proportion of blacks among high school seniors who took the 
SAT-over 8 percent in 1987. See Section 5 for more complete information on this population. 
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Section 5 
RECENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
William P. Snyder studied trends in officer recruiting since the end of the draft 
and concluded that officers who had joined the military during the 1970s were of 
"higher quality than those accessioned before Vietnam." Also, he found reason to 
expect "additional improvements" in officer quality (an "elusive concept") throughout 
the 1980s-with just a minor reservation: 
Steady growth in college enrollment and in the number of college grad-
uates undoubtedly facilitated officer recruitment in the seventies. During 
the eighties, however, this recruiting base is expected to decrease slightly. 
Attitudes toward military service among college-age Americans are at best 
fickle; other new and possibly unexpected problems may complicate officer 
recruiting in the future. Nevertheless, the adjustments of the 1970s pro-
vide a solid foundation from which to meet officer accession requirements 
for the remainder of this decade.1 
"Unexpected problems" have thus far not hurt officer recruiting-though the 
future will most assuredly be less rosy than the recent past.2 The possible problems 
for officer recruiting and retention may stem from the same economic issues and 
cutbacks in defense spending that are expected to affect the enlisted side. As Snyder 
correctly observes, officer recruiting and retention have been less sensitive to 
national economic conditions and unemployment levels3-but the relationship 
between officer service and economic factors is stronger in some areas than in 
others. This is nowhere more apparent than in the Navy's experience with middle-
grade pilots, who are leaving in large numbers each year to join the ranks of 
better-paying private companies. 4 It may also be stronger in certain officer 
1William P. Snyder, "Officer Recruitment for the All-Volunteer Force: Trends and Prospects," Armed 
Forces and Society 10 (Spring 1984): 410, 422. 
2See Mark J. Eitelberg, American Demographic Trends and National Security: Issues for the 21st Century, 
NPS-54-88-001 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, February 1988). 
3Snyder, "Officer Recruitment," p. 413. 
4Mark J. Eitelberg, "For Military Manpower, Tough Times Ahead," Wings of Gold (The Association of 
Naval Aviation), Summer 1988, pp. 27-29. Another serious retention problem is found among nuclear submarine 
officers. (Also see Eitelberg, American Demographic Trends.) 
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commissioning programs, such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and 
Officer Candidate School (OCS), which, combined, provided about 70 percent of all 
new officers annual,ly.5 
Indeed, ROTC scholarship programs may be something of a "scholarship draft" 
(or a form of what has been called "economic conscription") for needy students who 
have few opportunities to pay for a college education. Although the need for finan-
cial support to attend college "exists for most families even during economic good 
times,"6 it exists for even more families during economic bad times; and the nature 
of the economy, the costs of attending college, and the availability of student aid are 
bound to affect the numbers of young people applying for the military's scholarship 
programs from one year to the next. Moreover, as the supply of applicants expands 
or contracts, selection standards may be expected to change accordingly. These 
changing standards, in turn, may have a direct impact on the demographic charac-
teristics of persons selected for officer programs, especially if changes involve the 
raising or lowering of minimum scores on aptitude tests. 7 
The military academies are less vulnerable to shifting conditions in the econ-
omy because of tradition, their elite position in the commissioning hierarchy, and a 
solid reputation for excellence. The "baby bust" of the 1980s was expected to have 
some effect on academy applications, just as it was expected to create problems for 
colleges throughout the country. However, contrary to predictions, a growing num-
ber of 18-year-olds have been applying to colleges, along with increasing proportions 
of women, causing some chaos in college guidance offices: 
For weeks colleges have been reporting a dramatically increased number 
of applications and more from top students than they have seen in years. 
This is happening not only at the most selective institutions but also at 
less academically rigorous colleges down the line. 8 
5This is on a defense-wide basis. The proportion of officers commissioned through ROTC and OCS vary by 
Ser ,ice. OCS is included because it involves "a direct comparison [by the applicant] of Service opportunities with 
available job prospects elsewhere." (See Snyder, ""Officer Recruitment," p. 413.) 
6Ibid., p. 413. 
7 This suggests an interesting area for study: the demographic characteristics (including socioeconomic 
background) of ROTC scholarship and nonscholarship participants. 
8Deirdre Carmody, "The College Reject," New York Times, 18 May 1988. 
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The rise in total applications is attributed to increases in financial aid being 
offered by colleges as well as to generally more aggressive recruiting and marketing 
campaigns. The increase in highly qualified applicants, on the other hand, is consid-
ered to be a result of a "redistribution of the undergraduate population"-where 
"many 'A' students from lower-income families are applying to schools they would 
never have dreamed of applying to some years ago. "9 
The same phenomenon may be occurring at the military academies, now 
"deluged with far more applications than they used to receive": 
Applications for the academy classes of 1991, now being formed, are at 
record highs. At Colorado Springs [Air Force Academy], 16,670 men and 
women have applied, a 30 percent increase over the last year, for 1,400 
places. The Naval Academy has received 15,700 applications, a record for 
the fourth consecutive year, for about 1,300 places. At West Point, 14,700 
have applied for a class that will be smaller by 20 or 30 because fewer 
cadets in the upper classes are flunking out.IO 
A comparison between the academy classes of 1983 (entered in 1979) and 1991 
(entered in 1987) shows that, in addition to applications, there has been a modest 
increase in Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of new students as well as in the 
numbers of women and minorities (with the exception of women at West Point and 
minorities at the Air Force Academy). As seen in Table 36, for example, the SAT 
mean scores of new students at the Air Force Academy rose from 566 to 579 on the 
Verbal component and from 655 to 665 on the Math component between 1979 and 
1987.11 
lORichard Halloran, "Military Academies Are Becoming Even Tougher on Body and Mfod," New York 
Times, 22 May 1988. Halloran observes that the academies have also benefitted from "a rising interest in mili-
tary careers and a restored acceptance of military service after a long period of disfavor in the wake of the 
Vietnam War." It is important to note here that the definition of an "applicant" by the academies may be 
different from that used at other schools. Anyone who requests an application or admission materials from an 
academy is counted as an applicant. The number of applications received is much smaller. For example, at the 
Naval Academy about 6,000 completed applications (prescreened for minimum qualifications) are submitted to 
the admissions board during a typical year. About 2,500 candidates can be expected to pass the admissions 
board screen. 
11The SAT scores reported by the academies are averages in the cases of persons tested more than once. 
In a recent year at the Naval Academy, it was found that over half of all candidates applying for admission had 
taken the SAT more than once. 
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Table 36 
Academy Applicants and Enrollees: 
C.omparison Between Classes of 1983 and 1991 
Class of 1983 Class of 1991 
Applications and (Eal!ll:lld la l l!Zl!l (Eal111:lld la ll!l!Zl 
Characteristics of West Naval Air Force West Naval Air Force 
New Students Point Academy Academy Point Academy Academy 
Number of Applicants 9,180 11,771 11,159 14,493 15,565 12,711 
• Percentage Increase 57.9 32.2 13.9 
Applicants Admitted 
• Number 1,398 1,403 1,507 1,365 1,315 1,348 
• Percentage 15.2 11.9 13.5 9.4 8.4 10.6 
Number of Minorities 
Admitted* 158 192 237 205 214 202 
Number of Women 
Admitted 130 90 177 155 119 203 
SAT Mean Scores 
• Verbal 560 573 566 560 583 579 
• Math 630 660 655 640 664 665 
Source: Richard Halloran, "Milttary Academies are Becoming Even Tougher on Body and Mind," New York Times, 
22 May 1988. 
'Includes blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and other racial/ethnic minorities. 
This increase in selectivity, according to some, has resulted in the raising of 
performance standards at the academies-academically as well as · in terms of 
physical fitness, discipline, and leadership. Among the 2,000 or so colleges listed in 
the typical guidebooks for high school seniors, the academies are now placed among 
the nation's most competitive; and their programs have been called "among the most 
rigorous in the United States."12 In fact, "based on college-entrance-exam scores, the 
Service academies are just a cut below the Harvards, Stanfords and MITs; the Naval 
Academy ranks ninth, the Air Force Acac1emy 14th, and West Point 17th."13 And the 
academies need to be top-rate, it is said, "because the new American warriors have 
to be so much smarter than the generations that preceded them."14 
12Ibid. 
13"The Military's New Stars," Newsweek, 18 April 1988, p. 35. 
14Ibid. 
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THE NATIONAL POOL OF POTENTIAL OFFICERS 
Tables 37 through 38 give a general idea of the composition of the pool of 
potential officers by sex and raciaVethnic group. Table 37 shows the number and 
percentage distribution of high school seniors who took the SAT, by raciaVethnic 
group in 1987. About 73 percent of tested seniors were white, along with 8.1 percent 
blacks, 5.4 percent Asian Americans, 4.6 percent Hispanics, and lower percentages 
of other groups. Because the SAT is used in some areas of the country more than in 
others, these figures are not necessarily representative of all seniors applying (or 
thinking about applying) to college. Yet, it is interesting to observe that certain 
groups appear underrepresented (blacks and Hispanics, for example) while others, 
such as Asian-Americans, appear overrepresented. 
Table 37 
Number and Percentage Distribution of High School Seniors 
Who Took the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
by Racial/Ethnic Group, 1987 
Racial/Ethnic Group Number Percent 
American Indian 10,107 0.9 
Asian American 58,216 5.4 
Black 88,037 8.1 
Hispanic 49,913 4.6 
White 788,613 73.0 
Other 13,102 1.2 
Unknown 72,438 6.7 
Total 1,080,426 100.0 
Source: The College Board, 1987 Profile of SAT and Achievement Test Takers (New York: College Entrance 
Examination Board, 1987). 
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A more revealing portrait of tested seniors is presented in Table 38, which 
shows SAT median scores (in 1985) arranged by intended area of study and 
racial/ethnic group. Intentions obviously change over time, especially when you're 
18 or 19 years old and haven't even been through college orientation week yet. Still, 
it is probably safe to say that people expressing an interest in "military science" are 
thinking seriously about joining the military some day; and that people intending to 
study engineering are in a primary market for the military's recruiters. 
Persons interested in military science ranked fifth (out of eight intended areas 
of study) 9n the basis of their median Verbal score (435) and sixth on their median 
Math score (478). There are differences by racial/ethnic group-with military science 
coming out higher among certain groups and lower among others, but never first nor 
last. High school seniors interested in engineering, on the other hand, have the 
highest median score on the Math component; and this is true for all groups except 
Puerto Ricans, where the highest Math score is found among those interested in 
studying EnglisMiterature. 
The information on a student's intended area of study and his or her accompa-
nying SAT score is actually used by the Military Services in their officer recruiting 
programs. Since 1983, the Military's Joint Recruiting and Advertising Program 
(JRAP) has had access to certain information on persons who have taken the SAT 
and the American College Test (ACT). When the tests are administered, individuals 
are given an opportunity to (a) indicate their interest in receiving information on 
college scholarships or, specifically, on ROTC; and (b) approve that their names be 
shared with the providers of information. JRAP periodically receives. lists of test 
takers by different minimum scores, racial/ethnic group, and academic areas of 
interest. The Services may then contact JRAP and request a specific list; for 
instance, the Army might call and ask for a list of persons who scored at least 850 
(combined Verbal and Math) on the SAT and expressed an interest in engineering. 
ETS, in this case, would first approve the Army's request (to ensure that it conforms 
with the purpose of providing college scholarship information), and then sanction 
the distribution of the list by JRAP. The Army could then mail material on scholar-
ship opportunities and precommissioning programs to persons on the list.15 
15No personal information on test scores is shown on the Hst. 
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Table 38 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Median Scores of 
High School Seniors, by Racial/Ethnic Group and 
Intended Area of Study in College, 1985 
Intended Asian/ 
Area of American Pacific Mexican Puerto All Glll!U:15 
Study Indian American Black American Rican White Other Male Female Total 
English/Literature 
Verbal 495 468 385 467 473 538 520 549 521 530 
Math 430 519 353 450 438 509 482 534 488 503 
Health and Medical 
Verbal 388 432 336 381 358 443 386 460 416 430 
Math 413 535 360 422 376 487 442 535 448 473 
Engineering 
Verbal 409 392 368 396 401 469 385 449 472 453 
Math 494 573 430 491 378 570 511 555 561 556 
Computer Science 
Verbal 362 351 324 358 335 436 349 426 381 409 
Math 415 517 363 427 379 518 441 516 438 488 
Education 
Verbal 363 365 289 333 339 410 348 380 406 400 
Math 381 448 316 372 353 436 383 427 426 426 
Social Sciences 
Verbal 417 455 358 388 383 475 435 469 458 463 
Math 425 519 359 403 384 496 446 503. 460 480 
Military Science 
Verbal 395 372 322 393 365 449 385 436 420 435 
Math 425 454 344 428 415 496 415 482 446 478 
Undecided 
Verbal 385 412 336 381 367 447 404 433 444 439 
Math 433 514 359 426 399 494 441 497 478 486 
Source: Derived from data appearing in Leonard Ramist and Solomon Arbeiter, Profiles, College-Bound 
Seniors, 1985 (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1985). 
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In this way, the Military Services are able to aggressively pursue potential 
candidates for the officer corps and manage an effective affirmative action policy. 
They are also able to get timely inforniation on scholarship programs to students 
who have expressed an interest in military service. College admissions tests, oddly 
enough, are the activator for the lists and they are also used to determine the divid-
ing lines of who appears on a particular list and who doesn't. This is an unusual use 
of test results (at least in terms of original purpose), but another example of how the 
test itself can provide access to opportunity. 
Women and Minorities 
Over the past several years, there has been increasing discussion concerning 
the more extended use of women in combat-related positions. In 1987-88, Congress 
was seriously considering legislation that would open many combat-support jobs to 
women and set the stage for an eventual removal of the combat restriction.16 At the 
same time, two U.S. allies-Canada and Denmark-have already begun to assign 
women to inilitary jobs on an equal basis with men.17 
In March 1987, Congress ordered the General Accounting Office (GAO) to con-
duct a study of the Services' assignment policies-specifically, whether the ban on 
combat jobs for women might be having unintended effects on their chances for suc-
cess in a military career. In fact, GAO did find that women were being needlessly 
barred from non-combat jobs-without justification in federal law or in the mission 
requirements of the Services-and it recommended several actions that would ulti-
mately open 880,000 jobs to women.IS 
16The Senate bill, if passed, would open to women as many as 140,000 jobs in the Anny, 14,000 shipboard 
billets in the Navy, and about 4,000 Air Force jobs. See Rick Maze, "Dickenson Wants Expanded Roles for 
Women," Navy Times, 20 July 1987, p. 41; and Sharon B. Young, "Bill Proposes Expansion of Women's Role," 
Navy Times, 9 March 1987. Also see General Accounting Office, Women in the Military: Impact of Proposed 
Legislation to Open More Combat Support Positions and Units to Women, NSIAD-88-197BR (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, July 1988). 
17 In addition, both New Zealand and the Netherlands have certified women as combat pilots. A brief 
discussion of the Canadian experience (a four-year experiment) can be found in Eitelberg
1 
American 
Demographic Trends, pp. 46-47. The changes in the Danish military are reported in Julian Isherwood, "Den-
mark, in Historic First, Opens Combat Jobs to Women," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1988, p. 25. 
18see Grant Willis, "Non-combat Jobs Unfairly Denied Women, GAO Says," Army Times, 17 October 
1988, pp. 12-13. 
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There are already signs that opportunities for women in the military will conti-
nue to grow in the coming years.19 This growth may even become a necessity before 
the end of the next decade, as the Services struggle to keep the force "manned" in 
the face of a declining military-age population and an ever-tightening budget.20 
Manpower planners also expect to see an increasing emphasis placed on 
recruiting minorities, as the proportion of minorities in the younger population 
continues to expand. On the officer side, a lot will depend on changes that might 
occur in the composition of persons attending college or receiving a baccalaureate 
degree. Indeed, the Services measure their success in recruiting minorities for the 
officer corps on the basis of census statistics on college graduates. For example, as 
shown in Table 9 (Section 2), blacks currently make up about 6.3 percent of all 
persons with four or more years of college-level education. At present, this figure-
6.3 percent-represents the Navy's minimum goal for the proportion of blacks that 
it believes should be in the officer corps. What the standard will be for setting goals 
in the distant future is uncertain: the proportion of minority high school graduates 
attending college appears to be declining and minorities are less likely then whites 
to graduate from college with a technical major.21 
In fact, of all technical degrees conferred in a recent year, less than 4 percent 
went to blacks and about 2 percent went to Hispanics. This tends to make the 
recruiting of minority officers especially difficult, because the military's commis-
sioning programs emphasize "the importance of a technical background in being 
prepared to work with modern [military] systems."22 Moreover, as the years 
progress and "modern systems" become even more complex, there. will be an 
increasing need for officers skilled in technical disciplines. 
The Navy has already modified its officer selection system with this in mind. As 
previously noted (Section 3), the formula for selecting midshipmen at the Naval 
19"More Women Expected to Serve,"' Army Times, 17 October 1988, p. 2. 
20see Eitelberg, American Demographic Trends. 
21See J. H. Braddock II, R. L. Crain, Marylee C. Taylor, Shi-Chang Wu, Enhancing Productivity in Naval 
Aviation Training in a Market of Changing Demographics (Baltimore, MD: Center for Social Organization of 
Schools, Johns Hopkins University, March 1988), p. 2. 
22Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity in the Navy (Washington, D.C.: 
ChiefofNaval Operations, December 1988), p. 3-6. 
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Academy was recently changed to triple-weight scores on the SAT Math; and those 
who apply to the Navy's ROTC program now have their SAT results weighted so 
that the Math component accounts for 70 percent of the combined score. 
The Navy may revive a former policy "unique to Annapolis among the nation's 
three military academies" that requires as many as 80 percent of its graduates to 
earn a technical degree.23 By giving more weight to an applicant's SAT Math score, 
it is also felt that the selection system will bring in more students who have a 
greater interest in becoming engineering, math, or science majors-and enough 
students, perhaps, so there wouldn't be a need for quotas. As stated by the CNO 
Study Group on Equal Opportunity: 
Although the Naval Academy does not force midshipmen to major in 
engineering fields, it was the shift in emphasis on the Math component of 
the SAT to select candidates with increased engineering field interest. 
This policy differs from previous guidance, which required that technical 
and nontechnical majors be split on a 50/50 basis.24 
Yet, it is noteworthy that the differences between the SAT scores of some 
racial/ethnic minorities and whites are wider on the SAT Math than on the SAT 
Verbal; and though there is very little difference between the SAT Verbal scores of 
men and women (10 points higher for men in 1987), women tend to score much 
lower than men on the SAT Math (47 points in 1987).25 (Added to this is the fact 
that women and most minorities are less inclined to select technical majors in 
college.) A selection system that emphasizes SAT Math scores or technical interests 
and abilities will magnify the already-large differences that exist be_tween these 
groups. The Navy (and other Services) have an affirmative action plan that operates 
to discount these differences-so the prospects for attracting underrepresented 
groups may not be greatly diminished. But this trend will certainly not encourage 
increased participation by members of underrepresented groups. 
23Lisa Leff, "A Major Choice for Midshipmen," Wa,hington Post, 26 March 1989. 
24Department of Navy, CNO Study Group•s Report on Equal Opportunity, p. 3-17. 
25See Tables 28 and 30. There was a difference of96 points in 1987 between the scores of white and black 
high school seniors on the SAT Verbal. The difference between whites and blacks on the SAT Math was 112 
points that year. 
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As discussed in Section 2, the Navy has been the least successful of any Service 
in attracting blacks. This is not to say that the Navy hasn't tried to increase the 
participation of minorities in its officer corps-because it has expended a great deal 
of effort in minority recruitment, and both its civilian and uniformed leadership are 
continually striving to create conditions that will interest more minorities in Naval 
service. Table 39 presents the Navy's affirmative action goals and shortfalls by 
officer accession program during fiscal 1987-showing that some programs have 
been more successful than others; and that the shortfalls for blacks (at 25 percent 
overall) are greater than for other racial/ethnic minorities. 
It should be noted that the data presented in Table 39 do not include the Naval 
Academy or Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) programs-both of 
which continue to have a large surplus of applicants over available openings. The 
programs shown in Table 39 include 34 separate officer commissioning sources-13 
officer candidate school (OCS) programs, 9 student programs, 7 direct appointment 
programs, 4 aviation officer candidate school (AOCS) programs, and 1 special pro-
gram. During fiscal 1987, these 34 programs had an aggregate accession goal of 
4,134 officers. Eight of the 34 programs experienced shortfalls totalling 298 officers, 
or 7.2 percent of the original goal.26 
A recent study by Braddock et al. highlighted some problems in Naval aviation 
selection and training-and recommended several ways to improve the recruiting of 
minority aviators, enhance the predictive validity of selection devices, and reduce 
training attrition, especially for blacks and Hispanics.27 One particular finding of 
interest was that "there is neither overwhelming evidence that the AQT/FAR 
[Academic Qualification Test and Flight Aptitude Rating] is of great value nor 
strong evidence that it is worthless."28 (The AQT/FAR is discussed in Section 3.) In 
fact, the Navy's Aviation Selection Test Battery, which includes the AQT/FAR, is 
currently being revised. And a strong motivating force in developing the new battery 
26From Navy Recruiting Command, "U.S. Navy Officer Accession Program Goals and Shortfalls for Fiscal 
Year 1987," memorandum, 15 April 1988. 
27 See Braddock et al., Enhancing Productivity. 
28Ibid., p. 3. 
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Table 39 
Minority Officer Affirmative Action Goals and Shortfalls 
for New Officers in the Navy, by Commissioning Program 
and Racial/Ethnic Group, Fiscal 1987 
Commissioning Program Afflnnatlve 
and Action Goals l2hQ!:1fi!II 
Racial/Ethnic Groupa (Number) Number Percent 
Officer candidate School 
Black 110 47 42.7 
Hispanic 100 26 26.0 
Other 28 5 17.9 
Aviation Officer candidate School 
Black 92 39 42.4 
Hispanic 79 0 0.0 
Other 38 11 28.9 
Direct Appointment Programs 
Black 47 0 0.0 
Hispanic 40 22 55.0 
Other 18 4 22.2 
Student ,:>rogramsb 
Black 124 6 4.8 
Hispanic 62 0 0.0 
Other 41 0 0.0 
Source: Navy Recruiting Command, "U.S. Navy Officer Accession Program Goals and Shortfalls for Fiscal Year 
1987, • memorandum, 15 April 1988. 
alncludes both men and women. 
bBecause of the special nature of recruiting in these programs, some commissions may be granted in future years. 
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was to enhance the recruitment of effective Naval aviators (or at least those who do 
well in training), especially minorities, who have historically experienced higher 
rates of training attrition.29 
As previously mentioned (Section 3), in 1988 the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) convened a special group to study "equal opportunity in the Navy." Called "a 
remarkably candid self-assessment" by some, the final report describes the varied 
obstacles facing black officers "at virtually every level, from recruitment to 
evaluation of officers for promotion."30 Problems were found within all of the Navy's 
commissioning programs, and, despite significant gains, the report noted "a lack of 
positive image/awareness" in the black community (where "the Navy had a negative 
image or no image at all").31 The study group presented 75 recommendations to 
promote equal opportunity in the Navy, and all were subsequently accepted by the 
CNQ.32 
The report takes a positive step in allowing the Navy to recognize its own 
shortcomings and to deal with them in a direct way. That's the good news. The bad 
news, as some would say, is that the Navy·does not expect to achieve its current 
minority commissioning goals-between 6 and 7 percent for blacks and 4 percent for 
Hispanics-until the final year of the twentieth century.33 
29See Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity, "Aviation Affirmative 
Action Initiatives," pp. 3-F-1/2. As noted here, this particular subject-and the issue of low minority 
representation in aviation positions-has been treated in at least three in-house studies, including the "Navy 
Inspector General Minority Flight Training Attrition Report." 
30See Richard Halloran, "Wide Bias Against Minorities Found in Navy," New York Times, 20 December 
1988; and Molly Moore, "Navy Reports It Lags in Minority Opportunities," Washington Post, 4 January 1989, 
p.A3. 
31Department of Navy, CNO Study Group"s Report on Equal Opportunity, p. 3-7. The Navy's image 
problem may be so extensive that it even reaches within the walls of the Academy. Up to 16 percent of each 
Academy class is permitted to enter the Marine Corps. Yet, between 1980 and 1988, 26 percent of black 
midshipmen opted to join the Marine Corps over the Navy. (See Ibid., p. 3-15.) 
32See James Longo, "Study Finds Some Roadblocks for Minorities," Navy Times, 26 December 1988; and 
Holloran, 'Wide Bias." 
33Department of Navy, CNO Study Group"s Report on Equal Opportunity, p. 3-30. 
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SELECTED ROTC TRENDS 
ROTC has undergone significant changes over the past twenty years. In 1966, 
about 264,000 people were enrolled in ROTC; by 1970, enrollment had fallen to 
156,000, and by 1973, to no more than 75,000.34 The sharp decline in enrollments 
was partly a result of protest against the war in Vietnam and anti-military senti-
ment that continued well into the 1970s. Many ROTC units were removed from 
college campuses (including some of the nation's most prestigious institutions) dur-
ing this period. The decline in enrollments was also affected by a sharp reduction in 
the size of the force after the war. Today, there are approximately 500 ROTC units 
nationwide, with about 100,000 students enrolled in the various Service programs.35 
In a 1984 study, Snyder attempted to gauge the quality of the ROTC program 
by ranking the sponsoring colleges using Barron's rating system (ranging from 
"most competitive" to "noncompetitive" and "special"). He found "a distribution 
weighted toward quality schools"-with ROTC overrepresented at average colleges 
and underrepresented at below-average schools.36 In addition, he found that "Navy 
ROTC has the strongest foothold at above-average institutions, with over 40 percent 
of its units at such schools."37 
A similar attempt was made to measure the quality of the schools hosting 
ROTC programs by using the SAT scores of entering freshmen at these schools. 
With the aid of the ROTC College Handbook, weighted averages for each Service 
were computed by taking the sum of the average scores (average score per school 
times the enrollment of the school) and then dividing by the combined enrollment 
(undergraduate only) of all schools reporting SAT scores.38 Of all the schools listed 
in the ROTC College Handbook as hosting an ROTC unit, just under 56 percent 
reported SAT scores. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 40. 
34Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. xxix. 
35From Solomon Weiner, ROTC College Handbook (New York: ARCO, 1988), p. 7. 
36snyder, ""Officer Recruitment," pp. 419-420. 
37 Ibid., p. 420. 







Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores 
of Entering Freshmen at Colleges Hosting 
ROTC Programs, by Service, 1987 
Number of Number SAT Mean Scoresc 
COiieges Hosting Reporting SAT 
ROTC Programsa Mean Scoresb Verbal Math Combined 
312 174 490 545 1035 
70 48 509 574 1083 
154 92 485 544 1029 
Source: Data were calculated from information contained in Solomon Weiner, ROTC College Handbook: 1989-90 
(New York: ARCO Publishing, 1988). 
aThese numbers may not conform to official Service records, since some schools are part of consortia programs or 
have "cross-town" agreements with other nearby schools. For example, the Navy officially administers an ROTC 
program at 66 colleges-but another 40 or so colleges participate under agreement with a host or sponsoring 
institution. The Army and the Air Force also have a large number of "cross-town" schools. Cross-referencing host and 
non-host programs might show that all three Services cover most of the same schools (in varying degrees). 
bA number of colleges use the ACT as an academic basis for admission. Many use both the SAT and ACT. Most of 
those that use the ACT exclusively report average ACT scores. However, several schools do not report any 
admissions test scores as a matter of policy. · 
cweighted average computed by taking the sum of the average scores (average score per school multiplied by 
enrollment of school) and dividing by the combined enrollment (undergraduate) of all schools reporting scores. 
The SAT mean scores shown in Table 40 are above the average of all enrolled 
freshmen (estimated at 440 to 445 on the Verbal and at 486 to 491 on the Math), 
suggesting that ROTC units are still situated at "above-average" colleges. Generally, 
the advantage held by ROTC colleges is greater on the Math component than on the 
Verbal. In addition, similar to the findings of Snyder, the Navy is seen as having 
ROTC units at the more competitive schools (as well as the fewest colleges of the 
three Services).39 
39See Ted Bush, "Navy ROTC: Main Pipeline for New Officers," Navy Times; 13 June 1988. 
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The range of scores and corresponding competitiveness of schools hosting 
ROTC units is quite wide, as indicated in Table 41. For example, the Army has a 
unit at Princeton University, which reports a mean Verbal score of 643; it also has a 
unit at South Carolina State College, which has a mean Verbal score of 318. This 
raises an interesting point. All of the schools listed in Table 41 with the lowest SAT 
mean scores are predominantly or historically black colleges. The weighted average 
scores of all predominantly black colleges hosting ROTC programs are 371 on the 
Verbal component and 390 on the Math (for a combined mean score of 761). This 
suggests that, to some degree, the difference between the mean scores of the 
Services shown in Table 40 are influenced by the individual Service's strategy for 
recruiting black officers (a point also raised by Snyder);40 and the Army has ROTC 
units at many more predominantly black colleges than do the Navy and Air Force 
combined. 
THE ARMY'S ROTC PROGRAM 
According to Table 40, the Army also has ROTC programs at many more 
colleges than does either the Navy or the Air Force-in fact, around 312 (depending 
on how one counts extension centers and affiliated institutions), compared with 154 
for the Air Force and about 70 for the Navy.41 
Table 42 shows how the Army's ROTC enrollees are distributed by geographic 
region and sex. As seen, close to half of the enrollees (27,984) are from the South-
with the South Atlantic area alone providing more people than either the entire 
Northeast or North Central regions, and more than twice as many as the West. The 
percentage distribution of men and women is similar across geographic regions, with 
some variation in separate areas ·(ranging, for example, from a low of 18.4 percent 
for women in the West North Central area to a high of 25.3 percent for women in 
Puerto Rico/Guam. 
40snyder, "Officer Recruitment," p. 420. 
41These numbers may not conform to official Service records, since some schools are part of consortia 
programs or have "cross-town" agreements with other nearby schools. The Navy, for example, officially adminis-
ters an ROTC program at 66 colleges. However, another 40 or 50 colleges participate as affiliated institutions or 
extension centers of the host institution. The Air Force has over 600 colleges participating in its ROTC 







Range of Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Mean Scores . 
of Entering Freshmen at Colleges Hosting ROTC Programs, 
by Service, 1987 
SAT Mean scores• 
Highest Lowest Total 
Verbal Math Verbal Math Verbal Math 
643 740 318 345 490 545 
(Princeton) (Harvey (S. Carolina (Morgan 
Mudd) State) State) 
630 690 350 350 509 574 
(Rice) (Rice) (Florida) (Prarie) 
A&M) View) 
624 682 272 302 485 544 
(Duke) (Duke) (Alabama (Alabama 
State) State) 
Source: Derived from information contained in Solomon Weiner, ROTC College Handbook: 1989-90 (New York: 
ARCO Publishing, 1988). 
"Highest and lowest scores for colleges that report average SAT scores. A number of schools do not report SAT 
mean scores-incluaing several colleges wtth •noncompetttive· admissions standards as well as schools such as 
Massachusetts lnstttute of Technology (where all three Services have ROTC programs and four out of five freshmen 
in the last class achieved a score of 700 or above on the mathematics component of the SAT). 
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Table 42 
Number and Percentage Distribution of Army ROTC Enrollees, 
by Geographic Region and Sex, June 1988 
P!ilrQ!ilnt 
Geographic Region Number Male Female 
Northeast 
New England 3,261 77.6 22.4 
Middle Atlantic 7,052 77.3 22.7 
10,313 77.4 22.6 
South 
South Atlantic 13,950 77.0 23.0 
East South Central 8,073 75.5 24.5 
West South Central 5,961 80.2 19.8 
27,984 77.3 22.7 
North Central 
East North Central 7,568 79.2 20.8 
West North Central 5,731 81.6 18.4 
13,299 80.2 19.8 
West 
Mountain 3,314 80.8 19.2 
Pacific 3,031 78.5 21.5 
6,345 79.7 20.3 · 
Puerto Rico/Guam 1,457 74.7 25.3 
All Regions 59,398 78.1 21.9 


















Almost 18 percent of the Army's ROTC enrollees are black, along with 4.5 
Hispanics and 3.8 percent "other" racial/ethnic minorities (see Table 43). In the 
South, blacks account for close to one-third of the Army's ROTC students. Other 
racial/ethnic minorities are relatively more concentrated in the West-where 5.2 
percent of enrollees are Hispanic and 10.2 percent are in the "other" category 
(including Asian-Americans). 
As of June 1988, a total of 10,560 Army ROTC enrollees were black. Just over 
one-half of black ROTC enrollees (5,313 young men and women) were in "predom-
inantly black" units (or those in which 50 percent or more of the total ROTC 
enrollees are black). These units are listed in Table 44, along with the percentage 
distribution of enrollees by racial/ethnic group and sex. Overall, about 7 percent of 
the Army's ROTC units are defined as "predominantly black." Two of the units--
Norfolk State University and South Carolina State College-each had over 500 
enrollees, 98.8 percent of whom were black. 
At the same time, about 55 percent of Hispanic ROTC enrollees were located in 
"predominantly Hispanic" units (see Table 45). Two of these units-the University of 
Puerto Rico/Mayaguez and the University of Puerto Rico/Piedras-together 
accounted for close to half (49.1 percent) of all Hispanics enrolled in the Army's 
ROTC programs as of June 1988. 
Tables 44 and 45 clearly demonstrate the importance of "predominantly black" 
and "predominantly Hispanic" units in the Army's effort to recruit racial and ethnic 
minorities for its officer corps. The data presented in Section 2 of the monograph 
indicate that the Army has been quite successful in this respect over the past 
several years. Almost three out of four new officers in the Army are commissioned 
through ROTC programs. No other Service relies as heavily on ROTC commission-
ing sources. (The Air Force comes the closest, with 40 percent of its yearly commis-
sions coming through ROTC.) With a heavy emphasis on ROTC, and a relatively 
high level of minority participation in the Army's ROTC units (especially at 
predominantly black colleges in the South), the Army should be able to extend its 
success in achieving racial/ethnic diversity within its corps of officers. 
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Table43 
Percentage Distribution of Army ROTC Enrollees, 
by Geographic Region and Racial/Ethnic Group, June 1988 
Geographic Region White 
Bs11.is1ILE1!:!!li!. ~r2yg 
Black Hispanic Other Total 
Northeast 
New England 91.3 3.3 1.5 3.9 100.0 
Middle Atlantic 84.5 9.2 2.5 3.8 100.0 
86.7 7.3 2.2 3.8 100.0 
South 
South Atlantic 62.8 33.2 1.5 2.5 100.0 
East South Central 69.7 28.7 0.4 1.1 100.0 
West South Central 64.3 25.5 7.1 3.2 100.0 
65.1 30.3 2.4 2.2 100.0 
North Central 
East North Central 85.0 9.7 1.1 4.2 100.0 
West North Central 90.7 5.9 1.0 2.3 100.0 
87.5 8.1 1.1 3.4 100.0 
West 
Mountain 85.1 4.1 6.0 4.8 100.0 
Pacific 75.5 4.1 4.4 16.1 100.0 
80.5 4.1 5.2 10.2 100.0 
Puerto Rico/Guam 0.8 0.0 90.3 8.8 100.0 
All Regions 73.9 17.8 4.5 3.8 100.0 
Source: Department of the Army, August 1988. 
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Table 44 
Number and Percentage Distribution of Army ROTC Enrollees, 
in Predominantly Black Units by Location (School), 
Sex, and Racial/Ethnic Group, June 1988 
Malt Egma111 
Unit Location (School) Numbor White Black Hispanic Other Number White Black Hispanic Other 
Alabama A&M University 365 2.5 96.4 0.5 0.5 86 2.3 97.7 0.0 0.0 
Alcorn State University 108 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 114 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Chicago State College 31 48.4 38.7 9.7 3.2 14 14.3 85.7 0.0 0.0 
Delta State University 88 51.1 46.6 0.0 2.3 29 31.0 65.5 0.0 3.4 
Florida A&M University 148 54.1 44.6 0.0 1.4 38 26.3 73.7 0.0 0.0 
Fort Valley State College 148 0.7 99.3 0.0 0.0 116 0.9 99.1 0.0 0.0 
Hampton University 160 0.6 99.4 0.0 0.0 92 3.3 95.7 0.0 1.1 
Howard University 286 2.8 96.5 0.7 0.0 101 4.0 93.1 2.0 1.0 
Jackson State University 131 4.6 94.7 0.0 0.8 107 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Lincoln University 150 42.0 58.0 0.0 0.0 12 16.7 83.3 0.0 0.0 
Norfolk State University 293 2.4 97.3 0.0 0.3 227 1.8 98.2 0.0 0.0 
N. Carolina A&T State U. 208 29.8 67.8 1.0 1.4 61 18.0 82.0 0.0 0.0 
Northeast Louisiana University 182 48.9 49.5 0.5 1.1 89 44.9 55.1 0.0 0.0 
Prarie View A&M University 125 0.8 98.4 0.8 0.0 55 1.8 96.4 1.8 0.0 
St. Augustines College 101 3.0 96.0 1.0 0.0 78 2.6 96.2 0.0 1.3 
S. Carolina State College 344 0.3 99.7 0.0 0.0 181 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Southern Univ. and A&M College 144 0.7 99.3 0.0 0.0 74 0.0 98.6 0.0 1.4 
Tulane University 118 51.7 39.0 0.8 8.5 46 10.9 80.4 2.2 6.5 
Tuskegee University 163 1.8 98.2 0.0 0.0 60 1.7 96.7 0.0 1,.7 
U. of Arkansas at Pine Bluff 261 1.9 98.1 0.0 0.0 57 3.5 94.5 0.0 0.0 
University of South Carolina 248 30.6 67.7 0.4 1.2 114 8.8 91.2 0.0 0.0 
Virginia State University 216 5.6 94.0 0.0 0.5 133 1.5 98.5 0.0 0.0 
West Virginia State College 160 40.0 58.8 1.3 0.0 52 40.4 59.6 0.0 0.0 
TOTALS: 
Predominantly Black Units 4,178 14.7 84.3 0.4 0.6 1,936 6.8 92.5 0.2 0.5 
Other Units 42,237 82.5 8.4 4.9 4.2 11,047 75.3 15.1 5.5 4.1 
Black and All Other Units 46,415 76.4 15.3 4.5 3.8 12,983 65.0 26.6 4.7 3.6 
Source: Department of the Army, August 1988. 
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Table45 
Number and Percentage Distribution of Army ROTC Enrollees, 
in Predominantly Hispanic Units by Location (School), 
Sex, and Racial/Ethnic Group, June 1988 
Mall! Etmalg 
Unit Location (School) Number White Black Hispanic Otho, Number White Black 
Pan American University 83 13.3 0.0 86.7 0.0 35 8.6 2.9 
Texas A&M University 84 39.3 11.9 48.8 0.0 24 25.0 4.2 




Mayaquez 326 0.0 0.0 99.7 0.3 111 0.0 0.0 100.0 
University of Puerto Rico 
Piedras 674 0.1 0.0 99.7 0.1 208 0.0 0.5 99.5 
TOTALS: 
Predominantly Hispanic Units 1,167 3.9 0.9 95.1 0.2 378 2.4 0.8 96.8 
All Other Units 45,248 78.3 15.7 2.1 3.9 12,605 66.9 27.4 2.0 
Hispanic and All Other Units 46.415 76.4 15.3 4.5 3.8 12,983 65.0 26.6 4.7 











OPPORTUNITIES GAINED AND OPPORTUNITIES LOST: 
SOME BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF MILITARY SERVICE 
It has been said that today's career officers are "more intelligent, well-educated, 
effective, experienced, honest, and loyal" than those of any other major military 
power in history.1 According to a recent cover story in U.S. News & World Report, 
titled "The Military's New Stars: Smarter and Tougher," this assessment is shared 
by "military historians, academic sociologists, and retired brass themselves." "In 
contrast to the dispirited, drug-ravaged, do-your-own thing armed services of the 
'70s and early '80s," the authors write, "the U.S. military has been transformed into 
a fighting force ofgung-ho attitude, spitshined discipline, and ten-hut morale."2 
Young men and women who decide to become commissioned in the modern 
military, informs an ROTC handbook, "are guaranteed a diversified professional 
career interwoven with adventure and travel plus a variety of assignments geared to 
challenge and develop individual skills and expertise."3 The handbook goes on to list 
the "many advantages" and "major disadvantages" of a military career-"a 
combination of privileges, benefits, opportunities and responsibilities rarely offered 
in other career fields."4 On the positive side, the handbook presents fourteen items: 
1. Responsibility and an opportunity to exercise leadership. 
2. Opportunity for advanced education. 
3. Excellent pay. 
4. Opportunity for extensive travel. 
5. Opportunity to gain personnel and management experience. 
6. Unmatched job and financial security. 
7. Low-cost life insurance. 
8. Free medical and dental care. 
1"The Military'• New Stars," U.S. News & World Report, 12 April 1988, p. 33. 
2Ihid. 
3Solomon Weiner, ROTC College Handbook (New York: ARCO, 1988), p. 1. Also, Solomon Weiner, Officer 
Candidate Tests (New York: ARCO, 1985), p. 1. 
4Weiner, ROTC, p. 1. 
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9. Government-paid moving expenses when changing duty stations. 
10. Generous annual leave with pay. 
11. Shopping privileges at military commissaries and exchanges 
[at reduced prices]. 
12. Periodic promotions based on ability. 
13. Membership privileges at officer's clubs. 
14. Outstanding retirement benefits.5 
At the opposite end of the scale, young readers are provided with five main 
drawbacks of membership in the military's officer corps: 
1. Frequent family moves. 
2. Separation from family when on certain assignments. 
3. Slightly greater hazard than in some other occupations. 
4. Working hours not always constant. 
5. Desired job or duty assignment not always available.6 
It is interesting that the advantages of service in the military are described 
here as "many," while the disadvantages are limited to those few that are considered 
"major." This is perhaps still typical of the public's view of "officership." These are 
people, so it goes, who get well paid to live out their childhood fantasies, playing 
with expensive weapons, ships, and jets, and ordering enlisted lackeys to do their 
dirty work, all the while planning to retire at the age of forty-five on a fat 
government pension. As every Army drill sergeant knows quite well, whenever a 
raw recruit calls you "Sir," you roar: "Give me forty push-ups, trainee! I'm no officer. 
I work for a living." Or, take the popular Bill Mauldin cartoon from World War II, 
where two officers are looking out over a beautiful valley and one says to the other: 
"Nice view. Is there one for the enlisted men?" 
This study is based on the premise that testing is an important gateway to the 
profession of arms. It is therefore appropriate to take a closer look at the opportuni-
ties afforded by service in that profession, including those both gained and lost. 
Service in the U.S. military can be demanding and highly rewarding. It's not for 




THE PUBLIC'S IMAGE 
In 1800, James Hayes writes, officers were described as "swaggerers, depen-
dents, decayed gentlemen, and others fit for nothing else."7 By the beginning of the 
Civil War, it was said that "to be an officer of the Regular Army was ... to be an idle 
gentleman, well paid for doing nothing, scarcely worthy of respect, and assuredly 
not of esteem. "8 
Samuel Huntington has observed that "changes in the fictional portrayal of any 
social type usually reflect and help shape more general changes in public atti-
tudes"-finding the distinct appearance of"a more appreciative interpretation of the 
military in popular fiction" toward the end of the post-World War II decade. Hunt-
ington traces the changes in the treatment of military characters from Mailer's The 
Naked and the Dead (1948) to Jones' From Here to Eternity (with its "sensitivity to 
the beauty, appeal, and meaning of the military life, its rewards and richness") and 
Wouk's The Caine Mutiny, both published in 1951.9 
However, what Huntington thought might be the beginning of a trend with a 
more favorable picture of the military profession turned out to be just a temporary 
aberration in the prevailing stereotype. C. Robert Kemble, in The Image of the Army 
Officer in America, provides a more accurate appraisal of-the military men. of 
fiction-finding them a ready and willing subject for extreme characterizations: 
When not being ignored, career soldiers have been subject to the extremes 
of hero worship and abuse. For the writer seeking a champion for the 
destined nation, a foil to the American Adam, a guardian of our borders, a 
slaughterer of the noble savage, a repository of decorum and honor, a 
terror to the laboring masses, or whatever, the officer corps has somehow 
conveniently filled any or all roles."10 
7 James H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study 
with Parallels from Industry, R-2276-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, August 1978), p. 3. 
8From Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relatwns (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1959), p. 212. 
9lbid., pp. 461-463. 
10c. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 
pp. 203-204. 
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Popular images of the officer are also reflected and shaped to some extent 
through the performing arts, especially movies of the time. The movies of the past 
25 years are espe~ially interesting in their messages and range of difference, 
reflecting the Cold War, the nuclear threat, conspiracies real and imagined, the 
frustration of Vietnam, and the recent revival of patriotism. The celluloid portrait of 
the American military officer has been painted in many colors: from the megaloma-
niacs, fanatics, and fools of Dr. Strangelove (1964) and the seditious schemers of 
Seven Days in May (1964)-to the surrealistic madmen, eccentrics, and warrior-
bureaucrats of Catch 22 (1970), M*A*S*H (1970), and Apocalypse Now (1979)-to 
the courageous, fun-loving, dashing, and determined stars of An Officer and a 
Gentleman (1982), The Right Stuff (1983), and Top Gun (1986). Although the 
portrayals of officers in movies over the past two or three decades have been quite 
diverse, they are often bound by a shared theme-namely, that the modern-day 
warrior, especially the careerist, is a member of an unusual species, a largely 
unknown creation that is far removed from the common man. 
FROM IMAGE TO REALITY 
The fact is that military officers are unlike the common person in several 
respec is. As Newsweek pointed out a few years ago, the profession of arms is "like no 
other-a brotherhood with its own code and customs, its own politics and intrigue, 
its own heroes and misfits, and its own average Joes."11 Military people have their 
own communities, their own separate housing and protected installations, with their 
own, military-sponsored medical, recreation, shopping, and education facilities. 12 
They don't have just any regular job, but share an entire way of life that asks them 
to place the needs of their. organization above their own needs or those of their 
ll"The New Warriors," Newsweek, 9 July 1984, p. 32. 
12 Approximately 46 percent of enlistees stationed in the U.S. with dependents were living in government-
owned or base housing in 1985. Among those stationed overseas, about 64 percent were living in government or 
base housing. At the same time, 30 percent of officers with dependents in the U.S. and 63 percent of those 
stationed overseas were living in government or base housing. From Arthur J. Bonito, Report to Congress: A 
Discussion of Military Depencknts' Issues Based on the 1985 DoD Suruey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Force Management and Personnel], March 
1986), pp. 31, 33. 
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families. They work under a contract of unlimited liability with their employer, 
giving up certain rights and freedom of action (such as quitting) found in civilian 
employment.13 They have their own rules of conduct, methods of discipline, and 
system of justice; and, of course, they have rigid standards for personal appearance 
and dress that take individuality out of the individual. 
Moreover, the business of national defense means that these men and women 
must live with the constant-though usually remote-threat of being placed in 
harm's way. The main function of the military is, after all, successful armed combat 
and, as Huntington writes, " the direction, operation, and control of human organi-
zations whose primary function is the application ofviolence."14 Officers are "pro-
fessionals in violence."15 The management of violence is the peculiar skill of the 
officer-common to the activities of all armed forces and not shared with any civil-
ian groups.16 
A Department of Defense publication titled The Armed Forces Officer describes 
this "special role" that the military establishment and its members are asked to 
fulfill: 
The officer may well be called upon to give life, fortune and sacred honor 
in defense of the nation. He or she will have to go through training that 
will teach the art of destruction of life and property and will be given 
chances to win the right to wear badges and ribbons that attest to prowess 
in these arts or in positions of great responsibility. The officer literally 
may be given the power to determine who will live and who will die. He or 
she will be given great responsibility and authority in the name of your 
nation.17 
130,,neral Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues, NSIAD-86-11 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 10 January 1986), pp. 8-9. 
14Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11. 
15Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 
1971). "Professonals in Violence" is the title of Chapter 1. 
16Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11. 
17Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1988), pp. 66-67. 
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Military officers are public servants-a "mixture of heroic leaders, military 
managers, and technical specialists"18-who are often called upon to sacrifice their 
quality of life for service to the country." As Mady Segal points out, the military can 
be a very "greedy" institution in the sense that it places considerable demands upon 
its members for their commitments, loyalty, time, and energy.19 Among the many 
demands made by the military establishment are geographic mobility and separa-
tion from family. 
In the course of a military career, an officer may be required to pack up and 
move his or her household often. According to the Department of Defense, "the mili-
tary lifestyle is characterized by frequent moves to new assignment locations." 
Moving or "rotating" is a "necessary part of preparing and maintaining a strong 
military force," and occurs "for training and additional experience under different 
conditions, to replace personnel separating from the military, and to accept promo-
tions." "Rotation" is also used to even out the burden of service in locations that may 
be less desirable than others.20 
A survey of active duty personnel conducted in 1985 showed that 20 percent of 
all officers had moved 4 to 5 times, while 27 percent had between 6 and 9 moves, 
and another 18 percent had moved at least 10 times.21 For those with longer years 
of service, instances of relocation increased accordingly: about 57 percent of officers 
at the pay grade of 0-5 and above reported moving 10 or more times.22 And, though 
the families of military personnel tend to move less often than do the members 
themselves, almost one-third of all officers with more than 14 years of service had 
their families relocate with them at least 9 times.23 
18Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. xiii. 
19Mady Wechsler Segal, "The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions," Armed Forces and Society 
(Fall 1986): 9. 
20Defense Manpower Data Center, Description of Officers and Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Armed 
Forces: 1985 (Arlington, VA: DMDC, October 1986), p. 177. 
21 Ibid., p. 178. 
22lbid., p. 180 
23From Segal, ""The Military and the Family," p. 17. 
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Some officers and their families, as Segal notes, may view the opportunity to 
travel as a benefit. In most cases, however, relocation causes considerable disruption 
to everyone involved-from the children who must change schools and friends to the 
working spouses who are forced to keep changing jobs. In addition, each move can 
have a strong impact on the family's financial condition-from added moving 
expenses (not covered by government subsidy) to the adverse effects on a spouse's 
career (in terms of continuity and progression) to the problems associated with 
buying, selling, or renting residences.24 
Separations from family are also common and expected. Military schooling, 
field training exercises, and "unaccompanied tours" may call for the officer to be 
apart from his or her family from a few days to a year. Officers in the Navy are 
especially susceptible in this respect, with periodic assignments to sea duty lasting 
for months at a stretch. Indeed, according to the 1985 survey of military personnel, 
more than half of all Navy officers claimed to have spent at least one-third of their 
entire military career at sea.25 In addition, more than 30 percent of the Navy's 
officers reported being separated from their families for at least 5 months of the year 
just prior to the survey (compared with about 19 percent of all officers indicating a 
family separation of 5 or more months).26 
This may help to explain why more than half of all officers believed in 1985 
that their families would be better off if they left the military and took a civilian 
job.27 (And, interestingly, the professed attraction of a civilian job increases for 
officers as their pay grade advances and they get nearer to retirement.) At the same 
time, survey results show that there is a considerable proportion of officers who are 
"not satisfied" with the environment for their families (45 percent), the frequency of 
moving (58 percent), retirement benefits (33 percent), or their promotion opportuni-
ties (41 percent).28 
24Ibid., pp. 18-19. Also see, for example, Nancy J. White, "Stress and Transcience Color Lives of Military 
Marrieds," Atlanta Constitution, 10 December 1984, p. 1-E. 
25Defense Manpower Data Center, Description of Officers, p. 185. 
26Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
27Ibid., p. 221. 
28Ibid., pp. 226-233. The survey question asked respondents to indicate the extent of their satisfaction 
with these items on a five-point scale ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied."" The proportions shown 
here consist of all those who did not indicate that they were either ··very satisfied" or "satisfied," including those 
who were "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied." 
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All of this suggests that military service demands a relatively high degree of 
personal and family sacrifice. Clearly, it is not an easy life for many service mem-
bers. To make matters worse, as Janowitz notes in The Professional Soldier, "the 
military profession does not carry great prestige" in this country. "Significantly," he 
writes, "certain perceptions of the professional officer are not the same as percep-
tions of the military hero. In contrast to the public acclaim accorded individual mili-
tary heroes, officership remains a relatively low status profession. "29 Some segments 
of the civilian public see entry into the military profession as "an effort to avoid the 
competitive realities of civil society"-while others may assume that officers are 
mediocre at best, since "war is essentially destructive [and] the best minds are 
attracted to more positive endeavors."30 These attitudes may prevail to some extent 
from one generation to the next, but surveys have also shown that the relative 
prestige of the military profession has fluctuated considerably over the past two or 
three decades.31 Indeed, officers in today's active duty force can probably recall 
instances of being both spit upon and honored with parades, times when it felt good 
to wear a uniform in public and times when it felt a lot better to hide the suit away. 
In actuality, the public prestige accorded the military profession-like the 
image of soldiering represented in the arts-is firmly tied to the dominant 
sociopolitical milieu; and it will tend to vary from individual tc, individual, and 
across different parts of the country with a varying makeup, history, and stake in 
the military culture or business of defense. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are 
distinctive public attitudes toward members of the military; and, furthermore, that 
not all segments of society share the same level of respect or appreciation at all 
times for America's men and women in uniform. 
New officers are given a commission stating that the President of the United 
States possesses "special trust and confidence" in the "patriotism, valor, fidelity and 
abilities" of the individual. In return, the new officer pledges a commitment of "life, 
29Janowitz, The Professonal Soldier, pp. 3-4. This observation predates the Vietnam era by seveml years. 
30Ibid., p. 104. 
31Recent evidence of this can be found in surveys conducted by the Gallup organization between 1973 and 
1987. Although the military has ranked relatively high compared to other American institutions over the entire 
period, the confidence rating given the military has fluctuated by as many as 15 percentage points (based on the 
proportion of people expressing "a great deal'" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military). In 1986 and 1987, the 
military ranked number one among all institutions (up to 10), receiving a confidence rating of over 60 percent. 
See George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinum (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1973-1987). 
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fortune, and sacred honor."32 And from that day forward, the officer must accept the 
responsibility and role of representing the country in whatever he or she may do. 
The military uniform may well be called an American flag of a different color: this 
worker doesn't just stand for a company or even a specific service, but, in symbolic 
terms, the nation as a whole. Perhaps this is why the American people tend to hold 
the military officer to a comparatively high standard of conduct and behavior. As 
observed in The Armed Forces Officer: 
Many Americans, in just as many professions, have codes of behavior and 
professional standards. The nation expects more from the military officer: 
It expects a living portrayal of the highest standards of moral and ethical 
behavior. The expectation is neither fair nor unfair; it is a simple fact of 
the profession. The future of the services and the well-being of its people 
depend on the public perception and fact of the honor, virtue and trust-
worthiness of the officer corps. 33 
The American people expect a great deal from their public servants, whether 
they are civil service workers, elected or appointed officials, or members of the 
armed forces. There is also an expectation that public service jobs should be funded 
at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer. The history of military compensation 
policy bears testimony to the fact that there is no particular pattern or definable 
relationship between the public's standards for military performance and actual 
pay. In January 1989, military pay was raised by 4.1 percent. This pay hike, accord-
ing to Department of Labor statistics, marks the first time in seven years that the 
military's cost-of-living increase has exceeded that of the average civilian worker.34 
The net result, by some calculations, acts to reduce the "pay gap" between military 
and civilian employees from 11 percent to 10.4 percent.35 (Though it should be men-
tioned that the variable housing ailowance, which helps to offset living expenses, as 
well as bonuses, longevity increases, and other benefits of service are not figured 
into the military's side of the "pay gap" measure.) 
32Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer, p. 1. 
33Ibid., p. 3. 
34P. J. Budahn, "4.1 Percent Pay Raise Trims 'Pay Gap'-A Little," Army Times, 19 September 1988, p. 4. 
35Ibid. 
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The General Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted several studies over the 
past few years comparing military compensation with pay levels in the civilian 
sector. ComparisoI).s of this type are generally difficult to make because, as GAO 
points out, "the military compensation system is complex": 
It consists of more than 40 different pays and allowance and many 
supplemental benefits. All military personnel receive basic pay. Many 
receive additional pay, depending on their occupation or duty situation. 
Necessities such as housing, food, uniforms, and medical care are provided 
either directly or in the form of allowances. Some compensation elements 
are taxable, some are not; some are based on pay grade and time in 
service; some are based on whether the individual has dependents; and 
some--such as the tax advantage--are imputed. In addition, on-base 
consumer facilities for food, clothing, and other items are subsidized. And 
a large portion of military compensation is deferred; that is, retirement 
benefits are accrued and paid to persons leaving military service after 
completing 20 or more years of service. 36 
Many comparisons of pay between military and civilian workers use "regular 
military compensation" as the military's equivalent to a civilian salary. Regular 
military compensation includes the individual's basic pay (which is taxable), an 
allowance for quarters when government housing is not provided (not taxable), a 
subsistence allowance when meals are not provided (not taxable), as well as a vari-
able housing allowance and an overseas station housing allowance. (Some compar-
isons of military and civilian pay levels do not include the last two elements, which 
depend on duty location and assignment and were added to the statutory definition 
of regular military compensation in December 1980.)37 
In the mid-1980s, GAO attempted to compare military compensation with that 
of civilian workers, weighing regular military compensation (along with special and 
incentive pays and the estimated tax advantage gained by service personnel) 
against the pay levels of civilians as reported in the Current Population Survey 
(conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Employee benefits were also compared, and then added to cash compensation to 
arrive at a figure for "total compensation." The GAO analysts used an "age-earn-
ings" procedure, matching individual characteristics such as age, sex, and level of 
36General Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues, p. 9. 
37Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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education. The results of the comparison showed that male college graduates in the 
military made more money than their civilian peers for each age between 23 and 
44-earning, on average, 28 percent inore than civilian cash compensation, 82 
percent more than civilian benefits, and 42 percent more than total compensation 
received by civilians. Female college graduates were also higher than their civilian 
counterparts at each age level-earning 15 percent more than civilian cash compen-
sation, 57 percent more than civilian benefits, and 27 percent more than total civil-
ian compensation. 38 
G;'\O notes in its report that these findings are generally similar to results 
others have obtained using the "same age-earnings" procedures.39 At the same time, 
the GAO findings do not agree with the results of comparisons that have used an 
"occupational-matching" procedure (that is, matching the duties, responsibilities, 
and work performed by persons who may have different characteristics). Military-
civilian comparisons using matched jobs have generally found that military 
compensation is lower than civilian compensation. 40 For example, in an 
"occupational matching" study conducted by'GAO in 1985-86, it was seen that mili-
tary compensation exceeded civilian pay levels in just 3 of the 52 jobs that could be 
matched.41 GAO also observed, however, due to a variety of reasons-including 
limits on the ability to match a cross section of military jobs with those in the civil-
ian sector-this methodology remains flawed.42 Oddly enough, in the same study, 
GAO discounted the value of analysis using the "age-earnings" approach as well-
noting that the different mixes of jobs and work histories of individuals in the mili-
tary and civilian sectors may give a comparative advantage to the estimated levels 
of military compensation. 43 
38aeneral Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Comparisons with Civilian Compensation and 
Related Issues, NSIAD-86-131BR (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1986), pp. 17-18. 
39Ibid., p. 19. 
40see ibid., p. 21. 
41General Accounting Office, Military Compen8ation: Selected Occupational Comparisons with Civilian 
Compensation, NSIAD-86-113 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1986), pp. 10-11. This 
particular study, unlike others, examined enlisted occupations only. The difficulties encountered in making 
civilian-military comparisons and the methodology-not the results-are the important issues here. Questions 
concerning the approach are relevant to compensation studies of both officers and enlistees alike. 
43Ihid., p. 3. 
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In 1986, the Senate asked GAO to compare the earnings of military personnel 
with that of federal civil service workers. The results of the study (using the "age-
earnings" procedure) showed that male college graduates in the military earned an 
average of 26 percent more cash compensation than did civil service workers, 63 
percent more than civil service benefits, and 36 percent more in total compensation. 
Female college graduates were likewise earning more than their counterparts in the 
federal civilian workforce: 16 percent more in cash, 59 percent more in benefits, and 
27 percent more in total compensation.44 
At the same time, military persoll'Ilel can gain an advantage over civilian 
workers by establishing legal residence in a state that either does not have a 
personal income tax or does not tax military pay. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil 
Relief Act of 1940 (amended in 1982) allows military personnel to retain legal resi-
dence, once established, in a state other than the one in which they may actually be 
living. As of June 1986, 10 states had no personal income tax, while another 12 pro-
vided full exemptions for active duty military personnel and several more offered 
some sort of partial tax relief. 45 
In addition to the benefits listed at the beginning of this section, military per-
sonnel also have access to home loan assistance, an array of "morale, welfare, and 
recreational" facilities, payment of mortgage insurance premiums, noncontributory 
social security wage credits, preference in federal hiring, unlimited sick leave, 
"space available" travel, and certain burial benefits.46 The monetary value of these 
and other benefits of military service are difficult to calculate, so they are rarely 
included in statistical analyses of military compensation. 
44General Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Comparison with Federal Civil Service 
Compensation, NSIAD-88-67BR (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1987), pp. 13-14. 
This particular study was widely criticized by Defense Department officials when it was released. A Pentagon 
manpower official called it "incomplete and misleading, if not downright inaccurate" for failing to compare 
military and civil service wages with that in the private sector. Another critic pointed out that the basis for 
'comparison failed to take account of differences between military and civil service jobs as well as "tremendous 
differences in skills, longevity of service and seniority." Apparently, the Defense Department was not asked by 
GAO to comment on the report before its publication. See John Burlage," DoD: Wage Comparison Study 
'Misleading'," Navy Times, 14 December 1987. 
45Ibid., pp. 3, 15. Eight of the 12 states with military exemptions provided the tax break only to active 
duty personnel who were domiciled but not living in the state and earned their pay out of state. 
46lbid., p. 27. 
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The fact is, there seems to be more confusion than consensus over how the 
whole of military compensation should be measured. Equally confusing is how to 
relate the unique conditions of military service to pay. These conditions-sometimes 
called the "x-factor"-include both the special hardships, risks, or problems of 
service life as well as the various nonquantifiable advantages, such as travel, train-
ing, job security, and the like.47 
THE BENEFITS OF RETIREMENT 
A major component of the military's benefit package is the retirement program. 
The Department of Defense Actuary has determined that the government's cost for 
military retirement pay amounts to about 36 percent of basic military compensation. 
This is the percent of salary that would have to be set aside to fully fund an annuity 
to cover retirement costs. By comparison, Hay Associates has estimated that the 
employer's cost for private sector retirement programs averages about 20 percent of 
salary. Several years ago, the Office of Personnel Management placed the govern-
ment's share of the cost of civil service retirement at approximately 28 percent. 48 
Perhaps the best-known feature of the military's retirement system is the 20-
year option, which allows a careerist with at least 20 years of service to draw an 
immediate annuity upon retirement. There are three separate retirement plans for 
persons now serving in the military. Those who joined the military before September 
8, 1980 and serve for 20 years can receive one-half of their final basic pay from the 
day of discharge until death. (For each additional year of service, the annuity 
increases by 2.5 percent of basic pay, up to a maximum of 75 percent of final basic 
pay coming after 30 years of service.) Those who joined the military between 
September 8, 1980 and August 1, 1986 fall under the "high-three" plan-where the 
base for calculating the annuity is no longer final basic pay, but average basic pay 
for the three highest earning years after 20 years of service. Persons who joined 
after August 1, 1986-first becoming eligible for retirement in the year 2006-also 
47G<,neral Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues, pp. 53-56. 
48See General Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Comparisons with Civilian Compensation, p. 11; 
and General Accounting Office, Military Compensation: Comparison with Federal Ciuil Service Compensation, 
p. 30. The G<,neral Accounting Office estimated that the government's cOBt of civil service retirement was some-
what higher, at close to 30 percent. According to some, the figure for private-sector retirement may also be fairly 
conservative. 
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have a somewhat different plan. These retirees will get 40 percent of their "high-
three" salary and see a 3.5 percent increase for each additional year beyond 20 (up 
to a maximum of 75 percent of average basic pay). All retirees, except those who 
entered under the newest plan, also receive annual cost-of-living adjustments in 
accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Those who joined after 
August 1, 1986 receive cost-of-living increases that are one percent below the CPI 
(with a partial recovery of income when they reach age 62).49 
Most career military personnel retire after 20 or 21 years, including three-
quarters of enlisted careerists and one-half of officers. The typical 2O-year retired 
officer, according to McNeil et al., is 43 years old at the time of retirement and 
receives an annuity for the next 33 years.50 The Department of Defense has 
estimated that the lifetime value of the "final pay" plan for the typical officer 
currently amounts to around $595,000. The typical officer retiring under the "high-
three" plan will receive about $553,000, and those eligible under the newest plan 
can expect to see $445,000 over the course of their retirement.51 
On the surface, it sounds like a great deal, to say the least: after 20 years of 
service, you retire at the grade of, say, 0-5 (Lt. Colonel or Navy Commander) with a 
yearly stipend of over $22,000 (1988 equivalent) that you can count on for rest of 
your life; moreover, your time is now your own, so you can take a very long vacation, 
work part-time, go to school, start an entirely new career, or just sit in your garden 
smelling the roses. This may sound like a one-way ticket down easy street to many 
civilian workers who have no similar opportunity for early retirement; but the fact 
is, many military retirees have family and financial responsibilities that force them 
to maintain a pre-retirement standard of living. Indeed, at 43 years of age, a head-
of-household may find that his or her family's financial needs are greater than ever 
before-and a 5O-percent cut in pay poses a serious problem.52 "Employment," write 
49see John Burlage, "Date ofEn':ry Determines Retiree's Paycheck," Navy Times, 1 August 1988, p. 12. 
50see Ibid., p. 22. 
51m Burlage, "Date of Entry." 
52rn fact, since the annuity is one-half of an officer's basic pay-not including additional allowances or 
other compensation-a person retiring after 20 years will experience a pay cut of greater than 50 percent. 
137 
McNeil et al., "thus becomes a necessity for financial as well as for personal 
reasons." However, 
a forty-year-old retiree is a persona non grata in our culture. Usually the 
individual's self-esteem will not allow cessation from paid employment, 
but seeking employment at middle age often means being at a competitive 
disadvantage because of the years spent in the military service. Therefore, 
retirement takes an economic as well as a psychic toll. 53 
To fully understand the dynamics of military retirement, it helps to have a 
broader view of the effects of military service in general-career or short-term-on 
the veteran's subsequent earnings in the civilian sector. A fair amount of research 
has been devoted to this topic over the past two decades, thanks to the availability of 
longitudinal survey data. One would think, with all of the many investigations 
undertaken thus far, certain major conclusions would be apparent. Although there 
are specific trends in the findings of such studies, there is still no strong consensus 
on whether military service exercises a positive influence on the socioeconomic 
attainment of most veterans. 
The vast majority of studies have focused on former enlisted personnel or 
veterans as a whole. Within this context, a body of literature has accumulated 
around the theme that military service can act as a "bridging environment" for 
many minority men: in providing working experience, opportunities for education 
and skill training, favorable conditions for personal growth, and exposure to a 
bureaucracy (similar to what may be encountered in the civilian world), the military 
builds a "bridge" for the otherwise disadvantaged between their pre-service life and 
a successful post-service career.54 The bridging hypothesis is supported by a variety 
of research indicating that minority veterans hold a civilian earnings advantage 
over nonveterans who have similar demographic characteristics.55 There are also 
53Ibid., p. 23. This observation may reflect the economic times in which it was made. The country 
experienced an economic recession in the early 1980s-with the national unemployment rate at its highest level 
since 1940. 
54see Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1982), pp. 72-75. The Authors cite several articles on the topic. 
55For a list of studies, see R. J. Higgins, Specification of Veteran Status in Estimating Post-Service 
Civilian Earnings, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1984; Marion Coleman and 
Dudley L. Poston, Jr., The Impacts of Military Service: A Review of the Research Literature, Texas Population 
Research Center Papers, Series 2 (Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, 1980); Erdinc Soyak, Post-Service 
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several studies with inconclusive or contrary findings concerning the positive effects 
of military service for minorities.56 
At the same tiI!le, there are conflicting findings on the effects of military service 
for white veterans-though most of the studies suggest that service in the armed 
forces, particularly during the Vietnam era, has not benefited the civilian earnings 
of whites.57 It is difficult to generalize from the collection of studies in this area 
because the "effects of military service"--either positive or negative-are difficult to 
isolate or distinguish from other nonquantifiable factors that may influence civilian 
earnings (such as innate differences or, in the case of Vietnam veterans, the way in 
which men were selected and screened). In addition, the results of these studies are 
affected by the definitions and assumptions used, the data base or sample, the 
methodology, as well as the time frame of the analysis. Moreover, the findings may 
be influenced by the varying conditions or character of military service (including 
the military job, length or location of service, exposure to combat, and other 
elements). 
Studies of the effects of military service on the individual have usually empha-
sized economic factors (with the exception of research dealing specifically with the 
social, physical, and emotional problems of Vietnam veterans). Research involving 
military retirees has likewise focused largely on the post-service earnings of this 
group. 58 And, like the studies of veterans, there are several conflicting and 
inconclusive findings from which to choose. 
Earnings of Vietnam-Era Veterans, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,,June 1983; and 
John R. Wood, Hispanics and the Military: A Reference Data Base, USAREC-RM-86-1 (Ft. Sheridan, IL: U.S. 
Anny Recruiting Command, February 1986). 
56See Ibid. for listing and description. Also, Mark J. Eitelberg and John R. Wood, Hispanics and the 
Military, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, in progress; and Stephen Chamarette and George Thomas, 
Civilian Earnings of Vietnam Veterans, NPS 54-82-001 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 
1982). 
57Most authors who have examined the literature agree that the findings are "inconclusive" at best. An 
interesting item in the literature is Dudley L. Poston, Jr., Mady W. Segal, and ,"ohn S. Butler, The lnf7,uence of 
Military Service on the Civilian Earnings Patterns of Female Veterans: Evidence From the 1980 Census, Texas 
Population Research Center Papers, Series 5 (Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, 1983), which stands out 
because of its special focus on women. In this study, it was found that veterans were more likely than 
nonveterans to earn $800 or more per week (using employed women as the population base and controlling for 
race, age, and education). Also, unlike most studies of male veterans, the veteran advantage here was greater 
for white women than for nonwhite women. 
58see McNeil et al., Military Retirement, p. 96. 
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In 1960, the University of Michigan conducted a study of "The Military Retired 
System and Certain Related Subjects" for the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
This study found that "the typical retiree was at a decided disadvantage" in 
regaining his economic status.59 In fact, the combined earnings from retired pay and 
a civilian job for the average retiree was no greater than his earnings while on 
active duty, and frequently less. 
The Department of Defense attempted to collect information on the post-service 
earnings of military retirees through a 1966 survey and, again, through a similar 
survey administered in 1977. The results of the 1966 survey indicated that military 
retirees earned as much as 23 percent less than nonretirees (among college gradu-
ates). The 1977 survey showed that the wage and salary earnings of retired officers 
averaged about 25 percent below that of nonretired veterans. However, as Cooper 
notes, the difference in earnings found in the 1977 survey resulted largely from the 
part-time workers found in the retired group; and, when the sample groups were 
restricted to persons working full-time, year-round, retirees earned about the same 
amount of income as did nonretirees. 60 Cooper goes on to point out that the differ-
ences between the 1966 and 1977 survey results are due to differences in the distri-
bution of the survey respondents according to years retired-with a large portion of 
those on the former survey retired for five years or less. 61 
In 1978, the President's Commission on Military Compensation examined a 
data base that had been developed with information from the Internal Revenue 
Service. The analysis indicated that retired officers experienced a loss of income of 
about 49 percent, when compared with nonretired veterans. The researchers, recog-
nizing that retired officers may voluntarily work somewhat less than full time, 
attempted to create an "adjusted" measure of earnings that would yield a better 
comparison. The "adjusted" earnings for retired officers, in the new comparison, was 
still about 19 percent below that of the nonretired sample. 62 
59 As reported in ibid., pp. 23-24, 135. Most research on the subject looks exclusively at male veterans and 
civilians. 
60ruchard V. L. Cooper, Military Retirees' Post-Service Earnings and Employment, R-2493-MRAL (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, February 1981), pp. 4-5. 
61Ibid., p. 7. 
62Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
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Danzon conducted a study of the Civilian Earnings of Military Retirees using 
the 1970 Census. Although the 1970 Census did not allow identification of all 
retirees and also had other drawbacks, Danzon did find that the weekly wages of 
identified retirees were typically about 10 to 20 percent lower than the weekly 
wages of noncareer veterans (with variations by race and level of education). The 
author qualified her results, however, by pointing out that: (1) actual retiree earn-
ings may be less than "potential earnings" due to personal choices that would affect 
income (such as hours of work, type of work, location, and so on); and (2) there is no 
information on "expected earnings," which involves occupational choice and 
"counterfactual" outcomes (that is, what the civilian earnings of a retiree would 
have been had he not pursued a military career).63 
One of the most frequently cited works on the subject is a 1981 study by 
Cooper, which was based largely on data from the 1977 Department of Defense 
Retiree Survey. In this work, Cooper attempted to look at the earnings of longer-
term retirees, or those who had been able to "weather the transition" from military 
to civilian life. Cooper's analysis indicated that "military retirees fare much better in 
their post-service earnings and employment than had previously been thought."64 
The results, like those of other studies, suggest that military officers as a whole earn 
somewhat less-25 percent in this case-than comparably aged and edur:ated 
nonretired veterans. However, it was also found that the "earnings differential is 
almost entirely accounted for by the fact that the military retirees work less than 
their nonretired counterparts." Retirees who worked full-time, year-round, were 
apparently earning about as much or more than similarly employed, nonretired 
veterans. 65 
According to Cooper, military retirees tend to do a number of things that lower 
their post-service earnings, such as settling in lower cost-of-living areas (or in loca-
tions adjacent to a military base) and voluntarily taking jobs that have lower wages, 
in trade for more pleasant working conditions. Aside from recent retirees-who 
63Patricia M. Danzon, Civilian Earnings of Military Retirees, R-2353-MRAL (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
March 1980), pp. 36-37. 
64cooper, Military Retiree's Post-Service Earnings and Employment, p. v. 
65lbid. 
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typically go through a five-year period when they earn considerably less than their 
nonretired counterparts-Cooper finds that the combination of retired pay and 
civilian earnings places retired officers in "the upper 10 percent in terms of income 
for comparably aged and educated nonretired veterans."66 
More recent studies of military retirees suggest that Cooper's methodology may 
contain a flaw, biasing retiree earnings upward. Borjas and Welch, for example, set 
out to provide an "unambiguous answer to the simple question of how military 
retirees do in the civilian labor market," using the same data base employed by 
Cooper. Their analysis, contrary to that of Cooper, led to two basic findings: 
1. The earnings of military retirees are significantly lower than the earnings of 
comparable civilian workers upon entry into the civilian labor force, and 
2. The earnings profiles of these two groups converge during the second career 
so that by age 65 their earnings are roughly similar.67 
Borjas and Welch therefore conclude that "military retirees do not do as well as 
comparable civilian workers during their second careers." And, military retirees 
earn from 14 percent to 24 percent less than comparable civilian workers after leav-
ing the military.68 
Another recent approach to the subject takes the position that earnings should 
not be compared on the basis of national averages--as most researchers have done--
but, rather, by matching occupational categories. This approach was adopted by 
Dale in a 1983 study of the lifetime earnings of Army officers and their civilian 
counterparts. The results of Dale's research indicate that "military personnel can 
have substantially lower lifetime earnings than their civilian counterparts."69 
Indeed, in the case of the Infantry .Officer/Engineer, total earnings are from 17 per-
cent to 30 percent less at the time of retirement-increasing over the years, but 
remaining just slightly less than that of his civilian counterpart at death. (The 
66Ib·d . l ., p. Vl. 
67George J. Borjas and Finis Welch, "The Postservice Earnings of Military Retirees," in Army Manpower 
Economics, ed. Curtis L. Gilroy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 
69see Charles Dale, "Part I: Officer Comparisons" (p. 18), in Charles Dale and Lawrence G. Hill, Military 
and Civilian Lifetime Earnings Comparisons, TR 619 (Alexandria, V k Army Research Institute, February 
1984). 
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author also emphasizes that conservative assumptions were used in the analysis, 
and these tend to raise the estimated earnings of Army officers to an upper 
bound.)70 
Goldberg and Warner also used occupational categories to compare the effects 
of military experience and civilian experience on civilian earnings. The authors 
looked at a large cohort of individuals who left the military in 1971. The veteran 
population consisted of former enlistees with a full spectrum of career lengths, 
including those with 20 or more years of service. The interesting finding here was 
that, for each of nine major occupational categories, military experience increased 
potential civilian earnings. However, there were clear differences between the vari-
ous occupational categories in their impact on civilian earnings: four technically-
oriented military occupations with a relatively high degree of civilian 
"transferability" were judged as being about equal to civilian experience in terms of 
their effect on civilian earnings. At the same time, job categories such as 
Infantry/Combat and Service and Supply were found to have a lesser impact than 
civilian experience on civilian earnings. 71 
The effect of an officer's military job on his or her post-service employment is 
clearly important, yet barely researched. In his prologue to The Professional Soldier, 
Janowitz observes the existence ofa "disarticulation between the prestige structures 
of the military·and of civilian society"-where officers at the middle level who have 
technical skills are believed to have the highest degree of civilian employability, 
though less prestige and limited career opportunities within the military. In 
contrast, officers who work in combat arms and operations---those at the very "core 
of the military and its prestige hierarchy"-generally have fewer opportunities for 
careers in civilian life and greater difficulties in making the transition to a civilian 
job. 72 So, what gets you ahead in the military tends to hold you back in civilian 
working life, and vice versa. 
70Ibid., pp. 8, 18. 
71Matthew S. Goldberg and John T. Warner, "Military Experience, Civilian Experience, and the Earnings 
of Veterans," The Journal of Human Resources 22 (1987): 79-80. 
72Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. xxvi. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that "the 
transferability of military skills in general is less of a problem than it is usually thought to be," as McNeil et al. 
observe; and "retirees who were successful in the military establishment tended to be most successful in their 
civilian job-seeking efforts and second careers." See McNeil et al., Military Retirement, p. 89. 
143 
This civilian-military disconnection may hit retired officers from the Army and 
Marine Corps the hardest, since these Services have proportionately fewer 
"technically-oriented" jobs than does the Navy or the Air Force. Blacks and other 
minorities may also be affected, to the extent that proportionately more tend to be in 
nontechnical supply, maintenance, and administrative positions. In fact, there has 
been some recent discussion about the travails of retired black officers, especially 
those who were general officers, in finding civilian jobs commensurate with their 
experience and abilities. 73 
A CONCLUDING NOTE 
It is interesting to note that fewer than half of all retired officers claim to have 
left the military for the purpose of finding a second career. A greater proportion say 
they retired because of their failure to be promoted or because their prospects for 
promotion appeared dim.74 This suggests that, for many officers, the decision to 
leave the military does not come easily. Indeed, as McNeil et al. observe in Military 
Retirement, "the process of retirement has a profound impact upon the retiree, his 
family and kin, and society."75 Because military retirement is so different from 
retirement in other occupations, the rewards and problems of retired officers are 
often quite unusual. McNeil et al. review several social, economic, and mental 
health problems of retirees in their book, but examination of these issues goes 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
Nevertheless, the unusual aspects of military retirement serve to underscore a 
major point of this section: namely, that the profession of arms, as much as it has 
changed or has been "civilianized" since the end of the draft, is still unlike any other 
job society has to offer; and the peculiar dimensions of military service have worked 
to produce a set of related benefits and burdens for officers that are equally distinct. 
73Eduardo Lachica, "Black Officers Find Dearth of Job Opportunities," Wall Street Journal, photocopy, 
n.d.; and Charles C. Moskos, "Success Story: Blacks in the Army," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1986. 
74McNeil et al., Military Retirement, p. 81. 
75Ibid., p. 128. 
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The officer corps calls for members who are also special in their own way, 
understanding their role in America's defense and willing to accept both the positive 
and negative conse~uences of military service on their personal and professional life. 
The primary function of a good process for selecting officers is to identify people who 
are well-suited for both the military and a military job. In most civilian professions, 
fitting the individual to the job is usually sufficient, since the job essentially equates 
to the organization. The uniqueness of the military as an institution and the 





Over the past 20 years, the military's enlisted force has been examined in 
almost as many ways as one could possibly imagine. From Congress to the popular 
media, from the Department of Defense to its devoted think tanks, from the halls of 
academia to the cubicles of Service labs, from government oversight agencies to 
special interest groups throughout the country, researchers, scientists, legislators, 
writers, and administrators have anatomized and analyzed just about every twist 
and tum of the enlisted ranks. Indeed, the mounds of paper created by government 
reports, research publications, and computer printouts on this subject may be 
matched only by the Great Pyramid as a surviving wonder of the world. 
Then there's the officer corps. For all of the attention given the enlisted force 
since, say, the Selective Service reforms of the late 1960s, the officer corps has 
remained remarkably free from outside scrutiny. Here we have the managers, 
technical experts, and leaders of America's conventional forces, "professionals in 
violence," who hold the ultimate key to the success or failure of the nation's 
defense-and beyond the defense establishment itself, no one seems to be much 
concerned about who they are, how good they are, how they're picked, or how they're 
trained. 
The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force devoted one 
chapter of its final report to "Officer Procurement and Retention."1 When the 
Department of Defense put together a "two-year, in-depth study" of the Armed 
Services, officers showed up on about a dozen pages of the 400-page final report, 
mainly in a chapter dealing with "military medical services."2 Four years later, the 
President's Military Manpower Task Force could barely scrape up a reference to 
officers in its final report, under a subsection on the "black content of the force."3 
1The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President's Commission 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970). 
2Department of Defense, America's Volunteers (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 31 December 1978). 
3Mi!itary Manpower Task Force, A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer 
Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1982). 
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And, by the time the nation's leading experts on military manpower convened in late 
1983 to review the "all-volunteer force after a decade," the officer corps was nowhere 
to be found (except in the audience and on the dais, of course).4 
Members of Congress continue to keep a close eye on the military's enlisted 
force. There is never a lack of concern over issues such as "representativeness" and 
recruit quality, as evidenced from the number of annual and special reports 
requested by Congressional committees from one year to the next. Without fail, 
there is also a debate or two on the virtues of national service or a new draft each 
year. Mor~over, Congress has exhibited a special interest since 1980 in the tests and 
standards used for screening new recruits, manifested in its guidelines and 
restrictions on minimum allowable levels of recruit quality and in its commitment to 
provide certain enlistment incentives, such as educational benefits. 
On the officer side, Congress can boast of legislating the Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1981 (the officer personnel laws governing 
appointment, promotion, separation, and retirement-replacing the DOPMA of 1947 
and the Officer Grade Limitations Act of 1954). In addition, Congress has recently 
shown some concern over the number of officers on active duty and the Services' 
reasons for present enlistee-to-officer ratios. Ethics issues may receive notice from 
time to time, usually as a result of a particular incident; "grade creep" has been a 
continuing area of interest; joint-duty assignments and the career experiences of 
senior officers have been studied; and certain compensation issues-such as special 
pays for officers, bonuses for retaining people in critical occupations, and retire-
ment-have also been examined. Yet, aside from particular aspects of the military 
academies, members of Congress have been generally less attentive to matters of 
recruiting, selecting, training, promoting, and retaining highly-qualified officers. 
Why is the officer corps so neglected in contrast to the enlisted force? There is 
no simple answer. The reason may be partly related to numbers: the enlisted force is 
seven times as large as the officer corps, with much greater turnover. (Approxi-
mately 20,000 newly-commissioned officers enter the military each year, compared 
with 15 times as many enlisted recruits.) It has also been said that "politics" is to 
blame: the Armed Services are extremely protective of their separate policies 
4See William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, eds., The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade 
(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986). 
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concerning officers, and there is a sort of unwritten code that an organization's 
leadership hierarchy is its own business. At the same time, powerful political 
interests surround the officer corps, whereas enlistees are seen as comparatively 
helpless within both the military and society. 
Another reason for the apparent lack of outside interest in the officer corps may 
relate to the background and education of officers. There is evidence to suggest that 
today's officers come from a wide spectrum of socioeconomic backgrounds-
clustered, perhaps, somewhere in the middle class. Officers in the military of the 
1980s may even be slightly overrepresentative of the lower social and economic 
classes. Yet, the traditional image still sees an officer corps drawn largely from the 
nation's more privileged families, with upper-class ties and old-world incomes 
attached to a successful business or profession. The image no longer fits the reality, 
but it survives; and, somehow, having privileged men and women in leadership 
positions seems quite acceptable. 
In addition, virtually all of today's commissioned officers are college graduates, 
and over one-third hold advanced degrees. Knowing that our officers are college-
educated is likewise somehow comforting, even though a baccalaureate degree is not 
alone an absolute guarantee of intellectual competence. 5 Nonetheless, questions of 
"quality" rarely arise because of the education level of officers-although the content 
of that education may be periodically challenged. 6 
The officer corps, unlike the enlisted force, is also difficult to study from a 
qualitative angle because there are so many different precommissioning programs 
and admissions standards between the Services. On the enlisted side, one can look 
at personnel quality factors with the aid of a single measure of aptitude, the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test or AFQT. In the officer corps, any one of several aptitude 
tests may be used in conjunction with other standards to select officer candidates for 
the military-and these tests and standards vary between the Services and by 
program within each Service. Added to this is the understanding that measures of 
"quality" for many officers have less to do with technical expertise and job 
5See Jim Tice, "ROTC Cadets to be Tested on Basic Acaderrric Skills," Army Times, 12 March 1984, p. 2. 
6For example, there has been some disagreement over the years concerning the subjects that cadets 
should be studying at military academies. Some have argued for increased emphasis on nontechnical subjects in 
literature, history, and the arts-while others believe that cadets should concentrate almost exclusively on 
engineering, science, and technology. 
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proficiency than with leadership effectiveness; and years of research have still 
produced no agreement on which personal traits are most needed for one to become 
an effective leader. 7 
For whatever reason, it is clear that the Armed Services have received rela-
tively wide freedom to oversee their officers in their own way. And, generally, there 
is no evidence to indicate that they have been anything but successful. Some areas 
could be improved-yet, there are just as many or more elements of the military's 
officer programs that could be held up as a model for other organizations to follow. 
THE ROLE OF TESTING IN SELECTION 
There are at least a dozen different tests now being used to screen applicants 
for officer precommissioning programs. These tests vary in number and type 
because the programs in which they are used have different purposes: some are for 
college students, others for college graduates; and some are for "all-purpose" officers, 
while others may be for pilots or navigators. A test is only employed in the selection 
process if research has demonstrated that it is a valid predictor of performance. The 
SAT and ACT are used in screening high school graduates for the military's college 
programs because completion of college is an important first-step in becoming an 
officer. The military's other tests are designed mainly for college graduates, and 
they have been validated against one or more measures of officer performance, 
including successful completion oftraining.s 
The reliance placed on testing varies from program to program, based on the 
education level of the candidate. The academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC) scholarship programs are more concerned with academic aptitude tests 
because of the large investment made in the college education of student partici-
pants. Non-scholarship ROTC involves much less monetary investment in 
education-and new participants have already completed two years of college-so 
7 In fact, psychologists have practically abandoned their search for leadership traits, <-nd now seem to 
focus on leadership styles in various situations. However, time and again, intellectual ability surfaces as an 
important raw material for good leadership. 
8Criterion validation, used by the Services in developing tests and selection procedures, is less common in 
the civilian sector. Criterion validation is the preferred method for studying the relationship between a selection 
instrument and job or training performance. Many civilian employment tests are developed using content 
validation, which is acceptable under federal guidelines on employee selection. 
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less emphasis is placed on academic aptitude testing. Applicants to Officer 
Candidate School (OCS) programs are college graduates, most with degrees in 
technical majors, so they must demonstrate the ability to be a successful officer as 
opposed to a successful college student. The tests for OCS commonly contain a 
portion on general academic ability, but focus primarily on factors related to 
leadership potential or aptitude in a specific area. 
The American military is a pioneer in the field of aptitude testing, with a rich 
history dating back to World War I. The aptitude testing of officers is a more recent 
development that has its origins in aviation screening. In fact, as one writer 
observes, over the past several decades practically "every test in the psychological 
arsenal"-including paper-and-pencil cognitive tests, psychomotor and information 
processing tests, light-plane and job-sample tests, and personality, interest, and 
background information tests-have been evaluated for use in selecting aircrew 
officers. The main motive for giving so much attention to aviator selection, states 
Hunter, centers on money: in 1982, the average cost of a person failing in Air Force 
pilot training was estimated at about $50 thousand; with an annual flow of 2,000 
trainees and a failure rate of 20 percent, there is a net loss to the Air Force of $20 
million a year. It is easy to see, therefore, "why the Services have a keen interest 
aimed at improving pilot selection procedures"-since, "even a test with minimal 
predictive validity, especially if inexpensive to administer, can result in a significant 
saving in training funds."9 
This point-that even a minimum of predictive validity can make a selection 
test valuable to the military-is important and can be applied to officer testing in 
general. The costs involved in educating and training enough candidates to obtain at 
least 20,000 new officers each year are quite large; and every bit of information on 
how to select the best people can have a substantial effect on the amount of money 
that can be saved. And, if job performance is included in the equation, potential 
savings escalate. Considering just the price of equipment-such as $280 million per 
B-1 bomber (three of which have crashed in early use) or more than $500 million per 
9David R. Hunter, "Aviation Selection," in Military Personnel Measurement: Testing, Assignment, 
Evaluation, ed. Martin F. Wiskoff and Glenn M. Rampton (New York: Praeger Publishers, forthcoming). 
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B-2 Stealth-one begins to get a sense of the possible value, in dollars alone, that 
can be attached to small numbers of military officers.lo 
It is also impqrtant to keep in mind that testing is just one dimension of a 
larger selection process within each of the Services. In fact, all programs rely 
heavily on the "whole person" method for evaluating applicants. There are differ-
ences between programs in the amount of weight given test scores, but test scores 
alone do not decide who is admitted or rejected from participating. Waivers and 
special options may be available to individuals who do not achieve a minimum test 
score. And final decisions on applicants are based on a variety of factors-including 
high school or college grades, rank in graduating class, teacher or employer 
recommendations, athletic participation, extracurricular activities, hobbies, college 
major, interview results, physical condition, estimated leadership potential, 
employment record, and other background characteristics in addition to test scores. 
THE ROLE OF TESTING AFTER SELECTION 
According to a recent study, a military officer's first job hinges more on his or 
her major in college and personal preferences than on anything else. "In contrast to 
enlisted personnel," the authors write, "there are few jobs (notably pilots and 
navigators) which depend on aptitude test scores to help make (job] assignment 
decisions." 11 In fact, aptitude test scores are important in aviation training (when 
used by performance review boards), aviation assignment, and in a few isolated jobs; 
but, generally, once an officer candidate has been admitted to a program, aptitude 
test scores do not play a role in the course of that individual's career. 
Test scores of one kind or another may appear in an individual's personnel file, 
and these scores may be used by someone making a personnel decision early in the 
new officer's career. However, there are no formal procedures for doing this, and it is 
not considered common practice. Once in the military, job performance and official 
lOThe three crashes of the B-1 bomber were attributed to mechanical malfunction. Modern military 
equipment tends to be quite expensive, and selecting good officers to take responsibility for this equipment is 
important. At the same time, there is an inestimable value attached to the lives of service men and women for 
whom officers may also be responsible both in war and in peace. 
11Douglas B. Rosenthal and Patricia Colot, Initial Job Assignments of Military Officers (Alexandria, VA: 
HumRRO, September 1988, draft), pp. 40-41. 
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evaluations (fitness reports or supervisor ratings) take over. And whether an officer 
gets a choice assignment or a timely promotion may have more to do with "career 
paths" and "ticket punching" than with anything else. 
PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES 
A lot of factors are involved in military personnel decisions; but, as every 
career-minded officer knows, there is a preferred path to get ahead. You need to 
move around, put together a good resume, and get the right tickets punched along 
the way. In recent years, advanced education has become one of the very best 
"tickets to the stars": 
Like the rest of society, today's military officers view the specific skills and 
paper credentials provided by education as a first class ticket to advancement. 
Without a major war in which to judge combat ability, making it in the military 
depends not just on talent, but on a series of well-calculated career steps-
including classroom tours of sometimes dubious merit.12 
Each Service has its own road or "fast track" to success. In the Marine Corps, 
one officer describes it as the "four M's": medals, muscles, master's degrees, and 
marathons.13 In the Navy, as suggested by Tables 23 through 25 (Section 3), it pays 
to be an Academy graduate. In all Services, command positions and combat expe-
rience are important. In all Services, too, advanced studies and graduate degrees 
are "the currency of success."14 Today, over four out of five Air Force officers at the 
rank of major or above possess a graduate degree-as well as 75 percent of Army 
officers, 56 percent of Navy officers, and 40 percent of Marine Corps officers at this 
level.15 
12"Tickets to the Stars," Newsweek, 9 July 1984, p. 48. 
14"The Military's New Stars," Newsweek, 18 April 1988, p. 37. Air Force authorities observe that, as a 
result of the Officer Professional Development initiative, an officer's level of academic attainment and "ticket 
punching" can no longer be considered keys to success. See Department of Air Force, "Comments on Draft," 3 
March 1989. 
15These figures are derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. It should 
be noted that a substantial number of graduate degrees are awarded to officers enrolled in cooperative programs 
between Service schools and civilian universities. 
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The implication, once again, is that testing has little or nothing to do with a 
military officer's career. However, this is not exactly true. In fact, testing will 
probably be used in admissions screening at civilian universities and even at certain 
military schools.16 Furthermore, testing does have an indirect impact on the sum 
total of a person's time in uniform. There is an old saying that "you pay at the gate." 
For a young man or woman who was rejected from a military academy because of 
low SAT scores and was later commissioned through OCS or ROTC; for a candidate 
who couldn't achieve the minimum test score for flight school and settled on a 
second or.third choice; for these and others, testing not only affected their very first 
opportunity, but the full span of their military career and journey down a preferred 
path to success. In this case, the gate was the initial selection and assignment 
process, and the payment turned out to be an application package that included a 
comparatively low test score. 
OPPORTUNITIES AND THE SPECIAL CASE OF MINORITIES 
Low test scores may help to explain why minority officers tend to be clustered 
in support occupations such as administration and supply. As previously noted, test 
scores do not exercise a direct influence on job assignment-but they can operate to 
push an officer candidate in a certain direction. An officer's job, in turn, can affect 
his or her opportunities for promotion directly (some jobs are better than others for 
advancement and retention) and indirectly (some jobs are more desirable and some 
tend to have higher officer evaluation scores). 
In 1987, a retired Army major filed a $10 million civil rights class action suit 
against the federal government, claiming that minority officers are the victims of 
institutional discrimination. The plaintiffs case drew upon his own experiences in 
the Army and his contention that minorities are often given "unimpressive assign-
ments" where promotion opportunities are few and far between. This case and the 
publicity it has received have prompted the creation of a new special interest group, 
The Minority Officers Association, whose goal is to improve minority and female 
16The Naval Postgraduate School, for example, is conducting a three-year study to determine whether the 
Graduate Record Examination should be used in admissions screening. Students are currently selected on the 
basis of their professional military performance, college grades, and exposure to college-level courses in math 
and science. See Barbara T. Transki, The Graduate Record Examination (GRE) as a Predictor of Success at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1988. 
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officer recruiting, assignments, and promotion opportunities in all Services.17 In 
fact, both the Army and Navy have been reexamining their promotion systems to 
find out why minorities have lower promotion rates and to make any needed 
improvements.18 
The problem of minority promotion rates and the tendency for minorities and 
women to be placed in lower-status jobs are far from new. These are lingering issues 
of equal opportunity that have stalked the military for as long as anyone can 
remember. Nevertheless, the Armed Services still emerge from American history as 
trial blazers for minority rights. In relative terms, there is reason for praise: though 
change for the better has frequently been strained and slow, no other public or 
private institution in the country can match the great strides for racial fairness 
taken by the military since the 1950s. It has been observed, for example, that blacks 
currently "occupy more management positions in the military than in business, 
education, government, or any other significant sector of society. "19 
It can also be said that no major employer of young people in the country is 
more aware of the problems of fairness in testing than the Department of Defense 
and its components. Selection and assignment practices have been held up to con-
siderable public scrutiny over the last 30 years, largely because of two factors or 
conditions of modern military service. First, the nature of the military's mission, in 
war or peace, places it in full public view, exposed to the watchful eyes of the 
popular media, special interest groups, the legislature, and others; and the great 
turnover of personnel from one year to the next creates an avenue of contact with 
the civilian community. Second, the end of the draft helped to open .the doors of 
17Bernard J. Adelsberger, "Group Forms to Push Interests of Minority, Women Officers," Army Times, 21 
November 1988, p. 28. 
18Thls subject is discussed in Section 3. A very recent study looked at factors that might explain the 
different scores of officers on professional evaluations. In one of the Services, the strongest statistical relation-
ship was found for a racial/demographic variabl ........ black. The regression coefficient for this variable ranged 
from -.29 to -.41, depending on the source of commission and year of entry. Within the context of this study, 
differences were statistically significant as well as meaningful. In Mark J. Eitelberg, "Selected Results of 
Directed Research (1988)," Monterey, California, January 1989 (unpublished). A recent in-house study by the 
Navy also found that "minority fitness report grades are lower which result in lower selection rates for 
minorities on promotion/screening boards"; and "bias is believed to be a factor in the lower fitness reports." See 
Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity in the Navy (Washington, D.C.: Chief of 
Naval Operations, December 1988), p. 4-16. 
19Charles C. Moskos, Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University, cited in "The Military's New 
Stars," Newsweek, 18 April 1988, p. 39. 
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military service even wider for minorities and women; and, at the same time, 
concerns over the military's experience in Vietnam and the consequences of 
all-volunteer recruitment have led to a profusion of research on manpower policy 
and practice. 
Even with the greater interest in military matters, the officer corps has been 
able to keep a part of itself hidden behind the enlisted force (for reasons discussed at 
the beginning of this section). It still operates in a relatively private realm, quietly 
removed from the public eye. Indeed, the military's corps of officers could probably 
benefit from increased exposure and inquiry into its policies and practices. 
Several years ago, the Army was subjected to considerable criticism concerning 
its failure to recruit minority officers. The Army was singled out by many-even 
though minority officer representation was higher in the Army than in any other 
Service-because rapidly rising proportions of blacks were being drawn to its 
enlisted ranks but not to its officer corps. Over the past two decades, the Army's 
achievements in commissioning blacks can be called nothing less than spectacular. 
In 1970, blacks comprised around 3 percent of all Army officers. Ten years later, the 
figure had risen to 8 percent; and by 1988 to nearly 11 percent. Moreover, the 
proportion of blacks among newly-commissioned officers each year has been 
increasing-from 6 percent in 1981 to 13 percent in 1987-suggesting that the trend 
of rising minority participation will continue. 
To fully understand the Army's achievement, one needs to know more about 
the characteristics of the manpower pool from which the military recruits its 
officers. As of 1985, approximately 6 percent of all college graduates between the 
ages of 20 and 29 were black (including 5 percent of men and close to 8 percent of 
women in this age group). Of all college degrees conferred in technical subjects over 
the past few years, fewer than 4 percent have gone to blacks. At the same time, 
blacks comprised around 8 percent of all high school seniors who took the SAT 
during 1987; and the SAT mean score for blacks that year was 728 (combined Verbal 
and Math), compared with a mean of 936 for whites.20 Now, recall that a college 
degree, preferably in a technical major, is required for admission to practically all of 
the Army's precommissioning programs; and, furthermore, that an SAT score of at 
least 850 is usually needed.21 
20These figures are taken from Sections 2 , 4, and 5. 
21see Section 3. 
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The other Services have not been as successful in recruiting blacks for officer 
positions. Indeed, the Marine Corps came the closest to matching the national 
proportion of college graduates who are black, with blacks representing 5.8 percent 
of its newly-commissioned officers in 1987. The Navy had the lowest proportion-
just over 4 percent. The proportions of blacks among all officers in the other Services 
were also relatively low: 5.4 percent in the Air Force, 4.4 percent in the Marine 
Corps, and 3.4 percent in the Navy.22 
In 1971, Janowitz observed that all Services "have been increasingly sensitive 
to the need for recruiting and retaining officers from minority backgrounds."23 But 
he also pointed out that the civilian opportunities for college-educated minorities 
have expanded, "making the recruiting and retention of minority officers progress-
ively more difficult."24 Over the past several years, the military's competition from 
the private sector has intensified for all categories of manpower, especially for 
college-educated minorities. But, at the same time, recruiting programs have 
become more sophisticated and more effective in attracting new candidates for 
military service. 
Why, then, is the Army able to be so successful in recruiting minority officers, 
while the other Services are not? No one seems to have a straightforward answer. It 
certainly doesn't reflect energy or intentions: the Navy, with the lowest proportion of 
black officers, has been actively pursuing minorities for its officer programs; and 
the same can be said for the other Services. Some have suggested that it's a matter 
of personal preference, and the burdens of military service do not stack up well 
against the greater freedoms and opportunities of life in the corporate world. Some 
attribute recruiting difficulties to the military's "image problems" in the college-
bound minority community. Others have suggested that testing may be to blame, 
together with the fact that minorities (and women) show less interest in pursuing 
technical majors in college (a strongly-preferred credential in the selection process). 
There may be an answer here. Perhaps, it's no coincidence that the Navy, with the 
worst record of the Services in recruiting minorities, has its ROTC units situated at 
the most competitive schools and can boast in having officers with the highest SAT 
22see Section 2. 
23Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. xxix. 
24Ib.d .. l ., p. XXXVll. 
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scores.25 The Air Force is right behind the Navy in terms of its technical 
requirements. Anc\ the Marine Corps also has a large contingent of pilots in its 
officer corps (one-third of all officers), for which training is very expensive and 
admissions standards are quite selective. 
The Army's success can probably be linked, as well, to its vigorous advertising 
program. In 1987 the Navy spent less than $300 thousand on advertising for its 
officer recruiting effort. The Air Force spent $2. 7 million, the Marine Corps spent 
$3.6 million, and the Department of Defense allocated $1.7 million of its advertising 
budget to officer recruiting. During the same year, the Army's advertising 
expenditures for officer recruiting totaled almost $10 million-more than 30 times 
as much as the Navy.26 
Recruiting strategy is another important factor in accounting for differences 
between the Army and the other Services. The Army relies heavily-the most of all 
Services-on ROTC programs for obtaining its officers. It also operates the most 
extensive ROTC programs at predominantly black colleges and universities. The 
implication here is that the Army's model for success in recruiting minority officers 
should be studied more closely by the other Services-with an eye on making 
changes in the substance, if not the strate,;Y, of their various methods for locating, 
attracting, screening, and preparing minority candidates for commissioning.27 
25see Sections 4 and 5. 
26When the advertising costs ~re divided by the number of new officers commissioned during the same 
year, the Anny's dollar-per-officer ratio ($1,722) is still considerably greater than that for the Navy ($59) and the 
Air Force ($455), but lower than the ratio for the Marine Corps ($2,649). The dollar-per-officer ratios are 
somewhat inaccurate, since the target population for recruiting may not be commissioned for several years, and 
some officer attrition will occur; but they do show relative differences based on personnel requirements. Budget 
figures are from Department of Navy, CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity, p. 3-8. The Navy's low 
advertising budget may help to explain why this Service has "a negati,·e image or no image at all" in minority 
communities. (See Section 5.) 
27rn 1976, the Defense Manpower Commission studied recruitment of minorities for the officer corps and 
recommended that the Department of Defense develop "a policy to assist the Services in minority officer 
procurement." And, furthermore, that programs "be strengthened at institutions which historically have 
produced the bulk of minority officers, the predominantly minority colleges." See Defense Manpower 
Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, April 1976), pp. 242-243. 
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Long-term efforts are also needed to expand the pool of eligible candidates for 
officer programs. As long as the military requires a college degree (with emphasis on 
a technical major) for admission to the corps of officers, the recruiting and retention 
of minority officers will be relatively difficult. This suggests two or three options. 
The Services can attempt to relax their requirement for college-educated officer 
candidates-but education would still have to come at some point for most non-
degree holders in the increasingly high-tech force. The military can attempt to 
expand its own role in higher education-but this approach would probably find a 
wall of opposition in the civilian education community. Perhaps the most desirable 
solution lies not with the military but with the nation as a whole, which must 
provide a better environment and improved opportunities for disadvantaged 
minorities and other less-privileged young people to attend college. This is, after all, 
not just a military problem. It's a national issue, and efforts to cultivate the 
intellectual abilities of America's youth, rich and poor alike, would have only a 
positive result for both the military and society. 
LOOKING AHEAD 
Several subjects have been addressed in the monograph that merit further 
research. In n_o particular order, these include: the "quality" of the officer corps (as 
determined by various test scores in addition to the SAT) and its relationship to 
performance (including examination by occupation); the social and economic 
background of officers and the continuing "democratization" of the officer corps; 
possible steps (including the modification of standards and minimum test scores) to 
promote increased participation by minorities in the military's leadership ranks-as 
well as steps to increase participation by persons in the upper social strata, who 
may actually be the most underrepresented class in the officer corps; factors affect-
ing minority promotion rates and the continuing practice of assigning women and 
minorities to "unimpressive" occupations; the intergenerational effects of service in 
the officer corps; further study of the different strategies used by the Services for 
recruiting minority officers (including the distribution of ROTC units and the results 
of specialized programs for minority recruitment); and further research concerning 
the opportunities and opportunity costs-from the perspective of persons in different 
demographic categories- of being an officer in the modern military. 
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It has been almost 30 years now since Morris Janowitz wrote The Professional 
Soldier.28 It is a remarkable piece of work. It was the first of its kind and, so far, the 
last of its kind. Relatively little research has been devoted to the military's corps of 
officers-though it employs close to 300,000 individuals at any one time and holds a 
very important place in the lives of all citizens. A lot has changed since Janowitz 
produced his classic study, and a lot has remained the same. In 1960, Janowitz 
observed that "the military offers opportunities for social mobility to the dedicated 
and to the proficient, even if they are of lowly origin."29 This is one facet of military 
service that hasn't changed-but it will take continuing vigilance and adherence to 
the principles of equal opportunity, continuing efforts in behalf of those of "lowly 
origin," to make a good thing even better. 
28The original version was published in 1960. It appeared again in 1971 with a new prologue by the 
author. 
29 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 81. 
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APPENDIX A 
Scholastic. Aptitude Test (SAT) Scores 
of New Officers by Service 
! 
TABLE A-1 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Verbal: 
Mean Scores for New 0rtlcers, by Service, Fiscal 1975-85 
Fiscal Marine Air All 
YiaI 6nn:t N1:1v~ !:a02s Es:!ICt Services 
1975 503 530 482 511 512 
1976 494 5V 482 502 504 
1977 495 528 476 503 506 
1978 492 530 487 501 505 
1979 481 519 482 486 492 
1980 475 520 488 490 493 
1981 466 516 491 492 490 
1982 468 515 488 487 490 
1983 469 514 486 487 490 
1984 469 516 490 494 491 
1985 473 511 498 495 493 
1975-85 479 519 487 494 4% 
Source: Derived from tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test 
scores shown here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the 
Department of Defense Officer Cohort Files and SAT informal.ion maintained by the 
Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. SAT-Verbal scores for Lhe 
total population (including Lhose with direct commissions) over the 1975-85 period arc 
as follows: army, 486; navy. 522; marines, 486; air force, 498; and all services, 499. 
I G.o 
r· 
118 Eitelberg, Laurence, and Brown 
TABLE A-2 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Math: 
Mean Scores for New Officers, by Service, Fiscal 1975-85 
Fiscal Marine Air All 
Y~az: Arm):'. Nav):'. ~QW~ Eorce Sm:ic~ 
1975 550 588 520 577 567 
1976 535 586 522 563 556 
1977 534 584 520 565 557 
1978 532 589 528 561 556 
1979 524 583 526 541 544 
1980 520 582 540 544 546 
1981 513 583 541 558 549 
1982 510 583 534 557 549 
1983 509 583 529 555 547 
1984 508 589 538 562 549 
1985 519 581 543 560 553 
1975-85 522 584 531 557 552 
Source: Derived from tabulations provided by I.he Defense Manpower Data Center. Test 
scores shown here are from a data base created by computerized matching of the 
Department of Defense Officer Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the 
Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. SAT-Math scores for the 
total population (including lhose with direct commissions) over the 1975-85 period are 
as follows: army. 527; navy, 584; marines, 529; air force, 559; and all services, 552. 
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TABLE A-3 
Scholastic Aptltode Test (SAT) Combined Verbal and Math: 
Mean Scores ror :-ew OITlcers, by Service, Fiscal 1975-85 
FIS~ -Marine I Air All 
Xe!!t Armv· Nav)'. ~2m~ Eorce Sroices 
1975 1053 1118 1002 1088 1079 
1976 1029 1113 1004 1065 1060 
1977 1029 1112 996 1068 1063 
1978 1024 1119 1015 1062 1061 
1979 1005 1102 1008 1027 1036 
1980 995 1102 1028 1034 1039 
1981 979 1099 1032 1050 1039 
1982 977 1098 1022 1044 1039 
1983 978 1097 1015 1042 1037 
1984 977 1105 1028 1056 1040 
1985 992 1092 1041 1055 1046 
1975---85 1001 1103 1018 1051 1048 
Source: Derived from tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Test 
scores shown here arc from a data base created by computerized matching of the ,. 
Department of Defense Officer Cohort Files and SAT information maintained by the !. 
Educational Testing Service. 
Note: Excludes officers who received direct commissions. SAT combined scores for the 
total population (including those with direct commissions) over the 1975-85 period are 
as follows: army. 1013; navy. 1106; marines, 1015; air force, 1057; and all services, 
1051. 
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APPENDIX B 
Department or Defense Occupational Areas for Officers: 
Definitions and Major Subcategories 
I. General Officers and Executives - Includes all officers of General/Flag 
rank and all commanders, directors, and planners nO! classified elsewhere. 
A. General and Rag 
B. Executives (includes all Marine Corps full colonels) 
2. Tactical Operations - Includes pilots and crews and operations staff 
officers. 
A. Fixed-Wing Fighter and Bomber Pilots 
B. Other Fixed-Wing Pilots 
C. Helicopter Pilots 
D. Aircraft Crews 
E. Ground and Naval Arms 
F. Missiles 
G. Operations Staff -
3. Intelligence - Includes strategic, gencml. and communications intelligence 
officers, and counterintelligence officers. 
A. Intelligence, General 
B. Communications Intelligence 
C. Countcrintelligence 
4. Engineering and Maintenance- Includes design, development. production, 
and maintenance engineering officers. 
A. Construction and Utilities 
B. Elcctrical/Elcc1ronic 
C. Communications and Rad:ir 















Automotive a~d Allied 
IC. 3 
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M. Surveying and Mapping 
N. Other 
5. Scientists and Professionals - !~eludes physical, biological, and social 
scientists not involved with health care, as well as other professionals 
such as lawyers and chaplains. 
A. Physical Scientists 
B. Meteorologists 
C. Biological Scientists 
D. Social Scientists 





J. Mathematicians and Statisticians 
K. Educators and Instructors 
L. Research and Development Coordinators 
M. Community Activities Officers 
N. Scientists and Professionals 
6. Health Care - Includes physicians, dentists, nurses, veterinarians, 








G. V etcrinarians 
H. Biomedical Sciences 
I. Health Services Administration Officers 
7. Administrators - Includes general and specialized administration and 
management officers. 
A. Administrators, General 
B. Training Administrators 
C. Manpower and Personnel 
D. Comptrollers and Fiscal 
I r. "r 
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N. Morale and Welfare 
8. Supply, Procurement, and Allied - Includes officers in supply, 
procurement and production, transportation, food service, and related 
logistics activities not classified elsewhere. 
A. Logistics, General 
B. Supply 
C. Transportation 
D. Procurement and Production 
E. Food Service 
F. Exchange and Commissary 
G. Other 
9. Nonoccupational - Includes patients, students, trainees, and other officers 
who, for various reasons, are not occupationally qualified. 
A. Patients 
B. Students 
C. Others (Includes billet designators, officers new to their occupational 
field, and other nonoccupational officers and designations not included 
in the previous groups.) 
Source: Dcparunent of Defense, Occupational Conversion Manual (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Force Management and 
Personnel), January 1987), pp. xv-xvii. 

